

The Role of the Mojahedin Khalq Before and After the Islamic Revolution of Iran

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ABSTRACT

The Mojahedin Khalq Organization was formed in 1965 with an organizational and religious approach and was one of the political groups that fought against both the Pahlavi regime and the Islamic Republic. The main purpose of this group was to oppose the government and their armed methods. In 1971, after the execution of the organization's main leaders, members of the organization came to the conclusion that Islam did not meet the organization's goals for guerrilla and armed operations, and that Marxism could replace Islamic ideology, which were divided into Marxist and religious branches. The religious groups of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization joined Imam Khomeini in 1975, but the Marxist branch, led by Rajavi, fought against the revolution with the idea of seeking supremacy. The main question of this research is how the Mojahedin Khalq Organization has changed its ideological positions and approach to Marxism. In response to this question, it is hypothesized that the Marxist course of the members of the organization gradually began from September 1941 onwards and finally this organization took on a Marxist form and content. This article examines the principles of thought of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization, the process of ideological deviation of the organization and the reason for the failure of the organization and the strategy and performance of this organization after the revolution. The present research has been done using the method of interviews, library and documents in an analytical-descriptive method.

Keywords: Mojahedin Khalq Organization, Armed Struggle, Marxist Ideology, Assassination, Failure

INTRODUCTION

The Mojahedin Khalq of Iran Organization was founded in 1954 by several young Muslim intellectuals, some of whom had gained political experience in the National Resistance Movement and the Freedom Movement in the 1930s and 1940s. It was established with the aim of overthrowing the Pahlavi government by resorting to "armed struggle" and establishing an Islamic government. Its founders were Mohammad Hanifnejad, Saeed Mohsen and Abdolreza Nikbin, who announced their existence in 1971. In Iran before the revolution, several groups and parties were trying to overthrow the Pahlavi regime. In order to bring the people and the elites of the society with them, these groups must present their reasons for rejecting the Pahlavi regime, the favorable situation after the regime and how to reach the promised society.

The emergence of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization of Iran is the result of a new era after the suppression of the Pahlavi regime after the suppression of the June 6 uprising, the deportation of the uprising leader to Turkey and then Iraq, the arrest of countless political and religious fighters and elites, at the stalemate of libertarian groups and parties, a new era of authoritarian

and repressive rule began. According to the leaders of the Mojahedin, the only reason for the failure of the struggles until then was the lack of organization for the leadership of the masses, which also had to be filled by the parties. The ideal society desired by the Mojahedin was a monotheistic classless society.

In search of its revolutionary ideology, the organization engaged in a dialectical interpretation of Islam and, using the militant and revolutionary principles of Islam, presented revolutionary Islam as an ideology to justify the armed struggle to overthrow the Pahlavi regime. The organization began its work with religious activities, and because the new ideological view of the organization was attractive to intellectuals, especially the youth, it moved towards Marxism, which was not supported by the main leaders of the revolution.

In 1975, with the execution of the founders and the imprisonment of the early religious cadres, under the influence of people with a Marxist orientation, the organization became skeptical and officially became a Marxist. Thus, the main roots of ideological change can be traced to the fields of thought, strategy and organization.

The Mojahedin Khalq Organization, with its regular organizational structure and extensive facilities for armed struggle, as well as by pretending to be Islamic, was able to attract many people, but after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the power-seeking of the leaders, the non-religious tendencies of this group, which declared themselves Marxist in 1975, became more apparent. Due to ideological differences, this group opposed the government of Imam Khomeini, and by taking the side of the revolutionary forces against the mentioned group, this organization gradually sought to overthrow the Islamic Republic and started armed actions against the government of the Islamic Republic and they played a pivotal role in creating post-revolutionary unrest.(Mazaheri, 2005, 38-43) Finally, by declaring armed war and terrorist acts, it inflicted significant damage on the Islamic Republic.

