

Influence of Security Sector Reforms on Crime Prevention in Juba City, Republic of South Sudan

Charles Ciec Mayor

Department of Peace Security,
Social Sciences, Egerton University, Kenya

Wokabi Mwangi

Department of Peace Security,
Social Sciences, Egerton University, Kenya

Hadija Murenga

Department of Peace Security,
Social Sciences, Egerton University, Kenya

ABSTRACT

This paper uses data collected for an MA Thesis on the influence of security sector reform on crime prevention in Juba City South Sudan. The study was motivated by the dearth of studies in this academic area and the increased levels of insecurity and crime in Juba and its environs. The study was guided by four objectives; to establish perceptions of the Security Sector Reform Actors on functionality of security institutions roles on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan; to assess the influence of Security Sector Reform policies and legal provisions in prevention of crime, to determine the influence of donor technical assistance in prevention of crime and to establish and the nature of obstacles facing SSR and their influence in crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan. This study was grounded on three theories; Legitimacy Chain, Three Dimensions of Governance, and Control Theories. The study used descriptive survey research design and Simple random sampling method in selecting respondents for the study. Key informants were selected by purposeful sampling. Questionnaires and interview schedules were used as the main data collection tools. This study comprised of 162 main respondents and 20 Key informants respectively. The main method of data collection was the questionnaire. Inferential statistics were used to analyse and present quantitative data. Qualitative data from the interview guide was analyzed by content analysis and presented as verbatim reports and narratives. Amongst other major findings, the study established a relationship between; Functionality of security institutions roles and crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan as a result of overlapping mandates and duplicity of roles with regard to security forces operations in Juba City-South Sudan. In addition, Donor technical assistance influenced crime prevention ($p=0.01$). Security Sector Reform policies and legal provisions in prevention of crime, and also donor technical assistance influenced crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan. The study recommends that the government of South Sudan should ensure that the existing SSR policies and legal provisions are effectively enforced. There is also a need for Government of Sudan in conjunction with international community strengthen the oversight role of parliament and civil

society. The study also recommends that there should also be inclusion of communities in the formulation and implementation of SSR policies and legal provisions. The study recommends that the government of South Sudan should seek more donor technical assistance to assist in crime prevention.

Key Words: Security Sector Reform, Donor technical assistance, Community inclusion.

INTRODUCTION

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal on the enhancement of effective accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law (UN, 2008). The goal is for the security system to be managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, which contributes to a well-functioning security framework thereby reducing crime. Security Sector Reform is considered as the fundamental base in establishing conditions necessary for sustainable peace and development in post conflict and fragile countries. It is also intended for rebuilding a security system that protect citizens and their properties from crime and defending the state in general (Kammel, 2018).

Security Sector Reform is of concern to different actors at the local, regional and international levels. It is an integral part of development cooperation approach used by donors dealing with fragile countries or those emerging from violent conflict to avoid relapse into violence and an increase in crimes (Kammel, 2018). Arguably, at the epicentre of the Security Sector Reform in SSR is apparently the Disarmament, targeted Demobilisation and non-discriminative Re-integration (DDR) programme.

The peace negotiators introduced this component in order to enhance SSR by targeting psychological wellbeing of those ex-combatants so that their integration back into the very society they have offended is measured and quantified. In Northern Uganda, stakeholders were faced with unique circumstances when the policy of DDR was rolled out in mid 2000s. They had to focus on reception, return of children and youth escaping from abduction, most of which were under the age of 18. Cantonment sites were largely avoided by ex-combatants, choosing to go directly to their villages instead without the knowledge of authorities involved (Baltzman & Annan, 2009). DDR is a multilateral undertaking whereby all parties must principally consent and must voluntarily accept terms and conditions therein. South Sudan is currently implementing R-TGNU which has a component of DDR that is supposed to persuade combatants from more than 10 different armed groups. Therefore, this research will help in the definition of suitable model of DDR in South Sudan for successful SSR, hence positively influencing security situation in Juba city (Baltzman & Annan, 2009).

