Impacts of Disengaged Board of Directors on Organizational Governance and Efficiency: An Analysis of a Major Weakness in the NGO Sector

Abstract

This article examines board disengagement as a significant governance challenge within the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector. Although NGOs may maintain formally constituted governing bodies, legal registration, reporting requirements, and organizational policies, these structures do not necessarily ensure active, informed, and accountable oversight. The article uses a comparative analysis of India and the United States to examine the relationship between formal governance requirements and substantive board practice. It first defines NGO governance and considers principles associated with good governance and effective boards. It then examines characteristics of weak and disengaged boards, individual director responsibilities, and selected legal and regulatory expectations in India and the United States. The comparison demonstrates that the two countries employ substantially different organizational and regulatory frameworks, yet both illustrate a common governance challenge: formal compliance does not by itself create an engaged governing body. Board composition, access to information, financial oversight, independence, executive accountability, and meaningful participation remain important to substantive governance. The article argues that strengthening NGO governance therefore requires attention not only to legal compliance but also to organizational practices that support informed participation, board development, accountability, and effective relationships between governing bodies and management.