



Challenges Affecting the Implementation of Decentralisation in Public Basic Schools in Ghana

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ABSTRACT

Educational management is a major element that produces successful educational outcomes. Over the years decentralisation has become one major policy for effective and efficient educational management in public basic schools in Ghana. Decentralisation entails the transfer of administrative and fiscal authority to the grassroots where management decisions are properly taken for effective management. This study sought to investigate challenges mitigating the implementation of decentralisation in public basic schools in Ghana. Among some key challenges faced were inadequate logistics for key stakeholders to carry out their functions. Again, there are limited support for infrastructure from both local and governmental levels. There are inadequate and delay in supply of teaching and learning materials. Delay in decision on appointments, promotions and sanction of errant staff. Political interference by government appointees also affects implementation of effective decentralisation. Difficulty in monitoring and supervise some schools due to bad roads in deprived communities also have adverse effect on the implementation of decentralisation. It was recommended devolution policy to replace the existing decentralisation policy in public basic schools for the full benefit of decentralisation. This will make it possible for major decisions like appointments, promotions and disciplinary actions taken at grassroots level instead of the centre. Logistics and TLM must get to schools on time for effective management of school.

INTRODUCTION

The current wave of changes in Public Administration where decisions are carried out at local or grassroots level with minimal control from the centre is gaining ground all over the world. The education sector is not left out in this dispensation.

Decentralisation is a system of governance where central administration transfers power to a local authority with the aim of being more responsive to citizens at the grassroots, and to enhance their participation in decision-making (*Barr & Reid, 2014*). A long-standing but complex subject, educational decentralisation has a wide range of implementation and impact options. Additionally, it is probably one of the most commonly employed policy solutions for increasing educational access and quality all across the world (*Fiske, 1996; World Bank, 2007*). The implementation of Decentralisation in the Education have been cited in prior research to have resulted in positive results over time including accountability, teacher motivation and

teacher attendance (*Enlistment, Stevenson, Phillips et al. 2015; Litvack, 2017*). According to Carr-Hill, Rolleston, Schendel and Waddington (2018), a systematic review devolving decision-making appeared to have a beneficial effect on dropout, repetition and teacher attendance. Studies including Skoufias and Shapiro (2006), Ikoya (2008), and Bruns et al. (2011), there are certain benefits to decentralising educational functions. Decentralisation, in the view point of Ikoya (2008), has led to less corrupt practices, better school infrastructure and security, and better use of available resources.

Decentralisation of educational system decision involve decision-making that affects all four areas of education. These are decision relating to organization of instruction (curricula, textbooks, teaching methods, and schedule), human resource management (hiring/firing; pay; responsibility assignment; training); planning and structure; and financial resources and spending. Education decentralisation can be assessed using this method (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1998). With the advent of decentralisation in Ghana, various communities saw the need to take active part in education at the community level. The Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) and School Management committees (SMCs) were formed to help management of schools. This had push with ACT 506 of 1995 and ACT 778 of 2008 which place both basic and secondary education in Ghana under the District Assemblies. The two ACTS mandated the Assemblies to form educational oversight committees which is the highest education body in the districts, among their functions are to provide education infrastructure and materials and to form disciplinary committee to hear cases concerning pupils and teachers and prescribe sanctions. The District Education Oversight Committees (DEOCs) are by law mandated to oversee Instruction in schools, manage teaching Personnel, and engage in planning and provision of structures for schools, although certain aspects like teacher recruitment, promotion and sanction still remain centralized. As one of the main expectations of decentralised systems is to employ its own competent staff who it can hire, fire and promote,

This study looks at the challenges affecting the implementation of decentralisation in Ghanaian Public Basic Schools. It is imperative that more local authorities have the powers to hire, reward and fire a teacher, the more teachers would put in effort into their work to generate the needed output. If teachers are aware of close monitoring, supervision, and evaluation that would come from the local level instead of a national education office, they would be more conscientious and up to task. While a great number of some studies including Carr-Hill et al. (2018) reveal positive associations, others including Kuhon (2020) argue that there are no significant and even negative impact of decentralisation on educational outcomes, particularly when there is inadequate capacity to supervise and resource schools and also political influences at the local level. Unterhalter (2012) have also mentioned that there is growing evidence including Banerjee et al. (2008), Pherali, Smith, and Vaux (2011); Rocha, and Sharma (2008), and Rose (2003) that decentralization reforms may have unintended and sometimes negative effects in certain political and economic circumstances. Surprisingly Leer (2016) found a significant negative effect on the number of hours that teachers spend in the classroom, for schools in rural communities. This finding could be due to low levels of monitoring by local and district education inspectors.

