Defending Dualism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.47.2964Abstract
It is the contention of this paper that the arguments in philosophy given both for and against dualism are less than decisive. In this paper I examine some of the standard arguments or objections to dualism, and try to show they are unconvincing. Although I do not think that any good arguments have been given for being a dualist, I shall not pursue that here. Instead, I will engage in a relatively unpopular enterprise of defending dualism against some common objections. I make no claim to cover all of the objections.
References
David M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, (Humanities Press, 1968. nd Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, 2 ed., (MIT Press, 1990}.
Tim Crane and D. H. Mellor, “There is No Question of Physicalism,” Mind, Vol. 99, (1990).
Rene Descartes, Philosophical Letters, translated by A. Kenny (Oxford University Press: Blackwell, 1970). Jaegwon Kim, “The Non-Eliminativist’s Troubles With Mental Causation,” in John Heil and Alfred Mele, eds., Mental Causation, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995).
Peter Smith and O. R. Jones, The Philosophy of Mind, (Cambridge University Press, N.Y.).
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