

A Re-Examination of Measures for Typifying Political Parties' Philosophies, Policies and Democracy in Free Societies and Lessons for sub-Saharan Africa's Emerging Societies

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"There's no more important cause than to help rally the National Endowment for Democracy, (NED), the United States, and our friends and allies around the world to support democrats globally, counter the authoritarians, [especially in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies] and show that democracy is the best way to deliver dignity, prosperity, and security for humankind."

Damon Wilson, NED President and CEO

ABSTRACT

This article re-examines measures on how plentiful political parties' philosophies and policies implant democracy in free societies, to adduce lessons for political parties in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies. From Bawn et al.'s (2012) characterising framework on political parties' in free societies, I expand their theory of political parties by affirming that, interest groups, activists and lay voters, rather than leaders of political parties must be the key actors in policy-making and democratisation; as groups' alliances develop collective plans and screen contestants for party nominations based on loyalties to parties' agendas. This premise contrasts with those theories, which believe that, parties are tools for self-seeking leaders. The variance edifies, because parties dominated by interest groups, activists and voters, rather than leaders, are more responsive to voters' preferences. Thus, I debunk the prevailing practices of political parties' philosophies and policies in sub-Saharan African societies, wherein elective offices aspirants rebuff popularising in solving social problems, but scheme on narrow self-seeking predatory ambitions at the electorates' chagrin.

Keywords: Political Parties, Philosophies, Politicking, Groups, Emerging Societies

INTRODUCTION – CONTEXTUALISING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Given the far-reaching interests demonstrated by people in this article, I undertake its re-examination for the purposes of augmenting and ventilate its research problem (Udo, 2021, Rays 2021). I argue that, globally, especially in free societies, inclusive political parties' philosophies and policies have become pleasantly common in the histories of societal politics, because political parties comprehensively incarnate numerous enviable capacities and roles for entrenching the culture of democracy in societies. Undeniably, democracy presents itself as the

most cherished and preferred form of governance, whether it is signposted to cajole people by a civilian or military regime (Bawn et al., 2012, Palmers 2017, Akeley, 2020).

Accordingly, this paper is mounted to divulge the approaches, delineations, characters and scopes of political parties' philosophies and policies in developed countries, herein called, 'free societies,' in relations to the philosophies and policies of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa's countries, otherwise called, 'emerging societies.' The instant specific research purposes are two: (i) to measure how plentiful, political parties' philosophies and policies, implant democratic culture in free societies, (ii) to adduce democratic lessons free societies; for imbue by political parties, their electorates and public administrations in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies.

Essentially, this paper is prodded by what Ake (1996), Akinoju (2021) identify as: (i) "...the prevailing chaotic non-imbue of inclusive philosophies and policies by political parties in Africa; (ii) the non-inclusion of any attractive iota of democratic culture in Africa's development agenda; and (iii) the astronomical rise in human underdevelopment indices, epitomised by widespread local and foreign policies shortfalls for reducing poverty, diseases, malnutrition, insecurity and bad governances; including agricultural productivity, energy, school, healthcare, haulage, industrial and governances dysfunctionalities in the continent." Apparently, as Akeley, (2020:12) opines, "...these and other numerous vices account for; and incarnate the messy, debilitating and disastrously strangulated democratisation processes in this Euro-1884 orchestrated ill-fated continent." As Swarthy (2020) adds, "...these vices ceaselessly dominant and thwart public policy-making processes, characterized by widespread impoverishment of the majority of people, especially in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies, irrespective of the region's massive natural resources."

Given this unpleasant imaging of Africa's landscape, this work advocates for the fast and rigorous inculcation of far-reaching changes in the political, economic and social mentalities and characters of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa's societies. This advocacy is informed by the envisaged democratic lessons, which political parties in this region must acknowledge, assume and propel their incarnating roles as the substratum for democracy. This paper's overriding research/academic ambitions are that: (i) with the policy and democratic lessons offered and assimilated, the implantation of the democratic culture will facilitate the filling of the gratuitous prevailing gap in knowledge in the lack of inclusive philosophies and policies orchestrated predatory than sublime characters of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies, (ii) the lessons will further facilitate in eradicating the existing excruciating shortfalls in the political, social and economic development and growth; and (iii) to cause the feasibility of an overwhelming human emancipation of the people in this resource-inundated region, whose teeming populations continue to wallow in widespread despondency, unending exploitation and subjugation.

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND ITS HISTORICAL RELATEDNESS TO BAWN ET AL.,S THEORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Using the democratic theory of political parties; expounded by Bawn et al., (2012), in which they assert that, interest groups, activists and lay voters, rather than leaders of political parties are the key actors for championing conflict free electoral results, it is plausible to affirm that, historically, political parties could not operate in the absence of the concept of democracy,

which is what foundationally rallies the majority of people, who are primarily needed to constitute the core electorate as the basis for manifesting the operationalisation of democracy. Thus political parties act agencies for recruiting future leaders who are propelled as contestants from these political parties into elective offices. In this vein, Bawn et al.,’s theory of political parties should become the Trojan horse upon which democracy and political parties, ride to impel party officials into ruler-ship circles in societies. Inversely, it is either the zeal to advance and spread democracy; or to gain control of ruler ship offices or both, which inspires the emergent of political parties, their chosen candidates, philosophies and politics; which therefore fundamentally underpin the democratic culture in societies (Wackai, 2007, Asonganyi 2012).

Cuing from the foregoing premises, I argue that, without the imbuelement of the appropriate democratic lessons, the application and entrenchment of democracy and the concept of political party is bound for extensively unpalatable setbacks, misconceptions, social, political and economic injuries and failures in sub-Saharan Africa’s emerging societies, irrespective of the democratic persuasiveness of Bawn et al.,’s theory of political parties. This assertion is informed by what (Waikato 2007:11; Akonyi 2012:89) agree to be, “...the prevailing domineering and thriving character of the governance vices, which thwart the blossoming of democracy in its multi-dimensional lengths and breadths, even with the avalanche of political parties operating within the so-called multiparty systems in sub-Saharan Africa’s societies.” Consequently, in order to benefit from the advantages offered the electorate by the theory of political parties, political parties in sub-Saharan Africa’s emerging societies must imbue new senses, mentalities and mindsets, towards equitable political dispositions for appropriate social and human capital, which comprehensively produce transparent, free and fair electoral processes and governances with sub-Saharan Africa’s public administrations.

As Jemaah (2018) observes:

“Modern democracy is impossible unless it is propelled and midwifed by enabling public administrations, which must stay neutral from the divisive, sometimes ethno-political inclined and multifarious intrigues of political parties’ philosophies and politicking, especially in Africa’s developing countries. This neutrality must be characterised by the non-involvement into electoral campaigns, non-projection of political parties’ agendas, non-involvement into choosing parties’ candidates for elective offices, discouragement from the incessant manipulations of electoral registers and similar undemocratic schemes, which favour specific political parties, against others in the same political competitions.”

While Jemaah’s avowals appear democratically persuasive in free societies, they are unconvincing in the politics of sub-Saharan Africa’s totalitarian emerging societies. in which these avowals are mostly used only as cajoling tools for incorporating the unsuspecting masses into the diabolical governing processes in sub-Saharan Africa’s emerging societies (Dibie 2000, Jemaah 2018:47). Consequently, these virtues are not imbued as never-to-be-avoided democratic norms and philosophies in these areas, which Riggs (1974) calls, “prismatic societies”. As we proceed, it is important to delineate what a political party is. How it epitomises democracy; who are its actors and how are such actors found; and what are their manifest or latent ambitions and philosophies? Are political parties synonymous to interest groups? How,

why, and when do political parties in sub-sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies, imbue democratic lessons from the political parties' philosophies and politicking in free societies?

To begin with, in civilised developed societies, scholars view political parties as groups of people, which are linked to sizeable numbers of citizens into organisations of aggregately genuine ambitions, whose paramount goal is to obtain or retain state power for the supposedly purpose of providing affordable social, political, economic and even cultural amenities to the generality of the citizenry (Shively 2005, Randolph 2012). Invariably, this is achieved by genuinely winning electoral offices, without indulging into electoral improprieties and malpractices (Shively 2005:168, Randolph 2012:90). Notwithstanding this definition and its impulsion, it appears political parties in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies, aggregate their ambitions to win electoral offices only through crude methods, which are usually anchored on promoting self-aggrandisements' (Enechi 2009, Obafemi et al. 2010, Herron 2017).

