

The 2020s Global Crises: A Discussion of How International Institutions are Responding to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis and Climate Change Crisis

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ABSTRACT

Humanity in the early 2020s has been endangered by several global crises like poverty, geopolitical unrest, inflation, pandemics, deepening inequality, supply-chain disruptions, climate change, and the Russia-Ukraine War; just to mention a few. The need for a social construct through the intervention of international institutions and non-state actors than individual state actors as postulated by Constructivists is essential. The purpose of this study is to review the response of various international organizations (IMF, World Bank, EU, UN, OECD, and NATO) to the global crises plaguing our world; specifically, Russia-Ukraine and Climate Change. We review the varied responses to the global impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war and Climate Change through the lens of Social Constructivism, an International Relations Theory. This theory emphasizes the impact of our actions on the world we live in and hence, the need for 'rules' that can guide our actions as well as reward those who follow the rules and punish those who do not. It also postulates the importance of international organizations/non-state actors in inducing our behaviors by lobbying or coaxing rather than individual state actors. Borrowing from the tenets of this theory, it is evident that our world needs the collaborative action of states through international relations and not individual state responses to combat these current global crises. This collaborative strategy is evident via the various responses (sanctions, emotional, material, weaponry) from the different international institutions listed in this study to the Russia-Ukraine war. Moreso, there continue to be diverse progressive collaborative conferences and policy reviews by member states of each of the international institutions listed in this

study in response to the overwhelming impact of climate change. Even though this study focuses on international institutions' responses to just two of the global crises, there is an avenue for further review-research on the other crises.

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine War, Climate Change, Social Constructivism, IMF, World Bank, EU, UN, OECD, NATO

INTRODUCTION

In the 21st century, we stand at a precipice fraught with dangers that threaten the very fabric of the world as we know it. Existential threats that currently face humanity include (but are not limited to) climate change, social upheaval, economic fragility, geopolitical unrest, supply-chain issues, pandemic-level health threats, rising energy costs, inequality, poverty, and hunger. The effects are widespread and systemically affect every nation. And in the face of these threats, humanity is far from reaching a consensus.

Climate change is truly a global phenomenon in all senses of the phrase and its effects are felt in every aspect of our world and our lives. Increasingly incremental weather changes due to greenhouse gas emissions have led to hotter summers, colder winters, rising sea levels, more severe storms, longer wildfire seasons, changes to precipitation patterns, the melting of the arctic, and rising sea levels (NASA, 2023). These changes have caused 9.4% of all deaths globally between the years 2000 and 2019 (Millan, 2021) and are estimated to lead to an additional 250,000 deaths per year between 2030 and 2050 (WHO, 2021). A recent study from the National Bureau of Economic Research indicates that, if left unchecked, climate change will overtake infectious disease as a leading cause of death globally by 2100 (Worland, 2020). In addition to the human cost, the economic impact of these changes is estimated to cost the globe between 2-3 billion USD by 2030 (WHO, 2021). Green movements which are geared toward cleaner, more sustainable sources of energy and lifestyles, have sprouted up around the globe in recent decades to combat climate change before its effects are irreversible (UN Environment Programme, 2022).

The impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on the globe can not go unnoticed. Beginning in February 2022, the invasion of Ukraine has set off a domino effect that has been felt across the globe in the spheres of geopolitics, economics, migration, supply chain, and energy availability and costs to name a few (Neuman and Hurt, 2023). This conflict has caused the greatest humanitarian crisis on the European continent since WWII (Smit et al., 2022). A recent investigation conducted jointly by the Ukrainian government, the UN, the World Bank, and the European Commission estimates that the impact of the conflict has resulted in an estimated 9,655 civilian deaths, damage to 2 million homes, and destruction of infrastructure (Aljazeera, 2023). Current estimates for rebuilding Ukraine are at \$411 billion spanning the next ten years (Aljazeera, 2023). Spiraling out of Ukraine, the conflict has impacted global geopolitical dynamics, the global supply chain, food production, energy costs, and migration.

Disparate responses to global threats have created the opportunity for international organizations to influence national and multi-national agendas and thereby direct global action. The purpose of this paper is to review the international organizational response to two of these global crises: climate change and the Russia-Ukraine conflict to add to the limited scholarly research on international organizations' responses to global crises in the 2020s. This analysis

will be limited to the 2020s. Within this context, the organizational response will be examined and critically analyzed from the perspective of social constructivism which deviates from individual state responses to events but postulates a social collaborative response to events.

This article is divided into five sections. The first section is a brief introduction to the global crises that have plagued the world in the last few years (the 2020s), thus, the need to review what various international organizations are doing in response to these crises, specifically Russia, Ukraine war and the rapid devastating impact of Climate Change. Our second section focuses on a specific international relation theory: Social Constructivism whose tenets we consider relevant to our study since it focuses on international or social collaboration in response to global events than an individual-state response to global events. The third section focuses on the response to the Russia-Ukraine war by international organizations like the IMF, World Bank, EU, UN, OECD, and NATO. The fourth section equally focuses on responses to Climate Change by the IMF, World Bank, EU, UN, and OECD. Our concluding section links our theory (Social Constructivism) to our findings of the above mention international institutions' response to both crises.

THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

Although international relations were studied before 1919 under disciplines like law, philosophy, economics, politics, and diplomatic history- it was not a separate discipline. The end of the first World War saw the rise of the formal recognition of International Relations as a distinct discipline with its introduction at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. The new discipline had its separate Chair of International Relations and this made way for many other Chairs at institutions of higher education in Britain and the United States (Burchill et al., 2005). The growing interest in this discipline has led to the establishment of several theories of international relations like Realism, Liberalism, The English School, Marxism, Critical Theory, Feminism, and Social Constructivism, just to name a few (Burchill et al., 2005; Schieder & Spindler, 2014; Norwich University Online, 2017). For this article, we will focus on Social Constructivism.

Social Constructivism, commonly called Constructivism, propagates the significance of ideas, identity, and interaction of actors and the impact of their actions on the international stage. The term Constructivism, which has risen rapidly and is redesigning the discussions in international relations, was invented by Nicholas Greenwood Onuf in 1989 (Collins, 2016) and he is considered one of the fathers of Constructivism in international relations, although no single person has been credited for its advent (Peltonen, 2017). Onuf (2012) defines Constructivism as "a way of studying social relations—any kind of social relations." Even though Constructivism can be applied to any field of social inquiry, it was primarily applied to the discipline of international relations. The foundation of this theory is based on the ideology that mankind is a social being and that social relations are what makes us human (social relations make or construct who we are). However, what the world becomes is our making from the natural resources provided by nature. In other words, we make the world through our actions. Countries might think or say they are self-contained but there are limitations to that, but the collaboration between countries (international relations) constitutes a "world in its own right" (Onuf, 2012).

The introduction of Constructivism is regularly linked to the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War was an event not captured by other traditional international relations theories like Realism and Liberalism due to their focus on states as self-interested actors. Their focus on the state did not allow the exploitation of the “agency of individuals,” and it was the actions of individuals that ended the Cold War and not the states. Constructivism captures the role of these individuals as it suggests that, ‘the social world is our making.’ In other words, Social Constructivism sees the world as a social construction (McGlinchey et al., 2017). That is, individuals, make society, and society, in turn, makes individuals- it is a “two-way process,” - but, there is a third or middle factor called ‘rules’ or ‘social rules’ that links individuals and society. These rules are declarations that tell individuals what they should do. There are consequences when these rules are obeyed or disobeyed and all of the manners in which we deal or respond to rules are called practices (Onuf, 2012). Onuf (2012) asserts that rules can inform us about a society’s active participants -agents and “people are agents, but only to the extent that society, through its rules, makes it possible for us to participate in the many situations for which there are rules.” Sociological and philosophical theories have been said to have shaped many of the tenets of constructivism. As a theory that emerged post-Cold War, it postulates that ‘security’ can be ‘socially constructed,’ as it suggests that the world is rather social than completely material (Collins, 2016). In other words, Constructivism goes above material reality by adding the impact of ideas and beliefs on international politics (McGlinchey et al., 2017).

Social Constructivism has three ontological postulations (1) the importance of ideational structures over material structures, (2) the significance of identity (includes interests and cations), (3) structures and states are jointly constituted (the agency is influenced by the structures and thus, the agency influences the structures) (Collins, 2016; McGlinchey et al., 2017). The structure represents the international system that is made up of both material and ideational elements while the agency is simply the ability to act (McGlinchey et al., 2017). Norwich University Online (2017) summarizes Social Constructivism as a theory that (...) rests on the notion that rather than the outright pursuit of material interests, it is a nation’s belief systems—historical, cultural, and social—that explain its foreign policy efforts and behavior... Constructivists also argue that states are not the most important actors in international relations, but that international institutions and other non-state actors are valuable in influencing behavior through lobbying and acts of persuasion. For this reason, constructivism has become a popular and important theory in recent decades as non-state actors like international organizations.

The fact that Constructivism postulates the importance of international institutions and non-state actors (agents) as vital influencers of our actions over states is the reason, we chose this theory over the other theories of international relations. Onuf 2012 states that “Agents act in society to achieve goals. These goals reflect people’s needs and wish in light of their material circumstances. Every society has rules telling agents which goals are the appropriate ones for them to pursue.” Hence, the correlation between the social constructivism theory and our study, which is focused on how various international institutions respond to the global crisis affecting society.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS RESPONSE TO RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

Preceding the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, 2022, the relationship between both countries since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been unstable and conflicted (Mbah & Wasum 2022). President Zelensky's demand to join NATO as the immediate cause of the 2022 invasion by Russia led to several international responses, especially from Ukraine's Western allies who imposed huge financial sanctions on Russia (Aloisi & Daniel, 2022; Mbah & Wasum, 2022). The impact of this war has been devastating to not just Ukraine but to the international community which was already dealing with global supply chain shortages due to the Covid-19 pandemic. A recent study by Mbah, Hultquist, and Repp (2023) on the impact of the 2022 inflation in North America suggests that the Russia-Ukraine War was a significant contributor to the abnormal inflation rates in Canada, the USA, and Mexico due to the constraints it caused on the global supply of vital global commodities like crude oil and grain products. Given the magnitude of the global impact that the Russian-Ukraine war on the international scene, it is, therefore, significant to review the response that major international institutions like the IMF, World Bank, EU, UN, OECD, and NATO have had to this global crisis.