The moment a conflict comes to an end, either through a peaceful settlement or as a result of military takeover, the war-torn country will always need to address the issue of surplus troops who may be discharged from military and rebel forces, which, for security purposes, are being disbanded. Since "ex-combatants have a potent ability to 'spoil' the peace process and undermine progress towards security and development, it is largely accepted that they need special attention" (Andy, 2008). According to the United Nations Rule of Law, Member States should fundamentally recognize the importance of strengthening justice and security

institutions that are accessible and responsive to the needs and rights of all individuals and which build trust and promote social cohesion and economic prosperity (Andy, 2008). Security sector reform (SSR) aims at improving safety through enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of security institutions controlled by civilians and operating according to human rights and the rule of law.

Conflicts in Africa have also included the proliferation of lethal weapons, mostly small arms and light weapons (SALW). This problem has become more acute and less controllable since the end of the Cold War in 1989. The manufacture and trade in small arms are lucrative businesses mostly controlled by mercenaries and private companies. According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) of South Africa, Africa alone has suffered 5,994,000 fatalities in the past 50 years due mostly to SALW. Estimates of the number of small arms and light weapons in circulation range from 100 to 500 million, with 50 to 80 million being AK-47 assault rifles. An increasing number of countries are becoming self-sufficient in the manufacturing of small arms and related ammunition either through indigenous or licensed production. Most of the weapons have found their way into the various conflict zones in Africa (Andy, 2008).

Crimes affect individuals at a personal level and also victimize large segments of society and create a climate of fear and insecurity. This impairs the quality of human life, impedes harmonious development and disrupts public peace and tranquillity (Anwar & Khan, 2015). In South Sudan, urban areas were particularly affected by crime and insecurity, for example, the 'Nigger' gangs were a serious problem in Juba (Rolandsen, 2009). Hence, SSR is placed at the centre-stage to legitimize the state, create an open society and control crime (Schroeder, 2010). Security Sector Reform emerged as a priority in the late 1990s from international development dialogue for application in the international aid and security assistance arenas. It was not until 2007 that a systematic methodology was codified by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and since then, major international donors like the UK, UN and US have applied this approach to development policy and strategies including crime prevention across Africa with mixed results (McLean, 2018).

Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war can be a challenge as has been witnessed in South Sudan. Juba city, the capital of South Sudan continues to face a number of criminal cases of different nature from the prevalence and proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the hands of the civilians has compounded the insecurity situation to Juba city dwellers. The efforts to tackle or prevent crimes are still at the infancy stage. Security enforcement institutions and its structures in the country are weak and the protracted civil violence has contributed to marauding criminal activities which has contributed to killing, loss of property leading to insecurity to city dwellers. A successful Security Sector Reform positively contributes to crime prevention by improving the ability of security agents of States in enhancing coordination and professionalism. In as much as there is no reliable, official statistics on crime in South Sudan, violent crime in form of murder, armed robbery, home invasion, cattle raiding, kidnapping, and harassment is rampant. In Juba, the most frequently reported violent crimes include armed robbery, home invasion, and carjacking.

South Sudan emerged from over 50 years of continuous civil war between its own warring movements in the South and the Khartoum government which ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and independence in 2011

(Turyamureeba, 2014). The country started building its institutions within a fragile post-conflict environment that is characterised by unresolved ethnic tensions, abuse of power, and military involvement in politics. Efforts were made to empower both the local and central governments to manage the recovery efforts and efficiently manage the reconstruction process including prevention of crime through SSR (Breitung, Paes & Vondervoort, 2016).

Institutional weaknesses and deep-rooted governance concerns at different levels of government were blamed for insecurity and lawlessness experienced in some parts of South Sudan since December 2013. The power struggle within the SPLM over leadership further led to insecurity in the Capital City, Juba and increased hostilities in Juba and its environs leading to widespread brutalities and crime against civilians (Johnson, 2016). This was attributed to the inability to reconcile ethnic divisions within the military structure and lack of a politically impartial armed force (Johnson, 2016). SSR was intended to build an effective accountable security for the State and citizens in order to achieve sustainable peace, development and reduce crime. SSR in South Sudan had mostly targeted the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and to an extent, SSNPS comprising of wildlife and prisons services and the fire brigade. SSR interventions increased the accountability and democratic control over the armed forces and increased its operational efficacy that extended to prevention of crime (Breitung *et al*, 2016).