Typically, Duverger's (1951), did not only classify political parties as instruments for gauging democracy, but also as tools likened to the elements (political parties) of politics, which standing as the nexuses between political systems with their electoral systems on one hand; and the citizens and the exigencies of democratic propriety, including the prodding of society's well-being, in terms of economic, political development; plus human and material growth." Duverger (1951:32) observes, "...in the politics of political parties, the single-member-district electoral systems that require only majority votes to win election tend to produce two-party systems, whereas proportional-representation systems tend to produce multiparty systems in vibrant democracies of free societies, with accompanying political and economic stabilities." Thus, the imbuelement and consolidation of high levels of political, social and economic propriety; while seeking and obtaining elective offices must become indispensable canons for true democratic political parties, operating within enlightened democratic cultures. Away from this, elections otherwise organised and supposedly, won become shams and abuses of democracy. Paradoxically, this is the phenomenon that prevails in the politics practiced in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies. Irrefutably, this is unacceptable phenomenon which must be changed if human development is an ingredient in the governing processes (Nnoli 1981, Okadigbo 1993, Aldrich 2011).

THE ANALYTICAL TOOL - A THEORY OF THE POLITICAL PARTY: ITS SUBSTANCE, CHARACTER AND SETTING

As its tool of analysis, this paper adopts Bawn et al., (2012) theory of political parties. This theory holds that, if efficiently operated in strict adherence to democratic principles, political parties being substratum for democracy, should aggregate broad spectrum of interests, which place citizens' preferences based upon their constituents concerns in national contextual substances, characters and settings. Through their efforts to control and influence public policy, political parties should play an intermediary role, linking the institutions of government to societal groups and the society at larger. Consequently, and in pursuant of the foregoing, I align with Bawn et al., (2012:5), to strengthen the theory of political parties in which interest groups and activists are the key actors. I partake in asserting that, coalitions of groups should develop common agendas and independently screen candidates for party nominations based their unflinching loyalty to their parties' agendas, rather than on the punchline, egoistic ambitions of the so-called party leaders. This theoretical stance contrasts with currently dominant theories,

which view parties as controlled by election-minded politicians who arrogates and party founders and leaders (Asobie 2002, Mamadou 2004).

Being a conglomeration of people with similar ambition towards political or state power, during electoral campaigns, a political party must objectively; and not subjectively make promises about what it will do if elected. It should stand for re-election based on its records of haven implemented and or willing to continue implementing its agendas upon which it was elected in strict respect of the concept of 'Social Contract'. Within this framework, voters become persuaded or not persuaded to vote for it. Obviously, these are voting conditions and rights that exist in free societies, because, in these societies, voters are not coerced to vote based on void imagination of promises, fake candidates and undue loyalty to a political party, which promises and epitomises only the skewed allocation of scarce political, economic, cultural and social resources to cronies, hand-clappers and praise-singers (Ashe 2009, Kelechi 2017:16, Jemaah, 2018:47).

Consequently, in free societies, it is easy to see how political parties are consciously deterred and become very scarred in serving democracy, in manners that lead to entangling, strangulating and estranging it. Herein, voters give more effective directions and persuasions to governance by supporting a party's programmes, rather than an individual's politico-economic ambitions, especially the penchant for monopolising political power and the entrenchment of dominant political party rule. By holding entire parties rather than individual politicians accountable for what governments do, voters create an incentive for responsible governance that might not otherwise exist. Thus, I vehemently contest the view of a party that does not supports this enticing assessment, which argues that a political party in advanced democracies, such as in the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, even France, and so on, are best understood as coalitions of like-minded citizens, activists, supporters and voters, seeking to control and use state power for the common good, which ranges from generalised availability of material wealth to high-minded social, economic and political growth of all the segments of the societies. Certainly, all of these attract massive inflow of immigrants from totalitarian societies into the free societies. Consequently, this is a viably powerful democratic lesson, which should be imbibed by public administrations and their governance actors and styles epitomised by the ruling political parties in sub-Saharan African emerging societies.

Given this, the coalition of policy-demanding groups develops an agenda of mutually acceptable policies, insists on the nomination of candidates with apparent demonstrated commitment to programmes with national outlooks, and work to elect these candidates to office. In this group-centric view of parties, candidates will, if the coalition has selected them well, have as their paramount goal, the advancement of the party programmes, within the precincts of national interests. Most studies on political parties assume that voters can judge which party offers more of what they want, implying that parties must construct programmes with a keen eye to voters' satisfaction.

Conversely, I consider this premise as credible; because as Bawn et al. (2012:13), infer, "...there is an electoral blind spot, in which voters are able to reliably ascertain policy positions or evaluate party performance. However, recognising the limits of voters' insightfulness, most group-centric parties exploit the complexities of politics to disguise the actions they take on behalf of party agendas." On the strength of this, it appears political parties are not dependable

friends of popular sovereignty in a given society, especially in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies. In fact, while electoral competition constrains group-centric parties to be responsive to citizens' preferences, in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies' political parties cede as little as possible, the possibilities of policy framing to the electorate. Herein, political parties just foist their unilateral plans unto coerced voters who must go along with them even if blindly (Kelechi, 2009:65, Aseh 2009: 31).

POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE GROWTH OR DECLINE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES

Parliaments are the epicentres, the boiling pots for modern democracy, because it is therein that partisanship timidly or eloquently explodes, dependable upon the characters of the ruling party and opposition parties. Hence, in the event of a coup d'état, this informs the primary action usually undertaken by any military junta to immediately suspend or outrightly abrogate the parliament and constitution, as the key representative institution and instrument for exercising state power. However, even in countries with abnormal ruler-ship incarnated by military juntas, the concept of political parties and democracy is usually regarded as the galvanising and/or cajoling factor for bringing the citizens to accept military government for the period, which such a government promises to be in power. Thus, political parties form a cornerstone for democratic societies, as even the military uses it to create or re-establish their hold unto political power, and the obeisance of population to military rule. So, by aggregating the interests of the public, articulating such interests in the form of policy options and providing structures for political participation; all of these which are never allowed by the military to flourish; given that, the political parties allow all these, they remain the epicentres of democracy. In free societies, political parties add to their values, concepts such the training of political leaders who later contest elections to seek a measure of control over government institutions; creating party identifications, establishing the foundation for future leaders, creating empowerment capacities for members and many more (Shively 2003, Nwosu, 2007, Emesis 2019).

When in the majority, political parties provide an organisational base for forming government, and when in the minority, it represents a viable opposition, or an alternative to the existing government. In free societies, when elected, candidates seek to further their party's interests in the legislature, representing specific policy agendas that must usually have the legitimacy of a popular electoral mandate; whereas in totalitarian emerging societies, political parties in parliament take and foist policy options unto the population with alacrity (Kibbeh 2019, Kessler 2021). In parliament, Members of Parliament (MPs) from the same party often coalesce into parliamentary groups or caucuses, the primary means by which parties organise themselves in the legislature. Thus, effective parliamentary groups are critical for the creation of more effective and representative political parties as well as the efficient organisation and management of legislative business that fosters party loyalties.

However, despite the important role that party caucuses play in the institutional development of parliaments, their meetings are necessarily held in private, and are therefore not usually subject to public scrutiny. Similarly, rules governing caucus procedures are generally internal party documents, although they sometimes become publicly available. In addition, written rules of procedures may not accurately reflect actual practice, especially where there are dominant leadership groups or established customs for organising parliamentary group work. Given the

political sensitivities involved, information about the internal functioning of parliamentary groups, particularly questions surrounding internal decision-making processes, cohesion and discipline and party loyalties are often shrouded in secrecy. This shortage of analysis applies to how these groups organise themselves internally, as well as how they relate to one another and their respective party headquarters.

An extensive understanding of the processes involved in being elected to the legislature, whether as an independent or as a party representative, provides an adequate understanding of the factors, which motivate candidates to run for offices, and the subsequent organisation of MPs in the legislature. As said earlier, political parties provide screening processes for selecting suitable candidates for election. In a strong party system, parties typically represent different ideological bases – such as left, centre, and right or far-right and far-left on the political spectrum; feminist; environmentalist – from which party manifestos are developed. This provides voters with clear choices, based on their own personal principles and values. In addition, successful candidates readily assimilate into party groupings within the legislature, based on their party identification. This facilitates coordinated parliamentary action and provides citizens with a clear understanding of how their vote has translated into representation. By contrast, independent candidates do not undergo a pre-selection process, and once elected, are not necessarily in a position to aggregate into like-minded parliamentary groupings.

