Altruistic Acts Usually Emanate from ‘Natural Selective’ Motivations

Abstract

This short essay addresses the apparent paradox between the theory of natural selection, published in 1858, which raised selfishness as a major evolutionary factor, and the concept of altruism coined by Auguste Comte as concern for the well-being of others without expectation of reward or reciprocity. The author recalls Darwin's concern that the personal cost of altruistic action challenged his theory, alongside widespread examples of apparently altruistic behaviour among animals and humans, such as honeybees and ants sacrificing themselves for the colony, birds raising offspring that are not their own, and people risking their lives for strangers. Contrasting perspectives, including those of Nietzsche, Martin Luther King Jr. and Einstein, are noted, as is Amotz Zahavi's handicap principle, which treats altruistic acts as costly signals of quality, fitness and social status. The author argues that most examples of altruistic behaviour can be explained by genetically embedded instincts that support the survival of the species, such as the protective instinct of motherhood, or by concealed selfish objectives such as reputation, recognition or self-esteem. The essay concludes that Comte's ‘pure altruism’ should remain a theoretical, unproved idea, that such acts should be categorized as ‘apparent altruistic’ behaviour driven by selfish motivations that fit natural selection, and that the alleged paradox between natural selection and altruism seems to fade away.

Abstract prepared by the editorial office from the full text of the article; the authors did not supply one.