THE HISTORY OF MOJAHEDIN KHALQ

In 1965, three students from Sharif University of Technology formed a group called the Mojahedin, which had political experience in the National Resistance Movement and then in the Freedom Movement and their main activity was the assassination of American military advisers living in Iran and some second-rate officials of the Pahlavi regime. The thoughts of the Mojahedin Khalq were taken from the Freedom Movement, as Engineer Bazargan, the head of the Freedom Movement, said: The Mojahedin Khalq is the "children of the freedom movement" and their basic intellectual foundations and teachings have been taken from Engineer Bazargan discussions and books and the freedom movement.(Herati, Mehdizadeh, Jalalpour, Yousefi, 2017, 151-174)

In the middle of 1968, Abdolreza Nikbin resigned from the organization. In that year, the organization formed five study and communication groups under the titles of "Ideology Group", "Political Group", "Labor Group", "Rural Studies Group" and "Clergy Group". Later, in order to gain the support of Imam Khomeini, who was in exile in Najaf, the organization sent a representative to him, which, of course, did not reach a conclusion due to Imam's insight (Beheshti Seresht, 2005, 57-82).

Until 1969, no woman was admitted to the organization because Hanifnejad, the organization's main and influential leader, opposed marriage and saw it as a dependency and a barrier to the struggle but the importance of the presence of women and the special use of their cover for the leaders of the organization was "discovered" and women entered the organization. (Hashemi, 2009, 125-184).

In the political and international dimension, like any other organization, he saw the socialist revolutions of Russia and China as the revolution of the working people and the oppressed masses, and regarded Mao and Lenin as continuing the path of the prophets in modern times. They sought to establish contacts with some Marxist governments and parties. (Jafarian, 2013, 546-8) In the organizational dimension, the organization followed the communist principle called "democratic centralism" and according to this principle, all members of the organization had to obey the orders and leadership policy of the organization without debate (Abrahimyan, 2007, 183). In 1969, the organization decided to establish contact with the Palestinian al-Fatah organization and use their facilities for guerrilla and armed training in order to acquire military capability to launch armed operations. (Rastgho, 2009, 59).

After the arrest of the group's leaders in 1971 by Savak, Massoud Rajavi, a second-degree member of the group, escaped execution by revealing the names and addresses of all members and was sentenced to life in prison, this was while the other members of the group were arrested and executed (ISNA, July 1, 2021).

The negative impact of becoming a Marxist in 1971 was a serious one for the members of the organization in disappointing the religious forces, and it had many negative effects on the Islamic movement and the creation of a crisis in the group. The ideological crisis in 1974 forced the members of the organization to change the system and turned the pyramid system into a system of branch independence, but the first whisper of disagreement began with the change of position and the way Marxism of members by Majid Sharif Vaeqi. From December 1974 to May 1975, Majid Sharif Vaeqi and his companions confronted the deviant movement; But the organization killed him. Thus, the first religious group was formed with Majid Sharif Vaeqi, Morteza Samadiyeh Labaf and Saeed Shahsvandi, who were destroyed by the Marxist section during their self-criticism. After this, the religious members of the organization practically did not have an organization called the Mojahedin Khalq Organization, but the Marxists tried to rebuild the organization based on the Marxist principles, which had been slightly revised. (Beheshti Seresht, Heidari Bateni, 2014, 41-69).

As Ayatollah Taleghani said in prison: "We worked so hard and trained these young people. Now the organization has changed its position. This has left us frustrated and disappointed." Ayatollah Taleghani was among those who issued fatwas (judicial decree) against Marxists in prison. Ayatollah Taleghani accompanied and supported the organization until 1954 and before the change of the ideology of the organization was revealed in order to save them. (Tasnim news, September 9, 2019) The members of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization gradually turned to sectarianism and practically became a sect. (Thaler Singer, 2006, 28).