Indeed, the concept of decentralization could be influenced by political decisions in some countries. Hence, country settings, political systems, and philosophical viewpoints on education

could influence implementation (Winkler, 1993; Karlsen, & Larrea, 2012). Some evidence from Ghanaian studies have documented the role of politics in the operations of the DEOCs. Such district and local power dynamics may affect participation, decision-making outcomes, and service delivery, as documented by Essuman and Akyeampong (2011). A participatory process at the local level, according to Hildyard, Pandurang, Wolvekamp, and Somasekhare (2001), may simply give possibilities for elite members to use their power to preserve exploitation and exclusion. While policymakers may believe that decentralizing decision-making will improve accountability, the reality may be quite different, since the agency and voice of individuals are subordinated to the power dynamics working within a group. Unequal power relations between the educated and ignorant, the old and young, the rich and poor, may marginalize the contribution of the less powerful in the decision-making process (Botchway, 2000). According to studies conducted in several African nations, inequalities in socioeconomic level, race, caste, social class, location (i.e., urban/rural), and gender have resulted in unequal access to involvement in organizations such as PTAs and SMCs (Bush & Heystek 2003; Rose 2003; Essuman & Akyeampong, 2011).

Despite the widespread use of decentralisation strategies in educational systems globally, there is a paucity of robust and empirical evidence linking decentralization to educational quality. Additionally, the association established by these extant studies (Souflas & Shapiro, 2006; Ikoya, 2008; Bruns et al., 2011; Sakyi, 2008; Sakyi, Adorno-Williams, Adze, 2011; Channa, 2016; Enlistment, Stevenson, Phillips et al., 2015, Carr-Hill, Rolleston, Schendel, and Waddington, 2018, Leer, 2016, and Kuhon, 2020) demonstrates conflicting findings about the impact of decentralization on teaching outcomes. Again, most of these studies focus attention on a devolved educational context failing to establish the relationships of decentralization in a deconcentrated and challenges confronting implementation of overall educational management including teacher discipline, motivation, and teaching. Thus, the study's findings provide context-specific evidence on challenges affecting the implementation of decentralisation in school management.

Specifically, this study sought to:

- 1 Determine mitigating factors towards the implementation of decentralisation in Ghanaian basic public schools
- 2 To investigate the type of decentralisation suitable for Ghanaian public basic schools.
- 3 To recommend policy guidelines to mitigate against challenges in the implementation of decentralisation in Ghanaian basic public schools

LITERATURE REVIEW

Studies including Ikoya (2008), and Bruns et al. (2011), and Oakgrove (2013) support the view that Decentralisation of education lead to certain benefits including better management of schools, better utilization of school facilities, and more resources available for students. According to Oakgrove (2013), groups tasked with guaranteeing the implementation of decentralised schools must be proactive in supervising school learning in order to maintain a standard. Again, the researcher against existing implementation difficulties indicated that timely provision of suitable resources, including teaching and learning materials, be made in order to increase educational quality. Although Ikoya (2008), Oakgrove (2013) suggest that need of decentralisation and also examined some challenges and practical measures which could be put in place to improve educational quality within the Nigerian context, they failed to explain the impact of decentralised systems on teacher outcomes as a result of decentralisation.

Regular internal and external supervision helps to ensure effective instructional delivery and the maintenance of standards in the school system. Felipe (2003), underscore the relevance of teacher's contribution to a school's educational system, and noted the way in which problems such as teacher promotion, pay package, society perspective of the profession, and many more can encourage or demotivate teachers. The level of dedication teachers has to their jobs may be minimal if they are not motivated, and this could lead to the school's goals not being met. In Earl et al. (2003) view, school leaders promote teaching and learning indirectly by their influence on staff motivation, commitment, and working environment. McLeod (2007) citing Maslow's theory of Human Needs argues that there exist in people a wide range of needs which determines their behaviour. A case study by Cangemi (2009) demonstrates one instance of how the concept of needs can provide a framework for managers to change employee behavior. The managers' awareness of employee needs including recognition through promotion, salary increment, and basic resources for work can help them to modify their management style to improve organizational outcomes. Within the context, the education directorates have the task to initiate fundraising to augment the school funds for the acquisition of essential resources need for schools to be effective.