In this model, the presence of genuine not satellite political parties in the election process provides at least three clear key benefits to the electoral processes. First, the screening of party nominees – also known as pre-selection – applies a level of rigour, which is absent in the independents' pathway and which theoretically and empirically improves the quality of candidates standing for elections. Secondly, this process can also improve the diversity of legislative bodies. For instance, in an increasing number of democracies, people advocate for higher levels of women's participation in politics, either through reserved parliamentary seats, or by requiring parties to field a minimum percentage of women candidates. For example, for the 2006 legislative elections in West Bank and Gaza, by law, each national party list had to contain a minimum of one woman in the first three names, a second woman in the next four names, and an additional woman for every five more names. In Cameroon, during the selection process of local party officials in the 2015 and 2020, the internal rules of the ruling party insisted upon thirty percent women's representation (Kofi, 2021, Ketchowa 2021). Statutory quotas for women also exist in Afghanistan, Belgium, Iraq, Indonesia and Serbia, to name a few. Where there are no legislated requirements, parties may voluntarily adopt policies to encourage women's participation, through women's wings, quotas, coleader ship positions, and pre-selection rules.

Despite the basic differences between my theory and the standard view of political parties, critical tests are hard to categorise. Actually, there exists expressive evidence, but party nominations, central to my model, are hard to train, since they are poorly documented. Measuring party responsiveness to groups or to voters might also sound difficult, especially in developing countries, where politics of fusion dominates. This paper contends with developing a theory and demonstrating its plausibility. My argument begins with a survey of party literature, after which I develop an alternative theory, first as an extended hypothetical story, then with more meticulousness. Then, I will describe the relevant empirical evidence; and

conclude with an argument for more attention to the role of organised political groups and activists in political parties, and the role of parties in public policy-making and decision-making in societies, especially in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies, developing countries.

THE LEGISLATIVE-CENTRED THEORIES OF POLITICAL PARTIES PARTY

Several works on political parties in the mid-20th century allotted central roles to organised groups, thence considered as the "raw material of politics" (Abramowitz 2008), whereas five decades later, the view changed differently radically. Currently, the discipline's most developed theories of party, feature the elected office holders, especially legislators, as the dominant actors. This legislative-centred focus emerged as studies of party outside the legislature reportedly became weakening and declining and party identification in the electorate began to decrease in the 1960s and remained below historical levels through the 1980s. As Achen et al. (2004) posit, "...this decline, especially of the traditional urban machines and other developments brought about the loss of party control over legislative nominations."

For instance, the McGovern-Fraser reforms of the 1970s in the United States opened presidential nominations to mass participation in states' primaries and caucuses; as party leaders lost their official role, many scholars started concluding that, parties had little impact on nominations. Thus, almost this same period, observers of Congress began to note increasing influence of majority party leadership, and much stronger evidence of partisan voting than had previously been recognised. Consequently, "...scholars seeking to understand how party mattered in the US Congress quite naturally given the consensus about the weakness of parties in other domains; focused on forces internal to the US Congress itself" (Adams et al, 2009). The theoretical view of parties in Congress is best introduced in the account of a mythical legislature first offered by Thomas Schwartz, then extended by John Aldrich, (Aldrich 2011). According to Bawn et al., (2012:17):

"This logic underlies some of the recent theorising about legislative politics, which appears to deeply influence my alternative group-centered view," which as Aldrich (2011:23) illustrates, "...the legislature of the Schwartz-Aldrich myth had three members (A, B, C.). Each member sponsors a bill (X, Y, and Z) that provides benefits to her own district and imposes costs on the others. Pay-offs for each bill and each district are: (i) ABC Bill X 3-1-1 (ii) Bill Y-13-1 (iii) Bill Z -1-13. If each legislator votes based on how her own district is affected, all the three bills will fail and pay-offs will be zero. All three legislators would be better off, however, if all the bills passed; each player would get a pay-off of 1. But, A & B could do better still by forming a long coalition, by both voting in favour of X and Y, and against Z. Without the long coalition, the decisive majority is difference for each bill, as the coalition of B and C defeats X, the coalition of A and C defeats Y, and so on. By forming a majority coalition that stays together across votes, A and B increase their pay-offs to 2.

The gains from keeping a stable majority together form Schwartz's and Aldrich's answer to the question: "Why political parties?" But there is a question that arises, which is, how does a political party keep its long coalition together?

As Cox and McCubbins (1993) observe, "...party leaders control the legislative agenda, suppressing proposals that might split the party and promoting the party programmes." The policies, thus, enacted create what Bawn et al., (2012) call "a trademarks, which are treasured

for winning elections, and the trademark concept begins to connect legislative theories with forces outside parliaments." However, it is real that, political parties, while emerging from legislative politics, solve many problems, which legislators face as they attempt to win re-election and build stable careers. Thus, legislative-centred theories of political parties have grown to incorporate broader aspects of political and social life, including the preferences of voters and groups. But it appears that, these broader forces impact political parties only through the narrow conduit-pipes of politicians' electoral incentives. The desire of incumbent office-holders for re-election animates political parties' machinery and arranges the basis of theories that measure their impact, which nonetheless, in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies, it is just the same known leader who win with dull or no animations.

Thus, as Bawn et al., (2012:18) allude,

"...as the election approaches, in free societies, members of the political parties begin working together to elect their members, who naturally favour the policies which are consistent with their party's manifestoes. For instance, in some countries, sheep shepherds are not rich or numerous, but form an otherwise unstructured electoral environment, with most voters uninterested, their chance of winning is high, given that, a member favours increasing tariffs on wool imports. Yet, another group, teachers, notices what the shepherds are up to. The teachers calculate they could easily outspend the shepherds to elect a teacher, whose top priority would be schools construction. Said otherwise, they could join forces with the shepherds, seeing the latter option appearing preferable; a candidate supported by multiple groups is even more likely to win. Leaders of the teachers union understand that the wool tariff increases the price everyone pays for wool, but this consideration is small compared to their desire for better schools' facilities."

As they pay attention to these issues, two other groups, clergy and coffee growers, make similar calculations; and the four groups decide they can do better by cooperating in electoral politics than by competing against each other. However, the coalition encounters some hitches, arising from the coffee growers, who want a new four-lane highway to increase market access for their remote region, but the other groups are dubious. The requisite tax increase would likely draw the attention of normally inattentive voters; and the other groups would become burdened with the tax. Several such concerns arise, but the groups bargain them out. Everyone agrees, for example, that a two-lane highway will suffice for the coffee growers. The clergy's plans to ban the sale of alcohol, the teachers' school improvements programme, and the wool tariff are similarly scaled back from what their backers originally projected. The coalition drafts a candidate who demonstrates sufficient appreciation of the importance of education, sobriety, transportation, and the need to protect consumers from inferior imported wool. The groups and their candidate recognise that these issues might be perceived as special interest boondoggles, so they do not emphasise them. Instead, the campaign centres on growing the economy and providing for the common defence.

Consequently, the coalition's candidate wins easily, and society takes pride in a government that is above trivial politicking, a phenomenon which is scarce in the philosophies and politics of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies. As Bawn et al., (2012:16) add,

"The shepherds get their tariff, ground is broken for a state-of-the-art highway in the coffee-growing region, new schools with majestic teachers' lounges are built, and the sale of alcohol on Sunday is forbidden. Several elections follow this pattern: candidates are vetted by the loose coalition of policy demanders, elections are low key, policy demands are implemented, and voters remain inert. The Sunday alcohol ban, however, generates some controversy. The saloon keepers are dismayed to lose their Sunday evening revenue and fear stronger restrictions unless something is done to stop the clergy. Formerly uninterested in politics, the saloon keepers consider running their own candidate in the next election, but realise that their odds would be poor against the dominant coalition. Meanwhile, teachers become upset about religious interference in the school curricula, and coffee growers suffer retaliatory protectionism in the export markets. Sensing the possibility of gaining allies, saloon keeper leaders approach the teachers and growers about circulating pamphlets to protest the government's interference in a free society."