The IMF Response to Russia-Ukraine War

An IMF article at the earlier start of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine suggests that the war was a huge "blow" to the international economy, specifically affecting three major channels: (1) rise in prices for commodity goods like food and energy leading to high inflation; (2) negative impact on bordering country economies like supply chain/trade disruptions, remittances and a historic inflow of refugees; (3) increase in business uncertainty and fall in business poise leading to tight financial conditions and possible capital outflows from emerging economies (Kammer et al., 2022). Due to the forecasted global impact that the war was going to have on the global economy, the IMF began its response strategies as early as February 2022 when the war just began. On February 25, 2022, the IMF managing director, Kristal Georgieva, met with IMF's Executive Board to brief Executive Directors for a preliminary assessment of the crisis. During this meeting, the IMF resolved to work in close collaborations with the World Bank Group and other collaborators to support Ukraine as they explored every option to financially support Ukraine in addition to the already available 'Stand-By Arrangement' of an outstanding sum of US\$2.2 billion as well as demanding an IFM emergency finance (IMF, 2022a). On March 1, 2022, the IMF managing Director alongside the World Bank Group President, David Malpass, issued a statement that suggest that at the level of the World Bank, they were concocting a package of about \$3 billion to further support Ukraine (IMF, 2022b). March 9, 2022, under the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI), the IMF Executive Board approved a disbursement of US\$1.4 billion (SDR 1,005.9 million) to alleviate the economic impact of the Russia-Ukraine war (IMF, 2022c).

On March 17, 2022, the heads of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), and Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) joined the Managing Director of IMF and the World Bank Group president to lend their support to Ukraine. The EBRD approved a preliminary package of about EUR 2 billion as instant aid to those directly affected by the war. The EIB at this time was putting in place an emergency assistance package of EUR 2 billion and speeding up a future commitment of EUR 1.3 billion for infrastructural reconstruction. The CEB provided grants to Ukraine's bordering countries to alleviate the burden resulting from refugees' expenses (IMF, 2022d). On October 7, 2022, under the 'new food shock window of the Rapid Financing Instrument,' the IMF Executive Board

approved an expenditure of US\$1.3 billion (SDR 1,005.9 million) to help with Ukraine's pressing balance of payment requirements (IMF, 2022e). The IMF Executive Board approved a 4-month Program Monitoring with Board involvement (PMB) to aid Ukraine, "maintain stability and catalyze donor financing amid very large balance of payment needs and exceptionally high risks" on December 19, 2022 (IMF, 2022f). In a recent visit to Ukraine, IMF Managing Director said on February 21, 2023, reiterated the institution's unshaken stand with Ukraine as IMF strengthens its collaborations with the Ukrainian authorities via their Program Monitoring with Board involvement (PMB) (IMF, 2023).

The World Bank Group Response to Russia-Ukraine War

At the early start of the war in 2022, a press release from the World Bank Group suggests that the World Bank Board of Executive Directors on March 7, 2022, approved a "FREE Ukraine" emergency package of \$489 million as part of an ongoing financial mobilization by the agency totaling \$723 million (FREE Ukraine support package of \$489 million; Grant Financing from UK, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, and Iceland of \$134 million; Parallel Financing from Japan of \$100 million). The World Bank Group on April 12, 2022, released a proposed road map for their response to the global impact of the war in Ukraine. This report acknowledges the global impact that the war in Ukraine is having on the global economy leading to a "worldwide crisis with horrific human impacts and economic consequences" (World Bank Group, 2022). Hence, the need to protect low-income earners, strengthen the response capacity of less developed countries and reinstate the long-term development goal mindsets, especially in a world plagued by several global crises. This proposed roadmap by the WBG is divided into short-term, middle-term, and long-term responses. The short-term response was expected to run from April to June 2022 with a total commitment of about \$50 billion to extend assistance to Ukraine, countries receiving Ukrainian refugees, and global economies being affected by the spillover of the Russia-Ukraine war. As of April 2022, the WBG had committed \$680 million in fast-disbursing support, which had also pulled together \$265 million from its bilateral collaborators via the Ukraine Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). As a middle-term response to the global crisis, WBG proposed to explore with its Board of Executive Directors the possibility of initiating a 15-month WBG crisis response package of about \$170 billion for the period from April 2022 to June 2023 (World Bank Group, 2022a).

In a brief in June 2022, the World Bank Group (WBG) president, David Malpass, integrated the stand with Ukraine: "We are a long-standing partner of Ukraine and stand with its people at this critical moment." As of June 2022, WBG's commitment to Ukraine since it joined the institution in 1992 summed up to more than \$14 billion towards approximately 90 programs and projects (World Bank Group, 2022b). The World Bank together with the Ukrainian Government and the European Commission met in Brussels on September 9, 2022, to assess the current cost of Ukraine's reconstruction and recovery and it amounted to \$349 billion (€349 Billion) through the Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) (World Bank Group, 2022c). On August 8, 2022, under the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance in Ukraine (PEACE) Project, the WBG added \$4.5 billion to Ukraine, a grant provided by the US government (World Bank Group, 2022d). As of March 9, 2023, the World Bank had mobilized more than \$20.6 billion in financial aid to Ukraine since the war began in February 2022 and out of which more than \$18 billion has been disbursed (World Bank Group, 2023).