The first component of SSR included developing a national security policy and legislation covering the armed forces. This included training on human rights, strengthening the oversight role of parliament and civil society, building the capacity of the military justice system and increasing transparency over military expenditure. The other component was 'train and equip' or 'enhance and enable' programs. The programs were aimed at strengthening the operational capability of the SPLA to fight a foreign enemy (Breitung *et al*, 2016). As the SPLA was not sufficiently internally streamlined and reconciled, it made SSR and control of crime an incredibly difficult undertaking from the start. Past attempts at SSR's role in crime prevention in South Sudan have made no significant contribution to reforming the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and were unable to sustainably change South Sudan's security situation (Breitung *et al*, 2016).

The South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) has been primarily stationed in urban areas with limited reach beyond country headquarters. Local security has been the mandate of SSNPS but due to lack of capacity and political backing, SSNPS has left most security challenges outside major towns to SPLA (Verjee, 2017). A steady increase in crime in population centres, both in frequency and in sophistication, adds to the complexity of the SSNPS task (Verjee, 2017). The situation points to the need of improving existing and developing new approaches in implementation of SSR in order to prevent crime in South Sudan. This is one of the major motivations for undertaking the study.

PROBLEM ANALYSIS

It undisputable fact that successful SSR remains strategic in crime prevention in the post-conflict environment of the Republic of South Sudan. SSR as a strategy conveniently helps in mitigating the relapse to insecurity and violent conflict. Several efforts have been made to return the country on security track after a protracted struggle in civil war. For example, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was rolled out to guide the creation of the new

state of South Sudan. That notwithstanding, there was still no provisions for SSR in the CPA, that this study assumes is the main precondition for the peace process itself. Although the government of South Sudan has security institutions such as SSNPS, NSS and SSPDF, among others that may be used to curb the rising pattern of criminality in the city of Juba and other crime hotspots in the country, most of their policies have been said to be externally driven and therefore unable to manage crimes and insecurity in Juba. Besides, reliance on external actors in the SSR processes however creates a gap in knowledge on the role played by domestic or local actors. This creates a challenge when SSR technical tools are to be transferred to domestic institutions so that local actors can play a significant role in the SSR processes. Transfer of technical tools to domestic actors is intended to ensure ownership by domestic institutions of the management of SSR processes and outcomes in the prevention of crimes. It is on this basis that the current study sought to explore the influence of SSR on crime prevention in Juba City – South Sudan.

METHODOLOGY

This study utilized descriptive survey design to obtain information from a cross section of respondents. In addition, stratified random sampling was also used to enlist respondents into the study. The design was preferred as it portrays an accurate profile of situations and utilises a questionnaire to derive both qualitative and quantitative information from respondents (Orodho, 2002). Descriptive research involves assessment of attitudes and opinions from individuals, organizations and procedures. The study comprised of a sample size of 162 respondents but only 118 questionnaires were returned. A total of twenty (20) Key Informants (K.I) from international donor organizations were also purposefully selected to inform the study based on their knowledge and experience of security issues in South Sudan. Interview method was used to collect data from the K.Is.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Functionality and Influence of Security Institutions Roles on Crime Prevention

The first objective in this study sought to explore perceptions of security sector reform actors on the relationship between the functionality of security institutions roles and crime prevention against two variables; Duplicity of roles and Overlapping of Mandates. The results are shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Perceptions on Functionality of Security Institutions Roles on Crime Prevention.

1. Respondents Perceptions		2. No	3. Yes	4. Total
5. Duplicity of Roles	7. n	8. 20	9. 98	10. 118
6.	11. %	12. 17.0	13. 83.0	14. 100.0
15. Overlapping of Mandates	16. n	17. 18	18. 100	19. 118
	20. %	21. 15.2	22. 84.8	23. 100.0

Author, 2022

As shown in Table 1 the general trend in this study are perceptions that there was a relationship between the functionality of security institutions roles and crime prevention that was explained by two variables; Duplicity of roles and Overlapping of Mandates.