Thus, in free societies, the opposition party recruits a candidate to challenge the incumbent President on a reform platform emphasising free markets, secular humanism and an individual's right to choose what to drink on Sundays. Correctly anticipating a contentious election, the Freedom Party carefully selects a good-looking candidate with outstanding communication skills. Nevertheless, if the incumbent President retains the support of the clergy and the shepherds, because, when the incumbent was first recruited, the coalition's primary concern was finding a candidate committed to its policy demands, the tendency is for the incumbent to retain power. Now running under the mantle of the "Heritage Party," the incumbent proves to be an uninspired campaigner. The Freedom Party's reform candidate is elected and the era of consensual politics comes to an end. The Freedom Party President is a knowledgeable politician. He likes being President, wants to keep the job, and knows that any perception that he is in service to special interests will hurt his reelection odds. He repeals the Sunday drinking prohibition (a popular move) but otherwise pays little attention to the interests that sponsored him. He spends most of the national budget on fireworks for the popular Independence Day celebration, leaving school construction and the coffee highway to languish. This enrages the teachers and coffee growers, who might certainly be tempted to withdraw their support at the next election. Continuing, Bawn et al., (2012) posit:

"The popular incumbent continues to claim the mantle of the Freedom Party and wins re-election anyway. An illustration: Learning a lesson, the Freedom Party takes much more care in future years to select nominees with proven loyalty. As the Freedom and Heritage Parties compete over many elections, political discourse is dominated by conflict between them. The party programmes become accepted as natural manifestations of competing worldviews such as: (i) a conservative one that seeks to protect and restore the traditions of a religious society of herders, and (ii) a liberal one which is oriented towards cultivating human capital and infrastructure to compete in the global economy. Some voters who care nothing about the interests of the various groups are nonetheless attracted to their parties because of values, such as social order or equality, which they perceive in their programmes."

Consequently, as the conservative and liberal ideologies help the groups define their terms of cooperation; they also promote the useful fiction that everyone in the coalition wants the same

things. Yet, the mobilisation of new groups and values also makes the political party coalitions more heterogeneous, thus, more difficult to manage. Close observers note that the main economic dimension is cross-cut by secular and religious cleavages. For example, as Aldrich (2011:33) observes,

“religious coffee growers sometimes vote Heritage because of the party’s temperance floorboard. Even the saloon-keepers, despite continuing conflicts with the clergy over business hours, sometimes defect to Heritage in protest of the humanistic ideas teachers push on their children. The parties respond to these internal tensions with sharper rhetorical appeals to Freedom and Heritage, saying less about specific programmes, and continuing to nominate candidates committed to the party’s entire agenda.”

However, some voters buy the vague appeals, but others are confused and end up voting on the basis of the performance of the economy. The groups are happy enough with this outcome. Each coalition controls government about half the time, an outcome much better than the numerically small policy-demanders could achieve without parties. The point of this extended myth has been to highlight our key claims.

Thus, organised policy demanders strive to recruit and elect only those candidates sympathetic to their goals, such goals, which are typically not shared by most ordinary voters. Bargaining among policy demanders constructs not only the party system, but also the ideological space. The resulting coalitions encompass diverse concerns, some narrowly material and some broadly idealistic. Inevitably, the party agendas become less than perfect matches for the concerns of most voters, who respond with varying degrees of trust, adaptation, and confusion. The importance of nominations and the nature of voter responses to parties are particularly important point, which require adequate elaboration. But do people undertake nominations? It is important to highlight that manifest or latent groups of organised policy demanders are the basic units of the theory of political parties. Consider a group that wants the support of an independent office holder with its policy demand. Alone or with a coalition, it can lobby the office-holder to take up its cause, providing enough facts and talking points. This strategy is unlikely to succeed, however, unless the demand either can be framed as not being controversially beneficial for a large number of voters, and/or lines up with the office-holder’s existing goals. Invariably, lobbying works reliably and mostly only for policy demands that officials already favour (Baylor 2011, Iweka 2017).

Consequently, a group can try to win over the elected official with campaign contributions, but a principal-agent problem inevitably might later appear. The official can tell whether the group is contributing or not; it is much harder for the group to know whether the official is really advancing its agenda, especially in developing countries, where voters’ are not adequately informed about politics and politicking. Easily observed activities, such as bill sponsorship and roll call of votes are less consequential than the behind-the-scenes coalition-building efforts needed to marshal policy changes through the legislative process, (Black 1948, Ugo 2014). Thus, office holders may always have information advantage over policy demanders, since they know more about their own actions and the policy-making environment. The rise of interest groups’ newsletters in the 1970’s and, more recently, blogs, have made it easier for interest groups and activists to monitor office holders on matters of moderate importance, such as amendment votes.

But in normal politicking, the principal-agent relationship between a policy demander and an incumbent persists. Policy demanders can (and in most cases they do) try to strike deals with incumbents who do not already share their goals, but they can never be sure they are getting what they bargain for. Another tack is to get a genuine friend nominated and elected to office. In seeking to control a nomination, interest groups and activists are in a stronger position to influence such nominations. Multiple aspiring office-seekers, none secure in the office they covet, compete for contributions and other campaign resources. At minimum, interest and activist groups can require promises of policy support. And very often they can hold out for candidates who have actually demonstrated their commitment through prior service. In advanced civilized and free societies, where small worlds of local politics freely exist, leading individuals are well known to each other; and so they act by selecting nominees out of such pools. As Bowers (1945) observes, "...policy-demanding groups can be fairly confident of getting the politicians whom they want get nominated." Notice that this nomination process can, if the groups work it well, produce a different kind of politicians than envisioned in standard theories of political party – a politician committed more strongly to a particular agenda than to office-holding per se.

This is not to say that such politicians would take unrealistic positions leading to pointless electoral defeats. This would do no good for them or the party. But they would take risks for policy that candidates in a politician-dominated party would not. The advantageous position of groups at the nomination stage is bolstered by lack of voter interest. Most citizens pay little attention to general elections and less to nominations. The few who vote in primaries lack the anchoring cue of candidate partisanship, rendering them open to persuasion. Media coverage of primaries is generally less heavy than in general elections, thereby increasing the impact of small amounts of paid advertising. The voters who pay closest attention in primaries often have ties to local interest groups and activists, further contributing to the capacity of policy demanders to control the outcome. Thus, the costs of providing selected politicians with what they need to win a primary election are often very insignificant. For many reasons, then, nominations are a natural focus of interest groups and activists, but how do multiple groups, each with different policy demands, choose a sympathetic candidate? My answer is: by cooperating with other groups as a long coalition lasts.

In fact, it is one thing for representatives to a national legislature, gathered under one roof, to create national political party coalitions, as in the Schwartz-Aldrich model; and it is quite another thing for diverse interest groups and activists to build national coalitions outside the legislature, such that politicians nominated by a party coalition in any part of the country might have roughly the same political commitments. Yet, as we describe later, policy influencers successfully form major parties dedicated to a common agenda. And on more occasions, groups of policy demanders try sometimes successfully, sometimes not to capture an existing party and turn it to their purposes. What about voters? One might question whether policy influencers have anything to gain from nominating a friendly candidate. According to the Median Voter Theorem, (Burnham 1989) electoral competitions should force parties to choose candidates who advocate policies close to those of centrist voters, far from what policy demanding groups prefer.

While ideological positioning seems to have relatively little effects on presidential elections, uncontrollable events can have large and extensive effects. As Achen and Bartels (2004) observe, "...bad weather (droughts, hurricanes, landslides, earthquakes) in the election year can lead to substantial vote loss by the incumbent president's party. For instance, in the US, weather, it is estimated, cost Al Gore one million votes in the 2000 election". Similarly, in free societies, unsuccessful wars also hurt the incumbent party during election, (Campbell et al. (1960). It would appear that, "...the largest and best documented effects on presidential elections are the performances of the national economy conditions, which are only marginally more amenable to political control than the weather. Consequently, "there is evidence that, if voters held presidents accountable for economic performances over their full term in office, economic voting might be defensible as a criterion of choice." Paradoxically, voters have constantly actually seem to be influenced mainly by economic conditions in the US presidential elections (Arnold (1990), Canes-Wrone et al (2002).