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the organization pursued a conservative process with the Islamic Republic, and at the same time organized rallies, sit-ins, and frequent demonstrations against the regime, and engaged in destructive press activities with the

opposition. The officials of the organization participated in the first elections of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the presidency and entered the election campaign with the candidates of their organization. They did not succeed in the parliamentary elections and Massoud Rajavi was disqualified in the presidential elections. It was from this time that their opposition to the Islamic Republic became apparent. (Haghibin, 2011, 13) On June 20, 1981, the Mojahedin and Bani-Sadr called on people across the country to take to the streets the next day to express their opposition to the Islamic Republic Party monopolists who allegedly carried out a secret coup. Their main intention was to repeat the February 1979 uprising, which they never revealed. At first, they intended to stage a series of demonstrations, then to stage strikes and solidarity throughout the country, especially in government offices and factories, and finally to weaken the morale of the state armed forces, especially the Revolutionary Guards, to overthrow the Islamic Republic. (Abrahamian, 2007, 277) The Mojahedin also carried out a series of suicide operations during this period, which can be called a crime.

PRINCIPLES OF MOJAHEDIN KHALQ THOUGHT

If we review the history of the formation of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization, we will see that the change in the ideology of the organization from Islam to Marxist was not so strange and unexpected. In other words, the beginning of the Mojahedin Organization became Marxist, not from 1975, but from the very beginning. The ideology that the early leaders first formulated for the organization was the core of Marxism, whose appearance was embellished with Islam. The members of the organization, under the influence of Bazargan, believed in a personal interpretation of Islamic rules and did not value the clergy and authority in Islam.

Hossein Ahmadi Rouhani, an influential and active member of the organization who became a Marxist in 1975, writes: "The organization believed in Islamic ideology from the beginning, but what it intended as Islamic ideology had characteristics that, during its growth and so-called evolution, expressed its own way of thinking and belief about Islam, and in fact with Islam and The Shari'a introduced by prominent Islamic jurisprudential scholars was fundamentally different" Rouhani goes on to write: "The members of the organization accepted the principles of religion. Explaining that they did not believe in the infallibility of the Prophet and the Imams in terms of prophethood and Imamate. They believed that they, too, had made mistakes." (Ahmadi Rouhani, 2005, 49-57) He adds: "Philosophically, while rejecting the first principle, the most important principle of materialism, namely the primacy of the soul over matter. Second, it believed in the principle of historical materialism, the material movement of history, which is the logical result of philosophical materialism. This was a dialectical issue in itself, which is why it must be said that the organization had neither Islamic nor Marxist ideology, but an eclectic ideology, a so-called concoction and a combination of Islam and Marxism, and the weakness and deviation of the organization in ourselves and there were other political deviations" (Ibid, 124).

Imam Khomeini's opinion about the principles and ideas of the Mojahedin was as follows: "I came to the conclusion from all their statements and writings that this population does not believe in Islam. The organization of this population is not based on belief in Islam. I consider them a deviant and misguided population I know and I cannot support and strengthen them in any way, I consider them more dangerous for Islam than the Marxists. (Imam Khomeini, 1999, Vol 19, 443)

The founders of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization used Bazargan's intellectual ideas to compile the organization's ideology and ideological foundations. One of the biggest reasons for the deviation of this organization was the influence of eclectic ideas and distance from religious centers and the formulation of religious opinions without consulting specialized institutions in this field, so that this issue led to the acceptance of Marxism and rejection of Islam and authorize violence against individuals who refused to obey the organization.(Ahmadi Hajiklani, 2008, 309).

Familiarity with Marxist works aroused the interest of the organization's leaders in this Marxist thinking and methods. Hanifunejad, the main theorist of the organization, believed that "a good Marxist cannot be a good Muslim. (Jafarian , 2003 , 231-2) The organization began its activities based on three principles: 1) armed struggle, 2) emphasizing the need for organization, and 3) the scholastic or ideological nature of the struggle.(zahiry, 2000,323) The socio-political education of the organization was also mainly based on Marxist-Leninist thinking, which at that time had a great appeal, especially in universities. In fact, the founders of the organization sought to somehow explore the attractions of Marxist thought in Islam. The organization's policy in the struggle against the Pahlavi government was also analyzed in the context of the working class struggle against capitalism. (Jafarian , 2003,241-2).

The organization believed that Iran was under the domination of American imperialism and that the White Revolution had transformed the country from a feudal society to a Western-dependent bourgeois society. The Pahlavi government had no support other than the bourgeoisie, and ruled mostly by creating repression, intimidation and propaganda. The ideals of the organization after the overthrow of the government were the creation of an economy independent of the West, the liberation of the masses and the creation of a monotheistic classless society. (zahiry, 2000, 323).