Despite the general argument in favour of the adoption of decentralisation, the appropriateness of decentralised education systems in every country have been questioned more recent literature. Hanushek, Link, and Woessmann (2013) found that school level autonomy although affects positively in developed and high-performing countries, it had negatively affected student achievement in developing and low-performing countries, despite the application of various reform ideas. Gershberg and Meade (2005) in an earlier explained that since educational decentralisation makes localities more dependent on their local resources, it means that certain aspects of equity could suffer in the absence of adequate compensatory mechanisms. Similarly, Laing, Rivkin, Schiman, and Ward (2016) found that decentralisation is likely to have heterogeneous effects that benefit some schools but not others, and that the reform may be less beneficial in high poverty schools that lack management capacity and motivation to improve educational quality. Laing et al. (2016) examined the influence of local school councils (LSCs), which are responsible for principal hiring, evaluation, and contract renewal, as well as other management duties, on the efficacy of school principals and school quality. The study used a quantitative design. They highlighted that LSCs with greater managerial competence and stronger incentives to promote school quality can enhance principal effectiveness. Laing et al (2016) study, on the other hand, was limited by its design, as a quantitative design oversimplifies the practical role of the local school council and fails to provide insight into how the local council could assist principals in improving their effectiveness, particularly in high poverty schools.

Although, proponents of decentralisation argue that bringing decisions closer to the people improves school quality and efficiency by ensuring that schools are more responsive to local educational needs, Leer (2016) highlight that the impact of decentralisation could vary substantially, due to the manner in which implementation of these reforms as much decisions making relies on local resources and management capacity. Leer (2016) study explored the effects of decentralisation on educational outcomes in elementary and junior secondary schools in Indonesia. The research also explored the impact of decentralisation on teacher effort. A difference-in-differences model was employed in analysis. The researcher found that generally found that no overall effect of decentralisation on achievement. Surprisingly the evidence from

the study also suggests a negative effect of decentralisation on teacher effort, particularly in rural areas and among schools with inactive school committees. More specifically, Leer (2016) found that decentralisation of educational systems did not have significant effect on math and language achievement, however observed a weak negative effect on math achievement among schools with inactive school committees. With respect to the impact of decentralisation on teacher effort, Leer (2016) found a significant negative effect on the number of hours that teachers spend in the classroom, for schools in rural communities. Leer (2016) finding, thus, support the argument that decentralisation has done little to change what happens in the classroom as indicated by research including (Bjork, 2003). There are several explanations for this disconnect. Leer (2016) explained that the finding reflects the result of incomplete decentralisation, rather than poor school management decision making by district and school level leadership. Sakyi (2008) noticed in a qualitative study that delegation of responsibility for management decision-making and planning was rarely implemented at the district level, and that financial and personnel choices remained centralized. Sakyi's (2008) study also identified a lack of staff capability, a lack of commitment, and inter-organizational conflict between health managers and local government officials as impediments to management decentralisation implementation in the area.

Similarly, Sakyi et al. (2011) identified several additional challenges, including insufficient funding, a lack of qualified personnel, insufficient logistics and equipment, poor interpersonal relationships, a lack of transparency and an effective operational system, a lack of incentives to motivate staff, political interference, poor infrastructure, and a high rate of illiteracy. A significant aspect that can quickly negate the favourable benefits of decentralisation is when local educators lack the necessary knowledge and abilities, as well as the motivation to do their tasks. However, the researchers did not examine the association between decentralised roles and educational outputs in schools. Again, the study's generalizability was hampered by its emphasis on a small number of rural areas in Ghana. To address issues of generalisation, the current study included schools from two or more districts that were randomly picked from each of nine randomly selected areas throughout the country.