But again, if one might ask: How much attention can political parties be expected to devote to voters' preferences, when a roll of the dice, perhaps within the six months before Election Day will be the biggest factor in an election? As Key (1949) famously argued,

"...voters are not fools, as even poorly informed voters can find cues and empirical ways that allow them to make senses of politics and respond with degrees of rationality." A candidate with a reputation for extremism might certainly perform poorly with voters who, though lacking a coherent ideology, still know they do not like extremism. Similarly, candidates who attack very popular programmes like social security, or promote unpopular ones like busing to achieve racial integration may likewise arouse the ire of voters, who are not usually attentive to politics."

Our theoretical claim is different: Lack of voter attentiveness creates license for political parties to take non-centrist positions, regardless of what voters may actually want. It is possible that both theories help to explain why political parties polarise, but we shall offer below specific evidence for the blind spot argument that: Exogenous changes in the amount of data available to voters about their representatives increases the risk that extremist legislators will be recognised as such and voted out of office.

COMPETING VIEWS ON POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR CONNECTEDNESS TO DEMOCRACY

Burke's description of a political party, "as a body of men united upon some particular political principles to capture or retain political power" is the balk of nearly every scholar who cites it. Similarly, Schumpeter (1942) opines that, "A party is a group of persons, whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive and aggregate interest for the struggle for power." He observes, "...the pressures of electoral competitions lead political parties to offer nearly identical platforms." But as Coleman (1996) alludes, "What businessmen do not understand, is that, exactly as they are dealing in oil, so I am dealing in votes." Apparently, current studies of political parties continue in this scholarly belief. However, political parties, and their politicians in totalitarian societies are unanimous in one subjectivism, which is - gaining political office at all costs. Herein, sound public policy commitments are, in most of their philosophies and politicking, merely secondary or non-existent, especially in sub-Saharan African societies, where politics is a jungle business for primitive accumulation of wealth, thus whoever wins takes all. Various explanations, most of them feeble, such as imperfect political competition;

uncertainty about what voters want; or lack of resources are invoked to cover up bad governance of political parties in power in most emerging areas.

As Venetia (2017) opines, “...most political parties are creations of the gullible politicians, with the exclusion of the peoples’-oriented activist; thus, two ambitions engulf political parties in emerging areas; consequently, those who seek and hold political office are basically the central actors – the so-called creators of the party”. Herein, the activists, who are more extremely concerning about the voters welfare, the politicians adopt extreme views for wedging them aside. In these nascent societies, the politicians’ role is to constrain the grassroots militants of the party, by coercing them in accepting the ambitions of supposed creator who seek high political offices, as they try to appeal to the electorate in selfish ambitions.” But even free societies, politicians and activists are at the centre of the party, leading the party as best they can to offer what voters want. Our view, in contrast, places policy influencers at the centre of this politicking. These political parties and their activists form coalitions to nominate and elect politicians committed to their common programme. In our view, party nominees are so much obliged by policy demanders not to deviate from what voters want, as genuinely committed to what the policy demanders want regardless of the wishes supposed party owners. This view of parties and politicians is as antithetical to Burke’s idea of parties as it is to Schumpeter’s. Apparently, the reason which makes plausible the survival of parties, despite their usual neglect of the electorate, is the limited attention, which the said electorate pays to politics and especially to policy positions and outcomes; and this is particularly acute in sub-Saharan African emerging societies.

As Baylor (2011:41) observes, “...in the US, as late as 1910, leftist political intellectuals were no more likely to sympathise with African-Americans than were conservatives, but by 1930 the left was systematically more favourable towards this group of Americans.” Thus, progressive party’s philosophies, were soon to re-christened as “liberalism, had realigned to favour this group of Americans. During this ideological shift in the US, liberal activists and union leaders in the Democratic Party began pressuring their party to stand up for civil rights. Explaining this turn among northern Democratic members of the US Congress in the 1940s, Simon et al., (2011) opine, “...the Democratic Party’s core coalition partners were instrumental in transforming the party to embrace civil rights. These coalition partners included not only civil rights organisations, but also labour unions, religious and ethnic-affiliated groups; and broad-based progressive policy influencers, such as Americans for Democratic Action (ADA).

These organisations, which were drawn into the Democratic Party during the New Deal for reasons having little or nothing to do with race, became among the most vocal proponents of civil rights measures, which manifestly pulled the party towards their position. As Simon et al, (2011:34) found, “...the Democratic legislators who supported civil rights in the 1940s did not come from districts with high concentrations of African-Americans, but from districts with high concentrations of union members.” Thus, it has become important to note that, democratic governance is hard to achieve if people do not live and believe in a shared realities. This then should be a core lesson for the emerging societies in sub-Saharan Africa to emulate in the formation and politicking in political parties.

As Feinstein et al, (2008), add, “...these same forces, augmented by labour unions, argued for a strong civil rights board at their 1948 National Party Convention, causing southern

segregationists to bolt to a new party. When it appeared that they might bolt again in 1952, the president of the United Auto Workers, a key player in the Democratic Party, said he doubted they would, "but if the South so chooses, to let this happen; let the realignment of the parties proceed." As this and other evidence suggests, a coalition of unions and liberals was purposefully seeking control of the Democratic Party for their purposes. However, American conservatism had by 1950 adopted a new states' rights stance towards civil rights; and the middle-of-the-road wing of the Republican Party was in virtual revolt against the party's moderation on just about everything, including civil rights measures. According to Ferejohn (1990), "One party operative, F. Clifton White, convened a meeting of conservative militants in 1961, claiming in his opening statement, "We are going to take over the Republican Party, and make it the conservative instrument of American politics." An organisational genius, White attracted a large number of new conservative activists into the Republican Party from the South, who became the backbone of Barry Goldwater's successful campaign for the GOP presidential nomination in 1964. These developments make it implausible to explain the racial realignment of the parties along the candidate-centered time line of Carmines and Stimson. Of course as, Ferejohn observe (1990:34) "...we cannot rule out the possibility of other activities by politicians prior to the policy influencers' activities."

From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that, in both parties, traditional political interests and realigned ideological groups usually press for change and this happened before the 1964 US presidential election. As Feinstein and Schickler (2009) explain, "Johnson and Goldwater's respective embrace of civil rights liberalism and conservatism in 1964 are better understood as responses to deeply rooted forces within their parties than their free and independent decisions." According to Gibson et al, (2016), "Another policy related issue where party positions changed significantly is abortion, because in several decades, Republicans emerged as pro-life and Democrats as pro-Choice." Studying this development, Fiorina (2004) argues that, "...the change occurred when abortion activists (pro- and anti-) entered the presidential nomination process, offering their support to candidates who took their preferred positions. Ambitious office seekers, looking for advantage, were forced to accommodate, even when it meant changing long-held positions." As Nnachi (2018) argues "abortion as a social policy issue fits other cases in which parties have caused the protraction of conflicts to new issues and offer this general model:

"Political parties and their politicians must vibrate their political ambitions through solving social issues of concern to the generality of the population, rather than to the aggrandizement of their predatory ambitions."

As Bawn et al. (2007) observe,

"...the Democratic Party in the US adopted the McGovern-Fraser reforms in the wake of protests at its 1968 Party's Convention, and most of the hitherto bitter views about party philosophies changed, [because, in free societies, the concept of change is dynamic]". Consequently, they observe, "....the most important reform was limiting national conventions to delegates chosen by voters in open contests in the year of the election. The candidate who won the most pledged delegates in primaries and caucuses were the de facto nominee."

Subsequently, delegates continued to gather in national conventions, but their task, like that of the Electoral College, has been to ratify rather than to choose. In this direction, some writer

argued, that the reforms, which overtook the Republican Party because many states created primaries for both parties in response to reform, killed the national parties.” Thus, should we understand the national party as state party delegates assembling to choose a nominee; this verdict could be regarded as correct. However, early herein, in our theory of political party, we appear to align with several pundits, who argue that the national party is better understood as a coalition of policy demanders or influencers, who try to elect loyalists to office based on their candidates’ unalloyed loyalty to the party’s agenda.