Overall, the findings present a picture of security reform actors that perceives that there is both overlapping of mandates (84.8%) and duplicity of roles (83.0%) in the functioning of security forces institutions. This implies that there was a general dissatisfaction by the security reform actors on how the security forces carry out their duties. According to a senior security force male Key informant this affects their effectiveness in crime prevention leading to upsurge of crimes;

There is lack of political will in security operations. In addition to micro-management and/or arm twisting by the political class resulting to bias in operations, doing what is according to us the preserve of other organs which have the requisite prowess to handle such. At times, we find ourselves doing the same operations with other institutions that we think does not have what it takes to execute such tasks. This weakens the war against crimes in this country.

This lends support to what Sebit et al, (2009) argued that civilian disarmament (an important crime prevention operation is besieged by confusion and the overlapping mandates of different GoSS institutions coupled with weak institutional arrangements. As a result, the GoSS has mandated SPLA to carry out the task of civilian disarmament, an approach that has proved to be largely ineffective and sometimes counter-productive with negative impacts on crime reduction. This calls for specialization of roles if the problem of crime and by extension insecurity must be cut at the nib.

Policies and Legal Provisions in Prevention of Crime

The study found that there is a very high frequency of crimes experienced in Juba City and that there is a high extent to which the policies and legal provisions have succeeded in prevention of crime. The study established that criminal laws as shown by 66.9%, strengthening the oversight role of parliament and civil society as shown by 66.1% and strengthening the operational capability of the SPLA/SSNPS as shown by 65.3% have led to prevention crime to a high extent. The findings correlate with Bryden and Chappuis (2016) who argued that political and legal provisions are important in SSR. Free and fair democratic communities require more effective and accountable security provision. New legal architecture is one of the examples that make valuable progress in security governance.

The study found that training on human rights as shown by 61.9% and building the capacity of the military justice system as shown by 61.0% have led to prevention of crime to a high extent. The study established that SSNPS Act as shown by 54.2% have led to prevention crime to a high extent. The study revealed that increasing transparency over military expenditure as shown by 55.1% have led to prevention crime to a low extent while SPLA Act as shown by 55.1% have led to prevention crime to a very low extent. Breitung *et al.*, (2016) also noted that failure in sufficient internal streamlining and reconciling of security forces makes security sector reform a difficult undertaking in South Sudan. Structural international support for the security services mostly targeted the SPLA and SSNPS while interventions followed the two traditional approaches to SSR of increasing the accountability of, and democratic control over the armed forces and increasing its operational efficacy.

Donor Technical Assistance in Prevention of Crime

The study found that there has been a moderate level of donor technical assistance that they have received and that donor technical assistance has contributed to prevention of crime to a

high extent. The study established that basic police training as shown by 66.9% and crowd control as shown by 66.1% have led to prevention crime to a high extent. The study found that defence techniques as shown by 61.0%, crime investigation as shown by 59.3% and training of trainers as shown by 57.6% have led to prevention crime to a high extent. The study revealed that conflict and post-traumatic management as shown by 66.9% have led to prevention crime to a low extent. The findings are in line with Sebit, Abraham, Abatneh and Wani (2009) who moted that donor governments and development partners offering reform programs or projects to support SSR include the UK, UN and US while agencies include USAID and DFID on the international front. The stakeholders collaborated to offer election security training for Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) through various courses like basic police training, crowd control, training of trainers (ToT), defence techniques and conflict and post-traumatic management.

Obstacles to SSR in Prevention of Crime

The study established that SR Obstacles have contributed in prevention of crime to a low extent. The study found that the level of importance that they have given to the failures of force integration as shown by 57.6% and failure to recruit qualified personnel for crime prevention as shown by 56.8% in the prevention of crime was high. The study found that high level of importance that they have given to failures of Disaster, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in crime prevention as shown by 53.4%, neglected peripheries and non-state actors in crime prevention as shown by 48.3% and failure of coordination in crime prevention as shown by 45.8%. The findings are supported by Chanaa (2014) who argued that the challenge lies in the conceptual-contextual divide whereby the conceptualization of SSR had outpaced any understanding of how the concept might adapt to the exigencies of specific reform contexts. In some specific context, DDR failures are numerous and interconnected while in other countries inadequate funding and underestimation of the task left some combatants out of the process. Peake, Scheye and Hills (2015) also pointed out that SSR programs tend to be designed in technocratic and non-specific terms at the expense of political context. As a result, after more than a decade of convergence in concept and policy, relatively little is understood about how SSR is implemented in practice, and with what effect for local-level security governance and ownership.