Further studies by Essuman and Akyeampong (2011) in Ghana suggests rural areas' local politics influence education decentralisation strategies' goal of better service education. They looked at how stakeholders in the school community view community participation. Using a multi-perspective approach, Essuman and Akyeampong (2011) looked at how community and school interactions work and the factors that influence them. PTAs and schools in Ghana's Central Region used semi structured questionnaires to collect data. In a case study by Essuman and Akyeampong (2011) the researchers also found that decentralisation enhanced community members' participation and representativeness in education beyond expectations. Essuman and Akyeampong (2011) also stated that in order to increase community participation, it is vital to meet the expectations of both schools and the community, and Essuman (2019) maintains that anything less than this reciprocity principle will weaken the link. It was also stated by authors Essuman and Akyeampong (2011) that community participation was expected to help with teacher monitoring. The case study's concluded that teachers preferred to report to convention officials such the school head, administrators, and district education supervisors rather than to members of the community. Teachers and school leaders were perceived by members of the SMC and PTA as not always wanting to encourage their participation in decision-making and often making decisions based on the opinions of individuals they

considered to be more knowledgeable or to have a higher social standing, as made to building consensus, according to the researchers (Essuman & Akyeampong, 2011).

Decentralisation can lead to decisions being made at several levels that are overlapping and contradicting, as well as the phenomena of elite capture, which reduces democratic spaces. The teacher recruiting rules in Nepal are divisive, resulting in a variety of employment contracts and benefits. Local elite interests drive decentralised finances in Uganda and South Africa, which are dominated by a small group of better educated and networked persons who can present themselves as an effective conduit for handling these monies to donors, central government, and the local population. The poor and disadvantaged are so ignored or excluded as a result (Prinsen & Titeca, 2008; Sayed & Soudien, 2005).

Regular internal and external supervision helps to ensure effective instructional delivery and the maintenance of standards in the school system. Whereas principals and headteachers are responsible for internal oversight within schools, the Education Oversight committee is responsible for external oversight. Inspectors' principal role is to ensure that high standards are maintained and schools are operated in compliance with established regulations. While it has been asserted that principals have discharged their internal supervisory responsibilities, the external supervisors (inspectors from the Ministry of Education) appear to be ineffective, as they rarely visit schools to supervise school operations. This has invariably harmed schools' ability to deliver effective teaching and learning. According to Nolan and Hoover (2011), shortcomings in school supervision, both by district level officers and head teachers, and the restrictions of disciplinary processes jeopardize effective teaching and have a detrimental effect on students' academic performance. In a previous study conducted in Ghanaian schools, Adadzi (2006) discovered that Ghana has the highest rate of teacher absenteeism (43%), and the lowest rating for instructional efficiency (30.05%), when compared to the remaining three developing countries. At the 22nd World Economic Forum (WEF 2012) on Africa, Ghana's education minister reported that teacher absenteeism was at 45 percent.

METHODOLOGY

Population and sampling

Population consisted of 14405 school heads of primary school across 261 districts in all Sixteen (16) regions in Ghana (MOE, 2019). Sample size was statistically determined by using Yamane's (1967) formulae, which indicated a minimum of 361 schools to be appropriate. A sample of 408 schools were selected. A simple random sampling technique was used to select 9 regions, followed by a random selection of a total of 67 districts from the 9 regions, 408 public and private schools were next randomly selected.

Instrument development

To ensure content validity, measurement items for the research model were adapted from literature. The measures for DEOC on educational management were selected from the ACT and classified using OECD (1998). Measures consisted of Personnel Management (8 Items), on Organization of Instruction (2 items), and Planning and Structures (2 items). Teacher outputs teacher outputs were selected from reliable instruments including Kor (2018) these consist of Teacher motivation (2 items), Teacher discipline (3 items), and Quality teaching (5 items). Headteachers rated various roles of their District Education Oversight Committees, and teacher outputs using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 5 – strongly agree to 1 – strongly disagree.

Sample and data collection

A cross-sectional survey was conducted. Interviews were conducted, and structured questionnaire was developed, pre-tested and administered during the survey. Collection of data for the study begun in June, 2019 to August 2019 across nine regions in Ghana. Prior to data collection, the researcher sent letters of introduction form the Institution of study (AIT) to all the District Educational offices and Headteachers of participating schools for their consent.