Cuing from the above, I reinstate, that party groups and activists continue to play a big role in the nomination process and often to dominate public policy choices. Rank-and-file voters possess the formal power to nominate, but they normally follow the insider consensus to do this job. Most strikingly, the role of insiders seems diminished in the most recent cycles, for instance in 2008 in particular in the US. Taking an example from the just over 10 percent of pre-Iowa endorsements, Obama nonetheless won a months-long struggle with endorsement over leader Hillary Clinton. Yet, while one cannot say that Obama was the insider choice, he had much more early support. As Cohen (2020) observes:

“In spring, 2006 Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid summoned the freshman Senator to his office and urged, to Obama’s amazement, that he run for president. It later surfaced that the entire Senate Democratic leadership, along with several other Senators, were early Obama backers. None, however, made any early public promise, partly because of fear of vengeance from Clinton, and partly because they needed proof that the novice candidate could win outside of his base in Chicago. Definitely, Obama won convincingly”

Yet, initially, Obama had strong backing among regular Democratic Party’s fundraisers, who kept him financially viable, even with the Clinton money machine, (Cohen, 2020:12). Ironically, in Iowa, the site of the first public contest, he had more insider endorsements than Clinton or Edwards, as he trounced the other two candidates. And, after winning Iowa, Obama received a flood of traditional party endorsements from organised labour and many other party supporters. Thus Obama was certainly not an outsider crashing the party, as he was widely favoured but untested politician who needed to adequately prove himself, before top leaders would openly embrace him. In politicking, it essential while, learning an institution as profoundly strategic as a political party, one must notice what does not happen as much as what actually happen. As Bawn et al (2012:34) note, “In this vein, we note the large number of major names, who tested the waters of presidential politics but simply dropped. In a free society such as the US, they include Gerald Ford in 1980, Donald Rumsfeld in 1988, Dan Quayle and Dick Cheney in 1996, Dick Gephardt in 2000, Al Gore in 2004, John Kerry in 2008 and Haley Barbour in 2012.”

Paradoxically, most political office races attract 10 to 15 interested politicians, but fewer than half actually place their name on a ballot. In the testing phase, office-seekers meet with groups, leaders, activists, fund-raisers, and top office holders, who grill them on their strategy to become president and the agenda they would pursue in office. From the candidates’ side, the question is whether they can get the backing needed to mount a serious campaign. For a few, the answer is clearly yes; they easily and quickly put together juggernauts that suck resources from other candidates and sweep to victory in the state contests. Al Gore and George W. Bush were in this category in 2000. For some others, the answer is equivocal, encouraging the

politician to run but guaranteeing nothing. Obama and Clinton were in this category in 2008. And sometimes the answer is so discouraging that the candidate, even a major figure like Gore in 2004, simply dropped. This screening process, though lacking formal structure and difficult for political scientists to observe, explains how a party, conceived as a coalition of interest groups and activists, can often get the candidates it wants out of the nomination process despite the demise of the traditional nominating convention.

Speaking about the role of organised interests in countries with proportional electoral systems, Eric Chang, Mark Kayser, Drew Linzer and Ron Rogowski observe, "So strong do these organizations sometimes become that major political parties are often mere coalitions of interest groups."⁸⁶ One implication of our theory might simply be that, despite institutions that seem to favor office-holders over interest groups, parties in the US are not so different from those in other countries. On the other hand, however, Richard Katz and Peter Mair's cartel party model bears some resemblance to the politician-oriented view that dominates the study of political parties, chiefly in developing countries as opposed to the United States.

The question of whether parties are best thought of as motivated by policy, office or a mix is an open one in the study of free societies; as our theory offers a mechanism for how policy motivated parties might arise. Moreover, our prediction of excess polarisation illuminates an existing puzzle in comparative politics. Excess polarisation is not limited to free societies such as the United States. Survey data from Western Europe shows that most voters place themselves at the centre of a right-left scale, Groseclose (2001), Hackler et al, 2010). So, political parties do not locate here, however, leaving most party systems with empty centres. As Poole et al., (1997) observe, "Scholars have reacted to the empty centre phenomenon mainly by positing reasons why moderate voters might prefer extreme parties. Perhaps voters view extreme positions as indications that the party is principled and resolute or perhaps voters support extreme parties in order to pull a coalition government in the desired direction; or still, perhaps more extreme positions motivate turn-out".

In fact, Poole et al., (1997:54), developed a unified model of party competition incorporating a variety of these reasons why voters might want to support parties whose positions were more extreme. Their model even includes habitual voting on the basis of party identity, a practice that could be construed as blind spot behaviour. Using survey data from Norway, France, the UK and the US, Poole et al., estimate the party positions that would maximise vote share and compare them to parties' actual positions. Thus, in each of the four countries, actual party positions are systematically more extreme than those that would maximize vote share. The excess extremism that Poole et al., consistently find is precisely what our theory predicts. Parties do not take positions in order to win as many votes as possible, rather, they take positions voters regard as extreme, moderating only to the extent that they absolutely need to. However, clearly some parts of our theory do not easily generalise to other democracies, especially those that elect their legislature in ways other than first-past-the-post.

When elections are proportional, parties can win seats and participate in government by appealing to small niches in the electorate with little pretence of centrism. Electoral blind spots may be helpful for attracting the votes of inattentive swing voters, but these votes are less critical when elections are not winner-take-all. When politicians are elected via party list, they have little opportunity to cultivate a personal vote, little incentive or ability to push back against

the party policy line. Nominations are less critical for policy demanders seeking to keep politicians in line. Our theory offers a way; however, to think about how cross-national institutional differences might impact the representation of organised interests versus ordinary voters.

THE NEUTRALITY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, THEORY OF THE POLITICAL PARTY AND LESSONS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA'S EMERGING SOCIETIES (1)

All those activities which have to do with registering political parties, seeking elective office, organising elections, and campaigning to woo the electorates are operated within the large spectrum of public administration, which demands its neutrality, if it has to be trusted by voters, especially those who loose elections. A fact which should not be overlooked is that, the character of public administration and its prevailing political system, plays an important role in shaping the philosophies of political parties, including the outcomes of parties' politicking. Generally, in order to win an election, politicians must do what voters want, create parties to help win elections, since parties are the substratum for democracy. These syllogisms provokes two major concern in the practice of public administration, namely: (i) Voters do not pay so much attention to politics to ensure that elective office winners must faithfully execute their wishes for winning an election; within fairly broad limits, obfuscation and phony credit claiming work always prevails. (ii) Interest groups and activists are the dominant players in political parties, insisting on the nomination of candidates who will exploit the limitations of voters' monitoring to advance party programmes. The glaring evidence for these challenges is obviously not conclusive, but we believe it is strong enough to raise serious misgivings around the reigning notion of parties and to establish their own trustworthiness. Empirically I assert that: policy demanders outside government form new party coalitions and force changes in established ones. This way, policy demanders (the electorate) rather than office holders determine the broad agendas of political conflicts.

For instance, in the United States, according to Bawn et al., (2012:28) "...centrist members of Congress are more likely to win re-election than extremists, because, the former are rare and the latter common in the House." However, the gratuitous risk borne by most office holders is consistent with my basic notion that policy-demanding groups rather than politicians are and should be the dominant players in political parties. As Bawn et al, (2012:61) continues,

"...when congressional districts and media markets align to persuade more informed electorates, extremists House members are at much greater risk for defeat. This belief suggests that the extremity of most members of political parties is not due to voter preferences, but to limitations in the ability of most voters to hold representative accountable. In some cases, interest groups or activists can be shown to determine the particular individuals nominated for office." (p.28)

POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY: ARE POLITICAL PARTIES FOUNDATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY?

A central claim of democratic theory is that democracy induces governments to be responsive to the preferences of the people. Consequently, political parties organise politicking in every modern democracy, and some observers claim that parties are what induce democracies to be responsive to the citizens' preferences. Yet, to others, parties give voice to extremists and reduce the responsiveness of governments to the citizenry. The debate about political parties and democracy takes on renewed importance as new democracies, especially in sub-Saharan

African countries, and in other parts around the globe, struggle with issues of representation and governability. Herein, I view the impact of political parties upon democratic responsiveness as revolving around what parties' objectives are, and how much their organisational structures reflect the democratic culture in a given society in terms of how much they are linked to the electorate through constructive free speech, sometimes the tolerance of non-constructive criticisms.