Eventually the contradictions in the ideological foundations of the organization became apparent, and in May 1975 most of the leaders of the time, who were still free, voted to accept Marxism and the Marxism-Leninism of the organization, Islam was considered the ideology of the middle class and not the working class. (Abrahamian, 2005,608-9).

On the eve of the victory of the Islamic Revolution, a few members of the organization who had been released from prison, along with a number of hesitant outside members and supporters who formed its forces, began a new organizational-political movement. However, the political activity of the Mojahedin Khalq before the victory of February 13, 1979 was limited to a few messages and statements with a low level of publication that in less than a month before the victory of the Revolution, not with a specific title but as "Mojahedin imprisoned or released from prison Has been issued.(A group of researchers, 2006,347-8) After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the struggle against the Islamic Republic of the Mojahedin changed its position from the political to the military phase, and the military phase became an armed movement based on the decision of the organization's leadership. Since then, the organization's plans have clearly moved toward complete overthrow.(Ibid , 574-581).

After July 28, 1981 and September 29, 1981, Massoud Rajavi and Bani Sadr Beth fled to France, and Musa Khiabani replaced Massoud Rajavidar in the country and at the headquarter of the organization. The organization changed and the organizing of the different departments

changed completely. However, in late 1981, after months of failed assassinations of innocent people, the central base of the Mojahedin was hit by the Revolutionary Guards, and on February 7, 1981, Musa Khiabani was killed along with several other members in clashes and shootings. The strike led to the complete withdrawal of Mojahedin forces from Iran to Iraq and Pakistan. The peak of the organization's betrayal of the country can be seen in their stance and actions in the face of the imposed war, and after waging a psychological war against the Islamic Republic, they became the fifth column of the enemy.

The members of this organization had three main principles in their thinking and relied on the Marxist interpretation of Islam. 1) The dialectical interpretation of religion 2) Islamic Protestantism and 3) Socialism (Shafieifar, 2012). Some of these groups of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization (Mahdaviun - People's Cry - Religious nuclei - Meysamy and the United Nation) were inspired by the views and ideas of Imam Khomeini and Dr. Shariati to join the revolution, led by Imam Khomeini and Others (Rajavi group) fought against the revolution with the idea of supremacy and the principle of leadership.

Recognizing the problem of society and its solution from the perspective of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization

Launch a social movement, including the Mojahedin Khalq, or rather an American-style color revolution, to overthrow the Islamic Republic and establish a secular republic approved by the West and the United States. Every day, this group designs an scenario-type of information-journalism and tries to cause chaos in the society by accusing different elements of the system. In some internal guidelines, secret networks are created to create chaos in society through terrorism to influence the political structure of society, known as the "strategy of tension", which means to influence and dominate through creating tension. The goal is to destroy the existing order and achieve their goals. Since the victory of the revolution, this "strategy of tension", with exactly the same characteristics as described in the internal pamphlets of the NATO secret armies, began through the Mojahedin Khalq in Iran, which means engaging the post-revolutionary regime in assassinations and riots. There were local riots, and the most important aspect of this "strategy of tension" is the "terrorism" that the Mojahedin Khalq carried out in Iran in the 1981s.

The organization had the method of armed struggle on its agenda and formed militias and team houses to train weapons and explosives to its members, such as assassinating individuals and regime officials, blowing up government buildings and ceremonies, and armed robbery of state-owned banks. The basis of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization was in the period before and after the Islamic Revolution. This organization is on the eve of holding celebrations 2,500th in preparation for its first and most important armed action, the organization sent a group to al-Fatah military schools in Palestine to teach the principles of destruction and explosion of this great ceremony a major blow to the reputation. This great ceremony would deal a major blow to the reputation of the monarchy, but after a few months of military training, all members of the organization were arrested in 1971 and the first generation of leaders before Savak infiltrated the organization and most of its members were executed or imprisoned (Shafieifar, 2012).