Factor by Factor Analysis

As presented in Table 2, the study established a relationship between Donor Technical Assistance and Prevention of Crime.

Table 2: The relationship between Donor Technical Assistance and Prevention of Crime*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

		Perceptions of Relationship with Crime prevention	Policies	Donor support
Perceptions of Relationship with Crime prevention	Pearson Correlation	1		
	Sig. (2-tailed)			
	N	118		
Donor support	Pearson Correlation	.636**	.507**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.001	
	N	118	118	118

Author, 2022

Table 2 presents a strong relationship between Donor Technical Assistance and Prevention of Crime. The general trend in this study were perceptions that suggested to the government of South Sudan to seek more funding to support crime prevention initiatives such as; Training of Trainers, Basic Police Training, Conflict and Post-Traumatic Management and Defence Techniques. As suggested in this study, this will a long way to cut criminality in the nib.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Amongst other major findings, the study established a correlation between; functionality of security institutions roles and crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan as a result of overlapping mandates and duplicity of roles with regard to security forces operations in Juba City-South Sudan. In addition, Donor technical assistance influenced crime prevention. Security Sector Reform policies and legal provisions in prevention of crime, and also donor technical assistance influenced crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan. The study recommends that the government of South Sudan should ensure that the existing SSR policies and legal provisions are effectively enforced. There is also a need for Government of Sudan in conjunction with international community strengthen the oversight role of parliament and civil society. The study also recommends that there should also be inclusion of communities in the formulation and implementation of SSR policies and legal provisions. The study recommends that the government of South Sudan should seek more donor technical assistance to assist in crime prevention.

References

- Andy, W. Knight (2008). Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: An Overview, African Security.
- Anwar, S. and Khan, S.E. (2015). Exploring Socio-Cultural Factors of Recidivism in Juvenile Delinquents: An Anthropological Perspective. *Sci.int. (Lahore)*, 27(1), 817-819.
- Blattman, C. & Annan, J., (2010). "The Consequences of Child Soldiering. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92 (4): 882-898.
- Bretung, C., Paes, W.C. & Vondervoort, L. (2016). *In Need of a Critical Re-think: Security Sector Reform in South Sudan*. (BICC Working Paper, 6/2016). Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC).
- Bryden, A. & Chappuis, F. (2016). Security Governance and Reform in Africa. Viewed: [https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/110121/1990821/Background%20paper_SSG_Africa_DCAf_ASSN_OSF%20\(FINAL\).pdf](https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/110121/1990821/Background%20paper_SSG_Africa_DCAf_ASSN_OSF%20(FINAL).pdf)
- Chanaa, J. (2014). *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects*, Adelphi Paper 344, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002.
- McLean, F. (2018). *Security Sector Reform: Defence Reform in South Sudan Between 2005 and 2013*. (Unpublished MSc Thesis, Middle East Technical University).
- Orodho, A.J. (2003) *Essentials of Educational and Social Science Research Methods*. Mazola Publishers,
- Rolandsen, O.H. (2009). *Land, Security and Peace Building in the Southern Sudan*. PRIO Paper, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).
- Sebit, A., Abraham, L., Abatneh, S. & Wani, K. (2009). *Police Reform in Southern Sudan*. The North-South institute, Ontario.
- Schroeder, U.C. (2010). *Measuring Security Sector Governance: A Guide to Relevant Indicators*. Geneva: DCAF.
- Turyamureeba, R (2014). *The CPA-DDR Program in South Sudan: What Went Wrong?* Nairobi: African Leadership Centre.
- UN (2008). Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform. Report of the Secretary-General. A/62/659-S/2008/39.
- Verjee, A. (2017). South Sudan's High Level Revitalization Forum: Identifying Conditions for Success. United State Institute of Peace. Khartoum.