EU Response to Russia-Ukraine War

From the first day of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the European council addressed Russia saying that this attack was "grossly violating international law" and that the European Union would "impose massive and severe consequences on Russia for its action" (House of Commons Library, 2022). Like the other International Institutions, the EU stands unwaveringly with Ukraine as they "strongly condemn Russia's brutal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine" (European Council and Council of the European Union, 2023). The EU had agreed on the first set of sanctions to impose on Russia one day before (February 23, 2022) Russia invaded Ukraine (Bosse, 2022). The EU had provided 2.5 billion Euros in a financial package through the newly created European Peace Facility to support Ukraine's military capacity at the beginning of the war (Maurer et al., 2023). According to a 2023 report from the Congressional Research Service, the European Union (EU) as of February 6, 2023, has applied several policy responses to Russia's invasion of Ukraine since it started in 2022. The 27-member organization- the EU, has applied several sanctions on Russia in an attempt to weaken its economic capacity to finance the current invasion of Ukraine. The EU froze the assets of 171 companies including major banks and 1,386 individual Russian officials/elites as well as travel-imposed bans on these individuals (Archick, 2023).

The EU also constrained transactions with the Central Bank of Russia alongside constraining access to its reserve holdings. Some Russian state-owned military-industrial enterprises equally suffered from these sanctions. A total of 10 major Russian banks including its largest banking institution, Sberbank was disconnected from SWIFT, the major global international financial messaging system. The Russian export-import sector was also affected by these sanctions as some export products were banned like exports in aviation, maritime, drone engines, luxury goods, and technology. The importation of steel, spirits, seafood, and gold from Russia was also banned. About nine state-own Russian media outlets were suspended as well as the closure of EU roads, seaports, and air space to Russian transport operators. As of December 2022, the EU has prohibited the importation of Russian crude oil and petroleum products but for crude oil delivered via pipeline (Archick, 2023; European Council and Council of the European Union, 2023). As early as March 2022, the EU member had decided to reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas in an unofficial meeting in Versailles (Maurer et al., 2023). This recent publication by the Congressional Research Service also suggests that, apart from imposing sanctions on Russia, the EU via its European Peace Facility (EPF) has committed 3.6 billion Euros as of February 2023 in military aid to Ukraine as well as training sessions for the Ukrainian armed forces. The 27-membered institution and European financial organizations have together mobilized about 37.8 billion Euros as of February 2023 in humanitarian, financial, and emergency aid for Ukraine (Archick, 2023).

UN Response to Russia-Ukraine War

The United Nations describes Russia's invasion of Ukraine as "a violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine" and a contradiction to the values of the Charter of the UN. A day after Russia attacked Ukraine (February 25, 2022), Amin Awad of Sudan was appointed by the UN Secretary-General- Antonio Guterres to serve as the UN Crisis Coordinator for Ukraine in the capacity of Assistant Secretary-General (United Nations, 2023b). Investigations for "war crimes and crimes against humanity" were opened by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court four days after the invasion (February 28, 2022). As the attack intensified despite the UN calling on Russia to stop its military attacks in Ukraine, the UN

General Assembly via a two-thirds vote adopted a resolution “calling for Russia to be suspended from the Human Rights Council” on April 7, 2022 (United Nations, 2023b). On July 22, 2022, in Istanbul, Turkey, the UN signed an agreement to reinstate the export of Ukraine grains through the Black Sea which was described by the UN Secretary-General as, “a beacon of hope.” By a vote of 143 members in favor and five against, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding that countries should not recognize the four Ukraine regions claimed by Russia as it described it as an, “attempted illegal annexation,” on October 12, 2022 (United Nations, 2023b).

Financially, the UN launched collaborative emergency appeals summing up to \$1.7 billion to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to Ukrainians on March 1, 2022, and as of April 25, 2022, the appeal was 70% funded (United Nations, 2023a; United Nations, 2023b). As the intensity of the crisis became worst, the UN doubled the appeal to \$2.24 billion on April 26, 2022, and as of March 2023, 86% of the appeal has been funded. The UN has provided humanitarian aid/protection to about 8.1 million people in collaboration with its partner. All over Ukraine, 13.3 million people have received humanitarian aid from 580 UN humanitarian partners. To help farmers in Ukraine the UN Food and Agriculture Organization declared a \$15.5 million initiative on January 4, 2023 (United Nations, 2023b).

OECD Response to Russia-Ukraine War

Like its counterpart, the OECD stands firm with Ukraine. Hours after Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the OECD council issued a statement saying, “The OECD Council condemns the large-scale aggression by Russia against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms as a clear violation of international law and a serious threat to the rules-based international order” (OECD, 2022a). On February 25, 2022, a day after Russia invaded Ukraine, the OECD council officially terminated Russia’s accession process which had earlier been deferred in 2014. The council also demanded that the Secretary-General, Mathias Cormann, should take steps to close the OECD office in Moscow and terminate every prior Russian invitation at Ministerial levels (OECD, 2022b). One year into the Russia-Ukraine war, the Secretary General of the OECD reviewed the response the OECD has made towards this war on February 24, 2023. The OECD in collaboration with its partners has helped facilitate the reception and integration of refugees from Ukraine, especially in the area of education and employment continuity. The institution has worked in close collaboration with the Ukrainian government to support its reconstruction and reform plan and has formally acknowledged Ukraine as a potential member of the OECD. The institution had earlier opened a liaison office (OECD-Ukraine) in Paris but has now officially opened one in Kyiv which began operations on March 1, 2023, an office hosted by the Slovak Republic Embassy to Ukraine in Kyiv (OECD, 2023).