Talking about organizational structure, political parties, which epitomize democracy, allow the electorate to choose and elect their leaders from the cell, branch, district, divisional, state and national levels, without undue interference from any of the upper strata of the party. In none democracies, the party chooses and impose local offices upon the electorate with alacrity, as the case of the Cameroon Peoples' Democratic Movement (CPDM) illustrates in Cameroon. Consequently, the political choices (including policy-making and candidates for elective offices) do not emanate from the electorate, since the electors are hardly consulted to obtain a true reflection of their preferences. Nevertheless, herein my view is not inelastic that, policy demanders - groups/electorate always succeed in controlling parties by controlling nominations. However, they always have the spur to try, and evidence shows they often succeed in free as opposed to totalitarian societies. Forming coalitions to control nominations is an effective way for policy demanders to get what they want out of government. The broader academic studies in political science in free societies and the practice of public administration in emerging societies need an enviable conception of political parties, which captures the aforementioned contentions; because political parties are the epitome of democracy, hence political power mongers and intruders into governing processes, usually use parties' formations to cajole electorate to believe them as democrats. Evidently, even military men have constantly worn the apron of political parties in the pretexts of advancing democracy.

A better grounding in understanding the essential character of political parties in emerging totalitarian societies would certainly broaden these debates. However, while some legal scholarships have incorporated the mainstream parties in service view, more recently scholars such as Michael Kang have begun to build our group-centred theories into reform proposals – the normative political theories. Theorists of democracy have written immensely about political representation as a relationship between office holders and constituents, but have paid little attention to political parties (Ufoma 2010, Bawn et al, (2012:16). This stance could be reasonable if a party were merely an electioneering device. But if a party is a coalition of interest groups and activists that limits voter choice to candidates whom it finds acceptable, parties should be given central roles in theories of democracy. Political theorists such as Lisa Disch, Jane Mansbridge, and especially Nancy Rosenblum, have gone some distance toward incorporating ideas from the dominant view of parties into normative analysis. My alternative view would clearly offer different normative implications which we hope theorists will explore in depth during their future analyses.

In the winner-takes-all politics, which is what has become the norm in totalitarian in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies, Seth (2009) notes, "...dominant view of politics in public discourse presents electoral politics as simply a spectacle for voters to choose, someone who will offer them rewards based on the votes offered." This characterises the dominant view (from which they, like me, dissent), Seth (2009:31) opines:

As spectators, one finds a fairly undeveloped quantity of the electorate; in the arena you find candidates, discrete show men and women who seek their indulgence. All succeed or fail in wooing a fickle electorate, partly based on some events, or mindsets based not on either in foreign policy issues in far-away Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, riots, assassinations, or domestic policy issues based on an economic downturn or partly on their skill in managing the related challenges but on how to compensate the electorate with minor and ephemeral political offices and contracts. Essentially, this view of politics persuades and dissuades in that, if politicians do something, it must be because voters want them to."

However, there is apparently only an issue, which is that, it misses the essence of true democracy, which is particularly concerned with local constituencies. More importantly, this near-universal viewpoint leaves us with two major critical issues: (i) public policy-making and (ii) the cohesion of organised interest groups.

But contrary to this popular image, Seth (2009:45) develops the view of politics as organised battle amongst the strongest of the fittest for political power, with which to mobilise and allocate political and non-political resources." Contestants in the battle are skilled and resourceful interest groups, especially business, who run roughshod with supposedly high degree of intelligence, knowledge and wealth over the downtrodden, headless and unorganized masses in societies. In fact, to imagine and believe that politics is usually organised by election-minded politicians, in the manner writers present this scenario in books, is to miss its essence of political life, given that such one-side thinking. Certainly, organised contests among groups that aim to control policy-making is closer to the reality. We would assert as well that many organised groups, such as rights advocates, environmentalists, labour, pro-life and pro-choice groups, teachers, and so on are more prominent in outsising the impacts on governing processes, especially when their preferred party is in power.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATISATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA'S EMERGING SOCIETIES: AN ILLUSTRATION FROM GHANA

The majoritarian type of democracy lacks consensuality, because, is the type of democracy in which the winning political party in an election calls the shots, in terms of controlling governance, filling normative offices, building or not building social, economic and political infrastructures, and overwhelmingly deciding public policy issues in the exclusion of the losing political party or parties. In the practice of this type of democracy the *raison d'être*, the intimate values and the full benefits of the democratic culture are undermined by the winner takes all syndrome or approach (Haggis, 2020, Ulrich 2021). Apparently, this is the type of democracy, which most emerging sub-Saharan African countries have adopted. Unfortunately, given the innate nature of this type of democracy, power-mongering, self-fulfilling, egoistic and punchline leaders in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging countries, have taken advantage of this non-inclusive winner takes all approach to confiscate governance, strangle and truncate the benefits democracy in the continent. For instance, as Achenga (2021), Tendongi (2021) assert, in Cameroon, like in many other sub-Saharan Africa's emerging countries – Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Chad, and so on, since 1985 through the 1990s till date, the ruling Cameroon Peoples' Democratic Movement (CPDM) has become a dominant party, characterised by the exclusive tenets of one-party-rule, in a multiparty dispensation, due to the belief in, and practice of majoritarian democracy and its winner takes all syndrome.

In Ghana, a relatively enviable democratic sub-Saharan African country, where there is periodic alternation of ruler-ship amongst the competing political parties, the sight of soldiers in its parliament on January 7, 2021 was a first for the country, becoming as it is, the subject of an inquiry, given the ensued scuffle between parliamentarians from the governing party and the opposition, over the election of a Speaker and two deputies. Nevertheless, an opposition candidate was for the first time elected as Speaker, thereby debunking the winner takes all syndrome. But such a situation can hardly occur in several other sub-Saharan Africa's emerging countries – such as Cameroon, Gabon, Congo and so on. However, as Bukari (2021) observes, “...what happened in Ghana's parliament was a perfect example of the shortcomings of the existing system of majoritarian democracy.

Evidently, Ghana's democracy takes the form of West's majoritarian in which the majority side is “always right”, but this rightness might be true in Western countries, given their advanced character of thinking and tolerance (Seetha 2016, Gray 2017). Certainly, this type of democracy gives the ruling party a freer hand to formulate, implement and evaluate public policies on which they campaigned. But critics argue that, this type of democracy distorts the outcomes which favour strong parties opposition. Consequently, suggestions about characterised by the adoption of a more vibrant variety of majoritarian democracy, infused with a human face (Masumbe 2013, Masumbe 2019). Thus, in the place of pure majoritarian democracy, the consensus-based-democracy appears more appropriate for sub-Saharan Africa's emerging countries, given their nation-building and state-building requirements. As Bukari (2021:3) asserts,

“...in contrast, to majoritarian democracy, consensus-based-democracy voting is not necessarily used to determine an issue, settle controversies or reach an agreement, as elections still determine the formation of the government. Rather, factions build consensus and reach agreements amenable to both sides. The minority accepts the agreement not because it takes that particular position but because of the need for maintaining and building relations, which benefits state and nation-building mechanisms – as the Dutch system illustrates.”

My scholarship perspectives, especially in democratisation, policy and peace studies are that, as public policy trusts, sub-Saharan Africa's emerging countries should focus on consensus building as the acceptable and uniting system, which tends to attract the brilliant way forward towards nation-building, rather than nation-tearing. This is because accommodation and pacification of coalitions, and patriotic compromises fit any political make-up better as leadership is more sensitive, moderated and progressively all-embracing in consensus democracy than it is in a non-swing-belt or bolt character in the majoritarian democracy, where power cannot swing from one side to another within the winner takes all doctrines.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA'S EMERGING SOCIETIES AND FACSIMILE WESTERN-STYLE DEMOCRACIES

Whether Africans accept it not, and whether the Western will continue to cover up the pitfalls in their democracies or not, the general notion is that, Western-style democracy, is becoming under strong scholarly analysis by patriotic Africans, Latin Americans, Asians and even Western scholars themselves. In the USA, Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa, democracies are struggling to deal with the insurgence and growth of far right groups, majoritarian democratic dictatorship, suppression and the disregard for democratic institutions. Majoritarian

democracies are becoming predators in favour of orchestrated violence against minorities, opposition figures and free media, using draconian legislations. As Bukari (2021:3) states:

“...the rise of Donald Trump and far right groups in the United States, the undemocratic behaviours of Viktor Orban in Hungary, the rise of the far right groups in Europe; and Jair Bolsonaro and his far-right views in Brazil. Given the use of majoritarian democracy, we have also seen the rise of democratic dictators in parts of sub-Sahara Africa, such as in Senegal, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda and Uganda, whose stock-in-trade has been to change presidential term limits. All these examples seem to depict the failure and crisis inherent in the facsimile adaptation of the Western majoritarian democracy in the African continent or elsewhere.”