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Reliability Testing

Measurement and subsequent analysis of the primary data are both dependent on the reliability of the survey items used. The internal consistency Cronbach's coefficient alpha was used to measure the survey items' reliability in the current study. The more Cronbach's coefficient alpha there is, the more reliable the scale is. According to Borg and Gall (1983), a reliable and valid research instrument has a coefficient of 0.75 or above. The estimate Cronbach's coefficient Alpha (α) values for all construct all constructs are presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Internal Consistence measures and the number of measurement items

	Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
DOEC Roles	.796	12
Teacher Outputs	.777	11

Result from analysis reveals an acceptable value for measures for teacher outputs and for District Education Oversight Committees (DEOCs) roles. The finding confirms significant amount of consistency among measured items hence suggesting that items reliably measured the factors considered in the conceptual framework of the stud.

In telephone interviews with four (4) district directors also responded on the main challenges affecting the operations of your oversight committees. From the views most dominant challenge affecting their operation was the financial constraints (100%), Logistics constraints (75%), delay in the implementations taking Decisions taking at their level (100%), Irregular meetings (25%), non-commitment of some members (50%), Lack of motivation (50%).

The second leading challenge as outlined by headteachers, relates to the Inadequacy in Head teachers also noted that there were some members of the DEOC who were not well trained and hence were not very effective with their operations (4.5%), Infrastructure deficits within the schools (5.3%). Other issues outlined by head teachers were the poor communication or delay of relevant information to some schools (2.4%). Disagreement between teachers and DEOC (1.2%), Difficulty in monitoring and supervision of school due to poor roads

What are the Mitigating Factors/Challenges Towards the Implementation of Decentralisation in Public Basic Schools?

Some studies in the past have identified the delay in resource allocation, lack of effective supervision particularly in government schools, and delay in most decisions on appointments, promotions and sanctions as some key challenges faced as a result of Ghana's current de-

concentration system (Nolan & Hoover, 2011; Mohammed, 2016; GNECC, 2014). The current study sought to investigate if these identified issues have been adequately addressing by further investigate current challenges that exist in the implementation process in selected districts.

In telephone interviews with four (4) district directors also responded on the main challenges affecting the operations of your oversight committees. From the views most dominant challenge affecting their operation was the financial constraints (100%), Logistics constraints (75%), delay in the implementations taking Decisions taking at their level (100%), Irregular meetings (25%), non-commitment of some members (50%), lack of motivation (50%). The perspective of headteacher were also solicited regarding the challenges to the implementation of the DEOC roles as outlined by the Education decentralization Act. A multiple response analysis of responses provided was conducted. The tool was employed because responses were open ended and respondents provided more than one challenge. Table 4.11 presents the challenges to the operations of the DEOC as outlined by headteachers.

	N	Percent	Percent of Cases
Support for infrastructure	34	13.8%	16.2%
Poor roads hinder monitoring and supervision of school	3	1.2%	1.4%
Poor communication	6	2.4%	2.9%
Untrained and Limited human resources	11	4.5%	5.2%
Lack of financial support	73	29.7%	34.8%
Inadequate logistics	35	14.2%	16.7%
Poor Infrastructure in school	13	5.3%	6.2%
Delay in supply Textbooks	31	12.6%	14.8%
Delay in decisions appointments etc.	24	9.8%	11.4%
Political interference	13	5.3%	6.2%
Disagreement teachers and DEOC	3	1.2%	1.4%
	246	100.0%	117.1%

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

- Among some key challenges faced were:
- Inadequate logistics for the operations, limited support for infrastructure,
- inadequacy and delay in supply of TLMs, delays in decisions on appointments, promotions and sanctions, Political interferences, poor communication of relevant information to some schools, Difficulty in monitoring and supervision of school due to poor roads.

Theoretical Implications of Research Findings

The finding of the study is generally supported by studies including Nolan and Hoover (2011), Mohammed (2016), Kuhon (2020), and Sakyi et al. (2011) who posit that key challenges faced as a result of Ghana's current de-concentration system are the delay in resource allocation, lack of effective supervision (Nolan & Hoover, 2011; Mohammed, 2016) especially in government schools, and delay in most decisions on appointments, promotions and sanctions (GNECC, 2014). Kuhon (2020) posit that after 20 years of decentralising, there remains shortfalls in the implementation of decentralization towards which are very likely to negatively impact of