NATO Response to Russia-Ukraine War

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization- NATO strongly condemns what it describes as “Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine,” which is a close collaborator to NATO. The relationship between Ukraine and NATO dates back as early as the 1990s and has intensified after Russia’s, “illegal annexation,” of Crimea in 2014 (NATO, 2023b). In September 2022, NATO also condemned what it describes as the “illegal attempt to annex,” four Ukrainian regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia). After Russia’s 2014, “illegal and illegitimate” annexation of Crimea, NATO had put off every practical civilian and military cooperation with Moscow but left open channels of political and military

communications. However, after the full-fledged February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has progressively increased sanctions on Russia as a pressure tool on Moscow to prohibit further reconstruction of tanks, and missiles and finance its war (NATO, 2023a). NATO allies at the start of this invasion sent several war weapons to Ukraine (The US- 31 Abrams tanks, the UK- 14 Challenger 2 tanks, Germany- 14 Leopard 2 tanks, and Norway- eight Leopard 2 tanks) (BBC News, 2023).

On March 24, 2022, the Presidents of the 30 NATO Allies met in Brussels to discuss Russia's invasion of Ukraine which they refer to as, "the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades." They called on Russia to adhere to the UN International Court of Justice ruling of March 16, 2022, to instantly stop military operations in Ukraine. Also, in response to the invasion, NATO activated its defense plans as it deployed elements of its Response Force and put in place 40,000 troops on its eastern flanks together with vital air and naval assets. It equally created four more multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania (NATO, 2022). Ukraine has received from NATO member states innovative Western weaponry, which uses 'NATO-standard 155-mm shells' (Erlanger & Jakes, 2022). A recent news report from Al-Jazeera suggests that NATO has committed about \$80 billion worth of military, humanitarian, and financial aid to Ukraine (Duggal, 2023).

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (GLOBAL WARMING)

IMF Response to Climate Change

To highlight the significant impact of climate change, Kristalina Georgieva, IMF's 12th managing director said, "The IMF today is a systemically significant institution in the fight against climate change. We integrate climate into our policy analysis, policy recommendations, and in our financial sector assessments. We integrate it in our public investment management assessments" (IMF, 2022g). To promote and transit to green and sustainable public investment, the IMF added a Climate-responsible dimension to the Public Investment Management Assessment (PIMA). This action transformed the PIMA into the Climate-Public Investment Management Assessment (C-PIMA). This organization makes the government more Climate-sensitive in carrying out investments ((IMF Infrastructure Governance, n.d.). On June 18, 2021, the IMF through Staff-Climate Note N°2021/001 proposed an International Carbon Price Floor among large emitters. This financial action caused Large Emitters to reduce their carbon pollution (Parry et al., 2021). On May 13, 2022, the IMF Executive Board approved the establishment of the Resilience and Sustainability Trust. Among many benefits, RST is one of the IMF lending toolkits for long-term structural challenges and will help beneficial countries (most especially vulnerable countries) to fight against challenges like climate change. An estimated US\$45 billion, will be disbursed to kick-start the initiative (IMF, 2022h). From November 7 through 17, 2022, the IMF ran an online course to train participants on the Macroeconomics of Climate Change (MCC). MCC was to provide an overview of the science and economic costs of climate change and discuss adaptation and mitigation policy options for tackling climate change-including pricing carbon emissions as well as greening the economy with the removal of fossil fuels subsidies while taking stock of the global climate debate, and analyses challenges and opportunities related to transitioning to greener economic models. This is one of the numerous courses initiated by the IMF in fighting against climate change (IMF, 2022i).

During the December 2022 Germany G7 Summit, IMF proposed a Broader Policy Impact of Different Mitigation Policies Including Carbon Pricing (IMF/OECD, 2022). On December 14, 2022, IMF employees Georgieva et al. (2022) proposed the initiation of a Debt-for-Climate Swaps and Debt-for-Nature swaps loan policy for countries that are most vulnerable to climate change. Per the authors, this loan will permit governments to improve resilience without triggering a fiscal crisis or sacrificing spending on other development priorities as a result of freed fiscal resources (Georgieva et al., 2022). On January 4th, 2023, IMF workers Tobias Adrian et al. proposed Financial Risk Analysis as a potentially efficient way of fighting the consequences of climate change in the banking sector. These IMF workers demonstrate how FRA could be used to measure the resilience of banks amidst climate change. Furthermore, FRA will permit the overall assessment of bank stability by measuring how physical or transition risks impact the economy and bank capital. The data collected from FRA will help enhance the public framework by raising awareness around the prudent management of climate risks and incentivizing banks in improving their frameworks. Through the FRA, climate risk analysis will enable financial institutions to disclose and better manage related risks (Adrian et al., 2023). On February 9, 2023, IMF workers Bo Li et al. (2023) made a report on the state of the fight against climate change. These employees outline the work done alongside their lacunes. Their report stands as an awareness of the realities and progress made in fighting climate change by every sector of life (Li et al., 2023).

World Bank Response

On June 11, 2020, the World Bank revealed that, through its Social Safety Net Programs, it is helping countries simultaneously to fight against climate change. This goes a long way to help countries better face the rise of major climate-related shocks (World Bank Group, 2020a). Through Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), an estimated \$23 trillion for potential investment in sustainable development by 2030 was pledged by the World Bank for 21 emerging market economies to honor the Paris Agreement of 2015. This is a major and landmark step in the financial fight against climate change and helps its clients to meet up with the goals of the Paris Agreement (World Bank Group, 2020a). The World Bank's agreement to the Santiago Action plan which involves almost 60 Ministers of Finances, has made the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action a strong tool to look up to concerning the efficient fight against climate change. This will also permit the realization of the ambitious goals set for the NDCs (World Bank Group, 2020a).