This current, which was influenced by Marxist ideology, considered global capitalism and imperialism as the main cause of all human problems and believed that imperialism and capital

have taken over the whole world and a branch of it has entered Iran and the problem of society is the crisis. They considered capitalism and imperialism. "They believed that the problem of society was more serious than the freedom movement had imagined." Their solution was to overthrow the monarchy.

Therefore, it seems that an important part of the great wave of blind terrorism in the 1981s is not the work of the Mojahedin Khalq; The work of the secret armed nuclei of the "network" or the small and scattered secret nuclear nuclei that they were doing and disappearing was the responsibility of the Mojahedin Khalq. One of the main functions of the Mojahedin Khalq was to disguise all the subversive and terrorist activities of the secret cells operating in Iran. They have been very successful in this field until today. A large, large-scale organization was set up in the most important department of the Ministry of Intelligence to monitor the activities of the "hypocrites or Mojahedin Khalq", but even as a small pamphlet on NATO and its allies' intelligence activities and covert cells operating inside Iran, weren't introduced. This is the same camouflage but pure blindness that has been cleverly created around the controversy of the "hypocrites or Mojahedin Khalq."

Thus, the "network" had agents in the left-wing Marxist political groups, the Mojahedin Khalq, as well as among the pro-Islamic Republic forces of Iran, mainly through former political prisoners who had collaborated with the spy team for any reason, and through These forces were able to pursue a "strategy of tension" after the revolution, and this "strategy of tension" in addition to manipulating and deeply influencing the political processes of the post-revolutionary system, which had two major effects on the Mojahedin Khalq: Rajavi became the absolute leader And the charisma and the other is to empty the anti-American and anti-Western potential of the Mojahedin Khalq and turn it into an organization similar to the private mercenary armies. (Moghadam , 2021, 124-134).

The organization was one of the few groups that tried to systematically penetrate the system, and to some extent succeeded. The reason for this success was that the institutions of the revolution did not have strong security and it was not possible to select its forces and it was formed spontaneously. That is why we saw the Mojahedin Khalq raise the issue of influence, and they did so very systematically. The Tudeh Party did the same, but the Mojahedin Khalq acted stronger than the Tudeh Party in the discussion of influence. The Tudeh Party was known as the Marxists, and their members were well-known and did not have much influence, but the Mojahedin Khalq , unlike the Tudeh, had the opportunity to influence. Many infiltrators were not known and continued their sabotage operations for a long time, inflicting serious blows on the Islamic Republic. Influential members of the Mojahedin Khalq had infiltrated the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Committee, and universities. Some intrusions were gradually discovered and removed from the system, and some were not identified and may still be sabotaging.

It is currently the responsibility of the US and Israeli intelligence services to conduct intelligence gathering and psychological warfare. The people who work in Albania today act exactly as one of the psychological warfare branches of the US and Israeli security services. As long as the organization has this function, its life continues. Another customer of the hypocrites today is the Saudis. These customers are the reason for the organization to continue its activities because through them they can hit the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.(Rezaei, 2020)

The process of ideological deviation of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization:

The Marxist course of the members of the organization began gradually from September 1941 onwards, and the teachings of the organization gradually became devoid of religious content until 1975, and the Marxist format and content replaced it, so that after the year 1975 to Gradually, the form and content of the organization shifted completely to Marxism, leaving only the name of God. (Meysamy, 2001, 198- 202)

The behavior of the Mojahedin Khalq cannot be considered a kind of deviation in the sense that from the beginning it was not the foundations of a religious organization, but the founders of the organization were people who personally adhered to traditional religion, but when the organization they founded and their theoretical works and books such as *We see economics in simple language*, *cognition*, *way of evolution*, etc, which was based on Marxist originality with religious roots, and due to lack of knowledge of the organization in the years before the revolution, the Mojahedin was considered an Islamic organization and Savak Proponents of the Mojahedin considered Islamic Marxism, and this was not a misinterpretation because the organization was Marxist before it was Muslim, and many who joined the organization had traditional Islamic motives. Indeed, many of them joined the organization before the revolution with the right motives, but the nature and ideology of the organization was not really a religious ideology.