meeting goals of Education for All in Indonesia. Some challenges including concerns of human resources, issues of curriculum, corruption and lack of funding to implement decision were found to be major issues mitigating the successful implementation of decentralisation in Indonesia. Sakyi (2008) also observed that the implementation of management decentralisation was hindered in the district due to a lack of staff capacity, a lack of commitment, and inter-organizational friction between health managers and local government officials. As an example, Sakyi et al. (2011) listed a number of problems, such as a lack of adequate funds, a lack of qualified personnel, inadequate logistics and equipment, poor interpersonal relationships, a lack of transparency and a good operational system, a lack of incentives to motivate the staff, and a high rate of illiteracy. When local educators lack the necessary knowledge and abilities, as well as the motivation to carry out their responsibilities, the favourable consequences of decentralization can be readily annulled.

In another study by Laing, Rivkin, Schiman, and Ward (2016), the researchers found that it is probable that decentralisation will produce heterogeneous effects that benefit some schools and not others and that the reform may be less beneficial in high poverty schools with lower capacity to manage and less motivation to improve the quality of schooling. Osei-Foie (1998) found that there were a weak institutional and resource capacity arrangements for the implementation of the policy and finally that there were insufficiency and irregularity in the strategies meant to implement the policy, thus, making the decentralisation in the basic education subsector appears nebulous. With regard to inadequacy and delay in supply of TLMs (Baba, 2012) highlight the need to adequate and timely provision of TLMs and needed physical infrastructure as their absence affect teachers as they are denied the opportunity to share professional experiences. For example, when there is adequate supply of Textbooks it offers security and confidence to inexperienced teachers (Tioga, 2010) as they provide structure and order in the teaching and learning process (Johansson, 2006; Tioga, 2010) and in the classroom. Although, among the least issues mentioned during the interviews the finding regarding disagreement on the part of teacher and some decision of DEOC's is supported by Essuman and Akyeampong (2011). The issue of the power dynamics at district and local levels among groups or members according to Essuman and Akyeampong (2011) may affect participation, outcomes in decision-making and eventually service delivery. Also, Essuman and Akyeampong (2011) mentioned that there was a feeling among SMC and PTA that sometimes head teachers and teachers behaved in ways which diminished the value of participatory decision-making and often decision-making was based on opinions of those considered more knowledgeable or of high social standing rather than consensus building. The finding in Ghanaian rural community was in line with an observation made by Lewis and Naidoo (2004) in their studies of school governance in South Africa. They found that consultation processes were invariably managed by a few powerful members and the school principals in their own interests used qualitative design to delve into South African primary school teachers' views on the implementation of distributive leadership. Although teachers favoured distributive leadership, Naicker and Mistry (2013) found that it was difficult to put it into practice because of the existing hierarchical structures and non-participative decision-making.

Decentralisation can lead to decisions being made at several levels that are overlapping and contradicting, as well as the phenomena of elite capture, which reduces democratic spaces. The teacher recruiting rules in Nepal are divisive, resulting in a variety of employment contracts and benefits. Local elite interests drive decentralised finances in Uganda and South Africa,

which are dominated by a small group of better educated and networked persons who can present themselves as an effective conduit for handling these monies to donors, central government, and the local population. The poor and disadvantaged are so ignored or excluded as a result (Prinsen & Titeca, 2008; Sayed & Soudien, 2005). A re-examination of decentralisation techniques is required to lessen these negative consequences. While the decentralised system must rebuild local governments and schools' accountability capabilities, it must also let underprivileged groups participate more fully in system. Given Ghana's current decentralised situation, very little can be written regarding the relationship between the intervener.