Upon launching the first-of-its-kind Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience, the World Bank Group is leading on innovative approaches that will boost adaptation and resilience outcomes in countries. Equally, it is ramping up support for countries' efforts to adapt and build resilience to a changing climate. These actions have proven the inextricable link between adaptation and resilience and their link to development outcomes (World Bank Group, 2020b). After announcing a new core diagnostic report called the Country Climate and Development Reports (CCDRs) in 2021 by the World Bank Group designed to analyze how each country's development goals can be achieved in the context of mitigating and adapting to climate change, this core diagnostic is today being rolled out to every country the Bank Group works in as per the CCDR Series (Marsch, 2023) (World Bank Group, 2023). Through this series, different aspects of CCDRs, —from their analytical underpinning to how they are shaping Bank Group operations, are explored. The data and analyses obtained through the CCDRs ensure the World Bank and other climate change stakeholders will help them to better understand Climate

change and; hence, better strategize financially in fighting against climate change (World Bank Group, 2023).

The World Bank has throughout the 2020s written books, guidelines, articles, and reviews to help explain and advocate for topics, principles, and engagements related to the fight against climate change. Among many we could cite are: *A Guide for Designing Strategies for Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience* (Hallegatte et al., 2019, 2020), *Groundswell: Acting on Internal Climate Migration (Part II)* (Clement et al., 2021) (Clement et al., 2021) and *State and Trends of Carbon Pricing* (World Bank, 2022).

EU's Response to Climate Change

At the advent of the 2020s, the EU had shown its desire to become the world's leader in efficiently fighting climate change. December 11, 2019, saw the presentation of the European Green Deal through a joint Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions known as "COM (2019) 640 final" (European Commission, 2019). The European Green Deal is a well-elaborated roadmap by the EU to collectively respond to climate change. It aims on transforming the EU's economy and society by putting it on a more environmentally friendly and sustainable path. The European Green Deal stands as the EU's means of becoming a global leader in climate and environmental measures, consumer protection, and workers' rights. Explicitly, the EU seeks to consolidate massive public investment and increased efforts to direct private capital toward climate and environmental action while avoiding lock-in into unsustainable practices (European Commission, 2019).

Practically, the European Green Deal is a well-elaborated policy with a timeline that runs from 2020 through 2030. In the short term, it has an objective to integrate and implement the United Nation's 2030 Agenda and the sustainable development goals. In the long term, the European Green Deal stands today as the ideal policy for achieving the ambition of "No net emission of greenhouse gases" by 2050. An overview of the European Green Deal timeline revealed the EU's commitment to (1) Increasing the EU's climate ambition for 2030 and 2050; (2) Supplying clean, affordable, and secure energy; (3) Mobilizing industries for a clean and, circular economy; (4) Building and renovating in energy and resource-efficient way, (5) Accelerating the shift to sustainable and smart mobility; (6) From 'Farm to Fork': designing a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system; (7) Preserving and restoring ecosystems and biodiversity; (8) Implementing a zero-pollution ambition for a toxic-free environment; (9) Pursuing green finance and investment and ensuring a just transition; (10) Greening national budgets and sending the right price signals; (11) Mobilizing research and fostering innovation; (12) Activating education and training; (12) Passing a green oath: 'do no harm' (European Commission, 2019).

On January 14, 2020, the European Commission reiterated the EU's desire to become the world's first climate-neutral zone. This goal was expressed through the presentation of the European Green Deal Investment Plan and the Just Transition Mechanism. Enshrined in this document is the financial roadmap to follow in order to attain the European Green Deal goals. With an estimated €1 trillion in investments, the EU plans to satisfy the Enabling factor and Practical support of the European Green Deal. The Just Transition Mechanism stands as a means to mobilize €100 billion throughout 2021-2027 to ensure a smooth transition towards a

climate-neutral economy. The sum of about €7.5 billion via the Just Transition Fund has been put at the disposal of each member state who is willing to commit to the eligibility criteria for tapping into this fund. It is estimated, €30 to €50 billion could be mobilized by member states if they top up the Just Transition Fund with money from the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund Plus. To incite private investment, the European Commission plans to mobilize €45 billion through a Dedicated Just Transition Scheme under the InvestEU. This will permit the transition into clean and sustainable energy and transport. Concerning the public sector, an investment fund between €25 to €30 billion will be mobilized through a public sector loan facility with the European Investment bank backed by the EU budget (European Commission, 2020).