People who were recruited by the Mojahedin Khalq from 1968 to 1975 were deceived by the ostensibly Islamic ideas, and even at a time when Taqi Shahram turned to Marxism in 1973 like had kept Islam and the verses of the Qur'an. In 1975, the organization left the Islamic institution and joined the public Marxist, but from 1968 to 1975, before the organization publicly entered the Marxist phase, the organization displayed religious symbols and a large part of its contributions to the organization. It was through religious people and the forces that joined the organization were also religious people, because knowing the internal nature of the organization was not an easy task and the only person who knew the organization well at that time and did not accompany the organization in any was Khomeini. It is common to mistake that organization in the year 1975's ideology changes because the organization has been Marxist since its inception and was only ostensibly Islamic, and in 1973 it became openly Marxist (irac. December 6,2020).

Cause of organizational failure (criticism of the organization)

The Mojahedin Organization had fundamental weaknesses and shortcomings in order to present the revolutionary and Islamic ideological foundations, and the most important factor in its failure was the deviation from Islamic ideas and, in fact, ideological fusion, because they assumed that Islam alone could not solve the problems in the new era, therefore, it is necessary to establish a connection between Islam and the ideologies of the new age, and this, while creating a spirit of imitation and intellectual fusion, prevents the presentation of an independent and coherent idea in the philosophical sense. They had no plans for the post-revolutionary society, the main reason being the lack of proper leadership by the group members. (Shafieifar, 2012)

The lack of a clear slogan and goal of the Mojahedin Organization, in the light of which it can have more support from the masses and be defensible against the Pahlavi supporters, is one of its titles, which was one of the shortcomings of the Mojahedin in achieving their goal. Lack of a

suitable model for the succession of the Pahlavi regime was another major problem of the Mujahiden and it became clear that the organization, by paying all those heavy costs, did not have a bright prospect of a future government that could envision a bright future for the people of the country. We do not have the right model in society to build the future with, the main reason being the lack of proper leadership in the organization. (Meysimi, 2001, 148).

The supporters of the Mojahedin were constantly arguing with the youth, especially the students, that they should act like the Algerians and the Vietnamese, otherwise sabotage and explosions and things like that will start. In this regard, they insisted that cultural work is futile and reactionary, and believed that more practical work should be done (Ibid, 159). While Mohammad Hanifnejad, one of the founders of the organization, believed more in theoretical work and finally, under the pressure of the forces of the organization and in order not to fall behind the filth of the people's sacrifice (as in the case of Siahkal), he consented to military work (Ibid :381). After the revolution, the Mojahedin Khalq became hypocrites; during the revolution, they became counter-revolutionaries; the Mojahedin Khalq became infamous and failed politicians in the international arena.

Strategy, performance and terrorist attacks of the organization after the Islamic Revolution

The performance of the organization after the Islamic Revolution should be divided into three stages: in the first stage, the organization tried to consolidate its position and present itself as an alternative to political leaders in power, in the second stage, tried to form an alliance with Bani Sadr and Strengthen the contradictions within the government to achieve its goals, Finally, by entering the armed phase, the third phase of its political life began. During this period, the organization's strategy tried to use the opportunity to equip and organize and increase its ability against its political rivals. Using rivals, it provided the ground for the organization to seize power as an alternative force, and on the other hand, tried to participate actively in the political arena after the revolution, make the most of the legal facilities and political context provided to achieve high levels of political power.(Fowzi,2007,89-112)

After the revolution, the assassination of forces supporting Khomeini was on the agenda of the organization. These assassinations were led by members of the central cadre of the organization, including Musa Khiabani, who were hiding in team houses (Abrahamian, 2007, 219) In this regard, Rajavi, from his exile in Paris, called all the officials of the Islamic Republic collaborators of tyranny and considered them suitable targets for the implementation of revolutionary justice and called for their assassination.(Ibid:220) This loss was very heavy for Khomeini's forces.

