When Social Capital Sustains Authoritarianism: A Comparative Analysis of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan

Abstract

Why do some authoritarian regimes remain politically durable despite leadership transitions, economic pressures, and sustained international criticism? Existing scholarship has generally explained authoritarian resilience through coercive institutions, executive dominance, elite management, patronage, and restrictions on political competition.[4,16,18,21,26,32] This article argues that these explanations understate the role of informal social relationships in reproducing political order. Drawing on theories of Social Capital and Social Liability, it compares Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to examine how family ties, patronage networks, community relationships, and state-regulated religious institutions simultaneously generate social support and constrain political behavior. These networks provide trust, reciprocity, information, and access to resources, but they also create obligations, reputational exposure, dependence, and pressures for conformity. The political consequences of social capital are therefore contingent upon the institutional environment in which social networks operate. Where formal state institutions align with informal systems of social organization, networks that might otherwise facilitate collective action may instead increase the social costs of dissent and reinforce political compliance. Although Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan differ in political openness, international integration, and the intensity of state regulation, both demonstrate how authoritarian authority may become embedded in everyday social relationships. By integrating political sociology, network theory, and comparative authoritarianism, the article offers a framework for explaining how social capital can contribute to authoritarian resilience.