Another very important step taken by the EU to fight climate change is the proposal for a European climate law to ensure a climate-neutral European Union by 2050 on March 4, 2020 (European Commission, 2020b). On March 10 through 11 2020, a future-ready economy plan, “European Industrial Strategy,” was adopted, and the Circular Economy Plan focusing on sustainable resource use was proposed (European Commission, 2020cd). The elaboration of an EU Biodiversity strategy for 2030 to protect fragile natural resources on our planet, alongside the Farm to Fork strategy to make the food system more sustainable, was presented on May 20, 2020 (European Commission, 2020f). On July 8, 2020, the EU Adopted the EU Strategies for energy system integration and hydrogen to pave the way toward a fully decarbonized, more efficient, and interconnected energy sector (European Commission, 2020e). December 9 through 10, 2020, the EU saw the birth of the European Climate Pact and the Sustainable batteries for a circular and climate-neutral economy, “European Battery Alliance” (European Commission, 2020g). The New European Bauhaus kick-started on January 18, 2021 (European Commission, 2021a) which was closely followed by the New European Strategy on adaptation to climate change, on February 24, 2021 (European Commission, 2021b). On March 25, 2021, the EU took an action plan for the development of organic production known as the “Organic Action Plan” (European Commission, 2021c). On May 12 and 17, 2021, the EU committed to a Zero pollution Action Plan as well as a Sustainable blue economy respectively (European Commission, 2021d). July 14, 2021, witnessed the delivery of the European Green Deal (European Commission, 2021e); and on September 15, 2021, the EU presented the new actions and funding for the New European Bauhaus (European Commission, 2021e). Concerning deforestation and waste management, the European Commission proposed a stop to deforestation, innovation in waste management, and making soil healthy on November 17, 2021 (European Commission, 2021f). On December 14, 2021, the EU commission proposed a target of greater efficiency and more sustainable travel (European Commission, 2021g). On December 15, 2021, a proposal to remove, recycle and sustain store carbon respectively alongside that to establish a new EU framework to decarbonize gas markets, promote hydrogen and reduce methane emissions was tabled (European Commission, 2021h).

On March 8, 2022, the EU committed to joint European action for affordable, secured, and sustainable energy under the banner of REPowerEU (European Commission, 2022a). On March 23rd, 2022, the EU vouched for the option to mitigate high energy prices with common gas purchases and minimum gas storage obligations. On March 30, 2022, the EU commission tabled proposals to make sustainable products the norm in the EU, boost circular business models, and empower consumers for the green transition (European Commission, 2022b). On April 5, 2022, two proposals were made; the first was to modernize the EU industrial emissions rule to

steer large industries in a long-term green transition. The second proposal aimed to phase down fluorinated greenhouse gases and ozone-depleting substances (European Commission, 2022c). On April 22, 2022, the European Commission joined the European Climate Pact and pledged to make its operations climate neutral by 2030 (European Union, 2022). On June 22, 2022, the EU Commission adopted the Nature protection Package proposals (European Commission, 2022d). On July 20, 2022, the EU proposed a save gas for a safe winter proposal (European Commission, 2022e). October 26 and 27, 2022, the commission proposed stronger rules for cleaner air and water, and the Council and European Parliament reached a provisional political agreement on stricter CO₂ emission performance standards for new cars and vans (European Commission, 2022f). On November 10, 2022, a proposal for new Euro 7 standards for pollutant emissions from vehicles and improve air quality was tabled (Neweuro, 2022).

On November 15, 2022, the Commission proposed action to fully harness the potential of algae in Europe for healthier diets, lower CO₂ emissions, and address water pollution (European Commission, 2022g). On November 30, 2022, within the European Green Deal; a proposal to Putting an end to wasteful packaging, boosting reuse, and recycling was tabled alongside the proposal for the certification of carbon removals to help reach net zero emissions (European Commission, 2022h). On December 6, 2022, the EU agreed on the law to fight global deforestation and forest degradation driven by EU production and consumption (European Commission, 2022i). On December 9, 2022, the European Parliament and Council agreed on applying new rules to the EU emissions trading system in the aviation sector (European Commission, 2022j). December 18, 2022, the European Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement to strengthen and expand emissions trading and create a Social Climate Fund to help people in the transition (European Commission, 2022k). On February 13, 2023, Commission sets out rules for renewable hydrogen (European Commission, 2023). On February 14, 2023, Commission proposed a 2030 zero-emissions target for new city buses and 90% emissions reductions for new trucks by 2040 (European Commission, 2023b). On March 10, 2023, the EU agreed to stronger rules to boost energy efficiency (European Commission, 2023c).

OECD Response to Climate Change

On October 27, 2021, the OECD birthed the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Declaration on a new approach to align development cooperation with the goals of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Through this declaration, DAC members are fully committed to implementing article 2.1.c of the Paris Agreement and to making financial flows consistent with pathways toward net zero Green House Gas (GHG) emissions and climate-resilient development while facilitating access to green technologies, especially in the energy sector (OECD, 2021). Being the custodians of the governance of ODA; by the declaration, OECD commits to aligning ODA with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Climate and environmental impacts will be considered in all ODA spending, including in sectors not traditionally associated with climate and the environment (OECD, 2021).

OECD also plans to effectively use resources as well as help developing countries to better face and fight climate change. In a joint publishing made by the OECD and IMF in December 2022, the OECD made a pertinent contribution toward the fight against climate change. In its project, "Comparing the Effectiveness of Climate Policies," OECD gives immense depth to the effectiveness of most of the policies being used as strategies to fight against climate change. The

pro and cons of the measure is an additional database, which if well exploited, will enhance the fight against climate change. This document was influenced by the December 2022 G7 summit in Germany, its pertinence concerning the fight against climate change is as important to the whole world as it is to the G7 members (IMF/OECD, 2022). After the adoption of the Net-Zero Carbon emission target as of January 30, 2023; on February 9 through 10, 2023, OECD initiated the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches (IFCMA). As described by the OECD, IFCMA is an initiative designed to help improve the global impact of emissions reduction efforts around the world through better data and information sharing, evidence-based mutual learning, and inclusive multilateral dialogue. It brings together all relevant policy perspectives from a diverse range of countries from around the world, participating on an equal footing basis, to take stock of and consider the effectiveness of different carbon mitigation approaches (OECD, 2023a).