In the following days, the assassinations of the Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah and Khomeini supporters increased in the cities. In several terrorist operations, a large number of government officials were assassinated, some of which were unsuccessful. Most of the killers were young people between the ages of 17 and 22, who carried out assassinations, some of which were suicide bombings, as a result of the organization's propaganda.(Ibid , 221-2)

On September 29, 1981, the office of the Prime Minister was blown up, killing Rajai and Bahonar, the new president and prime minister, who had not been in office for more than a

month. The explosion was carried out by one of the infiltrating elements of the Mojahedin called Kashmiri.

In general, the summer of 1981 was the peak of the terrorist attacks of the organization. In addition to the officials and the Revolutionary Guards and the officials of the Islamic Republic Party and the clergy, ordinary pro-revolutionary people were also targeted by terrorist attacks. During this period, various centers were bombed by this group and these attacks led to the killing of 504 people in different parts of Iran.

With the help of the people, the security and government forces succeeded in besieging the organization's main headquarters in Tehran on February 7, 1981, where Musa Khiabani the second level of the Mojahedin Organization and his wife, Ashraf Rabiee, the wife of Massoud Rajavi (leader) and Moghaddam, the military commander of the organization, were hiding and after hours of fighting, the all were killed.

In the following days, other team houses were discovered, and finally, by the end of the spring of 1982, all the team houses of the organization were discovered and identified, and the organization was forced to transfer the remnants of its forces to Kurdistan and from there to Iraq and later from Iraq to Albania and the members of the organization left Iran.

The Tirana camp is the current headquarters of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran in Tirana, the capital of Albania. In 2016, after the closure of Liberty Camp (near Baghdad Airport), members of the Mojahedin were transferred to European countries, mostly to Albania. Currently, 2,000 Mojahedin members live in the Tirana camp. Its members were previously stationed at Camp Ashraf in Iraq. After the overthrow of Saddam in 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council passed a resolution calling for the expulsion of members of the Mojahedin Khalq Organization (as Saddam's ally) from Iraq.(Theguardian, 9 Nov .2018)

CONCLUSION

With the influence of Marxists in the leadership, some members of the organization came to the conclusion that Marxism could replace Islamic ideology. They changed their ideology from Islam to Marxism and became ideologically divided. Following this incident, the organization was divided into two groups, religious and Marxist.

Although the first religious group was assassinated and purged by the Marxist faction and virtually severed ties with other religious members, other religious forces left behind by the organization can be divided into three categories, including prison forces, out of prison and overseas section. Outside the prison, each joined other forces or formed a new group. Some groups were influenced by Khomeini's ideas, continued their armed struggle against the Pahlavis and launched several military operations against the Shah's mercenaries. In the group inside the prison, led by Meysamy, who had separated from the Marxist section, he reviewed and revised the mistakes and shortcomings of the theoretical foundations of the organization and the religious members of the overseas sector also stood firm in their religious positions, individually or in groups, and continued their struggle.

In general, the Mojahedin Khalq Organization rejected the existing system and had difficulty proving its negation, due to the lack of adequate leadership, ideological purity and the

eclecticism of Islam and Marxism, it was not able to provide the desired system. The Islamic socialism they wanted was just a title and it never showed the elements of their desired society. On the other hand, this organization did not have a correct understanding of the society's problem and could not provide a correct solution to it with a superficial analysis, for this reason, the idea of this organization cannot be the intellectual basis of the Islamic Revolution. In the years after the revolution, this organization repeated the same analytical mistake and waged an armed struggle against the Islamic Republic. After the Islamic Revolution, the Mojahedin Organization tried to use the opportunity to reorganize itself and present itself as an alternative to the new government, to this end, the organization adopted a two-pronged strategy in dealing with the Islamic Republic. On the one hand, it tried to be accepted as a legal force within the framework of the newly established system of the Islamic Republic, and on the other hand, it maintained its facilities and capabilities to enter the armed phase. Contradictions and inconsistencies between different dimensions of this strategy eventually led the organization to confront the Islamic Republic. The organization was trying to achieve its goals by taking advantage of the contradictions within the government and by supporting Bani Sadr, after despairing of this tactic, he turned to armed war, which had dire and catastrophic consequences and led to the exclusion of the organization from the political and intellectual scene of Iran.

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