Ampratwum, Awal and Oduro (2018) in another Ghanaian study links governance in the educational sector due to political settlement with teacher accountability. The researchers argue that teacher levels of attendance have been high and this is one of the key factors accounting to the lack of quality in Ghanaian basic schools. The researcher based on qualitative review concludes that the quality of education differs across districts. The researcher explained this was due to undermining effect to political-competition on community cooperation and participation in decision making at the district level. Among least involved roles were involvement in the recruitment of qualified teachers for schools, make recommendations on the rewards promotion, wage adjustment etc. for teachers and school heads, and ensure the supply of recommended textbooks and other teaching and learning materials to schools. This observation is because aspects of education systems including teacher recruitment, promotions, supply of textbooks still remain centralised, and for this reason there are sometimes delay in the execution of these functions. This observation was made by Sakyi (2008) over a decade ago. These outcomes are also outlined by Nolan and Hoover (2011) who posit that, lack of effective supervision especially in government schools, and delay in most decisions on appointments, promotions and sanctions Teachers' irregular promotion, low pay package (when compared to other public workers), societal perception of the job and many more have dampened the morale of teachers. When teachers are not motivated, their level of job commitment may be low and the objectives of the school may not be accomplished (Felipe, 2003). Although decentralization is relevant Americana et al. (2008) and Laing, Rivkin, Schiman, and Ward (2016) posit that challenges including little experience of local democracy, on-going factional politics, less motivation or resistance on the part of key officials posits, the inadequacies in the monitoring and supervision of schools at district levels, delay of resources and important decisions (Nolan & Hoover 2011; Mohammed, 2016) seriously undermines effective teaching which adversely affects the academic performance of learners.

Practical Implication of Research Findings

The managers' awareness of employee needs including recognition through promotion, salary increment, and basic resources for work can help them to modify can help them leverage those needs to increase employee motivation, and subsequently on organizational outcomes.

According to Oakgrove (2013), real decentralisation requires that all decisions about teacher recruitment, remuneration, training, and awards be made at the local level. However, research by Prinsen and Titeca (2008), Sayed and Soudien (2005), and others has cautioned that when certain decisions of power are decentralised, it can result in overlapping and conflicting decisions, citing conflicting teacher recruitment policies in Nepal entailing various types of service contracts and benefits. In Uganda and South Africa, decentralised finances are driven

by local elite interests and dominated by a small group of more educated and networked persons capable of portraying themselves as an effective conduit for these monies to donors, central government, and the local populace. As a result, the poor and disadvantaged are overlooked or excluded (Prinsen & Titeca, 2008; Sayed & Soudien, 2005).

The work of DEOC is very important for effective decentralisation at the basic school level but the study identified serious logical challenges which hinders their functions as spelled out in both Acts. It will be necessary that various Assemblies take the work of DEOC seriously and make resources available for their effective role in the management of Basic school across the country. With regard to challenges relating to inadequate infrastructure particularly in disadvantaged districts Gershberg and Meade (2005) have advised for close collaboration between schools and parents as they could benefit from additional monies from parental contributions in order to improve on infrastructure.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Administrative budget of the various Assemblies must include running cost of DEOCS so that adequate resources are always available to carry out their mandated functions. One major activity of MMDAs is to improve quality education and improve infrastructure. Ministry of Local Government must make it mandatory for every Assembly to spend not less than 25% of its annual revenue on improving educational infrastructure. Ministry of Education must make a policy to procure and distribute TLMs before the beginning of every academic year since TLMs have direct effect in both teachers and pupils' performance. To enhance effective educational decentralization, the Ministry of Education must come out with legislation to allow various Assemblies working through the District Directors of education take up the responsibilities of recruiting, promotion, payment and sanction.

- There is the need to harmonise Ghana Education Service and Education Act 556 (1998) and 778 (2008) respectively to avoid existing conflict for effective decentralisation of Public Basic Schools in Ghana
- To achieve true and effective decentralisation in Public Basic Schools, major decisions like financial and personnel issues must be taken at District level as contained in Ghana Education Service and Education Acts 1998 and 2008 respectively.
- The work of DEOC is very important for effective decentralisation at the basic school level but the study identified serious logical challenges which hinders their functions as spelled out in both Acts. It recommended that various Assemblies must take the work of DEOC seriously and make resources available for their effective role in the management of Basic School.
- To make Assemblies more responsive to their statutory functions towards education decentralisation the government must include how DEOC function in the districts in the annual Functional Assessment Tool (FOAT).

Recommendation for future Research

- To address part of limitation of this study Cross-country research using Methodology of this study is recommended for generalisation for future policy formulation
- Decentralisation and the role of parents to quality education in public basic schools.

- Decentralisation of education management and its effect on urban, peri-urban and deprived community schools' performance.

Finally, as the study employed a cross-sectional data to examine relationships, observed effects may differ when a longitudinal study is conducted. It is therefore recommended for future study that a longitudinal study be employed in investigating impacts of decentralization on school outcomes.

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