In a nutshell, OECD helps countries obtain and maintain resilience amidst climate change through finances and regular data updates and analyses concerning the state of the fight against climate change (OECD, n.d.). Mitigation and the policies surrounding are issues the OECD takes seriously concerning climate change (OECD, 202b).

UN Response to Climate Change

The United Nations (UN) is an international organization created in 1945 with the original goal of preventing another world war (United Nations, n.d.). Now including all nations except Kosovo, Western Sahara, and Taiwan (Bada, 2019), the UN has established various Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) designed to improve the climate via collective international cooperation (United Nations, 2022).

The 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) was held in 2015 by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Bonn, Germany-based agency of the UN which is tasked with climate change (United Nations, 2022). The annual COP meetings are held to further the implementation of the Convention and to address the topic of climate change. During COP21, the Paris Agreement was adopted by all 196 parties to the UNFCCC. This agreement was to work to limit global temperature rise to less than 2 degrees Celsius, preferably 1.5 degrees Celsius (United Nations, 2022). The United States (US) deposited its instrument of acceptance of the Paris Agreement; however, in 2019 the US notified the UN of its intention to withdraw from the agreement in 2020. In 2021 the Biden administration deposited its instrument of acceptance of the agreement (United Nations, 2022).

Goal number 13 of the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) is titled, "Climate Action." Included in the SDG is the desire of the UN to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 7.6% annually, beginning, in the year 2020. The UN noted the COVID-19 pandemic hindered the actions of many governments and citizens in various ways, from disrupted economies to disrupted supply chains (United Nations, 2022). The UN noted the global mean temperature of 2021 was about 1.1 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial level (between the years 1850 and 1900). The UN estimates that greenhouse gas emissions fell by nearly 5.2% in 2020 due to pandemic-related events, but rose over 6% in 2021 to their highest level ever (United Nations, 2022). In addition to the Climate Change SDG, other SDGs include the climate-change-related topics of Affordable and Clean Energy, Sustainable Cities and Communities, Responsible Consumption and Production, Life Below Water, and Life on Land (United Nations, 2022).

The UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the body responsible for assessing the science related to climate change (IPCC, 2022). The IPCC notes that climate change has resulted in a rise in the mean sea level of around 0.2 meters between 1901 and 2018. The panel believes the warming effect in the air, the sea, and the land has resulted in heat waves, heavy precipitation, droughts, and tropical cyclones. The IPCC also noted that technological advances have decreased the cost of solar energy generation by 85% since 2010, the cost of wind energy by 55%, and the cost of lithium-ion batteries by 85% (IPCC, 2022).

COP27 was held in November 2022, at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt (United Nations, 2022). During the meeting, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) welcomed a proposal to unblock agricultural fertilizer exports from Russia. The area of Russia and Ukraine is a significant source of agricultural fertilizer worldwide, and the sanctions imposed by Russia's special military operation in Ukraine (Astrov et al., 2022). An agreement would likely be complicated, as Russian financial assets are frozen in the EU and in the G7 countries, various financial sanctions and controls are in place (Astrov et al., 2022). Agricultural fertilizer is commercially produced by processing natural gas, of which Russia has significant resources (Mangold, 2009). This indicates the complex and often diverging paths of the UN's SDGs, as eliminating hunger generally requires fertilizer, while the manufacture of fertilizer can result in the production of greenhouse gases (Mangold, 2009), and the purchase of fertilizer from UN members may run contrary to the economic policies of other UN members (United Nations, 2022).

CONCLUSION: CORRELATING SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM THEORY TO THE STUDY

Unlike theories such as Thomas Hobbes' Social Contract theory which focuses on the individual state's response to events to protect its citizens (Ebenstein & Ebenstein 2000; Mbah, 2021) the theory of social constructivism emphasizes the importance of social (collaborative) interaction and its impact on the international stage. It emphasizes that the world is made up of social beings whose actions determine the state of the world in which they live. In other words, our world is determined by our actions: "the social world is our making" (McGlinchey et al., 2017). Hence, the need for rules to guide our actions and international institutions/non-state actors are considered more significant in influencing our behavior by lobbying/ acts of persuasion than individual state actors (Norwich University Online, 2017). In the current era in which we live which is plagued by diverse global crises, it is evident that we need the collaboration of states in international relations to combat these crises more than individual actors. Based on the tenets of constructivism, we have seen and continue to see the growing involvement of diverse international institutions in constructing 'rules' to guide our actions as these actions have consequences on our world.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 did not only affect the individual states involved but has had a devastating economic, social, and political global impact. The extensive impact of this war is the reason why the international organizations have responded through sanctions on Russia and diverse support to Ukraine (financial, emotional, material, weaponry, etc) as detailed in our study. This emphasizes the tenet of constructivism which advocates that there are consequences when rules are not obeyed. Moreover, the devastating impact of climate change in recent years is a call for social reconstruction and the need to change or reshape our actions as they are negatively impacting the world in which we live. In an attempt to do this, various international organizations as portrayed in our study continually meet to provide 'rules' that

will help “save our world.” This study is however limited to two global crises. Further studies can focus on international organizations' responses to 2022 inflation, Covid-19, and many more.

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