Consequently, so many democracies, be they conservative or liberal, illustrate growing intolerances, given the abridged use of consensus in reaching agreements or settling disputes in the governing processes. Leaders of sub-Saharan Africa's political parties with ignorable mentalities use so-called majoritarian democratic tenets to justify their actions even if logical reasoning dictates the use of a human face variant in the use of state power which leads to consensual dealing with national situations, which are inimical to nation-building.

In fact, my suggestion for the adaptation and forging of consensus-based democracy in Africa's emerging societies, does not imply that, western-majoritarian style democracy should be negated and seen a bad political option. What I am addressing in this paper is that, the building of nationhood and statehood is faster, more convenient and far more acceptable within the spirit of inclusive citizenship and national identity; because the consensus-based-democracy basically leads to building understanding, tolerance, acceptance and incorporation of minority views into the public policy-making and decision-making processes in society. This type of democracy allows for strong and strengthened compromises, which invalid manageable controversies for reaching acceptable levels of human development and growth. In most sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies, the adaptation of the majoritarian democracy exposes extensive and glaring shortfalls in the resolve towards nation-building as illustrated by the absence of consensus in the case of Ghanaian 2020 election, which unnecessarily wedged to formal and inflexible majoritarian democratic principles. As Bukari (2021:3) states,

“The Ghanaian Electoral Commission's failure to use consensus was reflected in its frosty relationship with key members of its Inter-Party Advisory Committee, because this committee, made up of all political parties, even after guiding the progress of elections for over 20 years; the partnership was strained in the build-up to the 2020 election after the commission and the largest opposition party fell out. The fallout led to the hostile reception of election results, and from there to the scuffle in parliament.”

Invariably, a consensus based approach – democracy, would have certainly rebuffed this sort of outcome; and resulted into a far more peaceful acceptance of the election results, which would have led to the avoidance of the unpleasant, messy and disgraceful scenes which took place in Ghanaian parliament in the midst of a glaring worldwide audience.

POLITICAL PARTIES' PHILOSOPHIES AND POLITICS IN FREE SOCIETIES: LESSONS FOR EMERGING SOCIETIES (2)

From the foregoing analysis of the philosophies and policies of political parties in free societies, several lessons are adduced, which include, but not limited to:

- (i) ruling or opposition political parties, must never openly entice and/to incorporate their countries' civil servants, into partisanship via their parties' philosophies and policies, because the civil service must permanently neutral in rendering unalloyed services to any party (government) in power (AGIP) as it represents the bedrock, continuity and custodians of the public administrations;
- (ii) ruling and opposition political parties, must create highly sacrosanct and conducive enabling politico-economic and social environments and landscapes in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies, as *sine qua non* pre-requisites for allowing public administrations in these societies to amply midwife democratic tenets that consist of free, fair and level playing grounds for competitive politics;
- (iii) ruling political parties must allow unimpeded and appropriate flow of information through a free and upright press; including the provision of financial resources for contesting political parties as pre-conditions for levelled playgrounds necessary for partaking into competitive politicking;
- (iv) ruling political parties must debunk and eradicate the prevailing fake multi-parties' political settings and platforms in their emerging societies;
- (v) ruling and opposition political parties must eschew, rebuff and negate any form of electoral malpractices or any corrupt-practices agendas against the public good;
- (vi) ruling and opposition political parties must dissuade all sorts of hidden agendas towards the manipulations of national constitutions, which benefits egoistic leaders to garner indefinite presidential tenures;
- (vii) ruling and opposition political parties must refrain from creating and ingraining egoistically imbued totalitarian political devices, which thwart and strangle democracy in their societies;
- (viii) ruling political parties must discard the instincts that urge the resurgence of the syndrome of single or dominant political party rules;
- (ix) ruling political parties must distill and exterminate the prevailing coercive police state rules; and inculcate the rule of law, rather than the rule by power;
- (x) ruling political parties must imbue the senses of creating enabling public administrations, which prod real human progress, prosperity and happiness for the greater majority of citizens;
- (xi) political parties in the opposition must prove their worth in forging responsible and responsive electorate-friendly governance, in order to be trusted by the electorate to win and control state and political power;
- (xii) political parties and societies at large must ensure that, interest groups, activists and lay voters, rather than leaders of political parties are the key actors in societal politics.
- (xiii) political parties must ensure that, groups' alliances must develop collective plans wherever necessary; and to inculcate the transparent screening of contestants for party nominations based on candidates' loyalties to parties' agendas, rather than on the predatory ambitions of political offices seekers;
- (xiv) ruling and opposition political parties, must always be mindful that, the winner takes all philosophy incarnated by majoritarian democracy is outdated and unattractive in

governance, and in its place, the consensus-based-democracy should prevail in order to prod inclusively stable and peaceful societies.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

According to Damon Wilson, (2021) "Smart people all over the world are very quickly realising what it means to grow up under a tyranny than in a democracy. This realisation offers extensive lessons to people not to take democracy for granted, by understanding, what it means to grow up in freedom and with democracy's protections."

This article sought to divulge political parties' philosophies and their politicking in free societies, in order to adduce lessons to be contextually emulated in citizens-friendly and sensitive-oriented mentalities; ingrained into human faced governing processes by political parties in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies. In validating this work's research problem, I used the historical research method, which facilitates the use of primary and secondary data, in addition to Bawn et al.,s theoretical framework, specifically on their viewpoint on the performances of political parties in Western free societies. This enabled this author to increase knowledge on the theoretical and empirical contents of the theory of the political party for the benefits of political parties in emerging sub-Saharan Africa's societies.

Therefrom, I adduced appropriate democratic lessons from political parties' philosophies and policies in free societies, which incorporate consensus-based-democracy views even from opposition political parties and; the impulsion from interest groups, activists and lay voters, rather than that from leaders of political parties. I adduced that, the interest of social cohesion and the country's unity becomes the key and determinant public policy-making and decision-making factors in the national political arena. In order to achieve this, interest groups, activists and lay voters from all political parties, rather than the leaders of ruling political party usually become the key actors and governance enhancers.

Thus, I advocate that, political parties in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies must imbue philosophies; wherein coalitions of groups develop common agendas and transparently screen candidates for party nominations based on the candidates' unalloyed loyalty and clear submissiveness to such agendas; and not on any predatory ambitions of the so-called leaders of the political parties. Certainly, this theoretical perspective appears to contrast extensively with current dominant theories, which views of parties as instruments of self-seeking leaders. The difference is succinctly informative, because parties dominated by interest groups, activists and voters are more responsive to voters' preferences.

Thus, I fervently debunk the general practices of political parties' formation in sub-Saharan African societies, wherein members standing for elective offices, rebuff popularising themselves along soundly articulated and inclusive ideas from opposition political parties for solving social problems, but bask in narrow self-seeking party's and leaders' rapacious ambitions, at the chagrin of the electorate. From my contextual analysis backed by my chosen research methodology, especially the review of relevant literature, I discerned the unholy imbuelement by sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies, the adoption of majoritarian democratic norms, which extensively excludes a great chunk of the population from governance.

By fashioning their emerging societies upon the characteristics of majoritarian democracy, African leaders have under the guise of this character of democracy cajoled their unsuspecting citizens and have succeeded to alienate their ultimate voters by ingraining themselves into political power after silencing any sort of viable opposition and dissenting voices. Furthermore, from the relevant contextual data analysis, I deduced that, in most sub-Saharan Africa's emerging countries, the opposition political parties which the ruling parties try to show come degrees of cooperation in the governing processes, are those which are satellite and creations of the ruling parties. Thus, even after several decades of their so-called democratic experiments in this region, citizens are yet to see the dividends of real democratic rules in the continent.

Citizens do not feel involved; they have no clear senses of national belonging and identity backed any solid consciousness in sharing the national cake and by extension nation-building. Even the bogus African Union inundated with dictatorial leaders in the continent, and backed by their erstwhile colonialists from Western countries; who continue to forge their subjugation with neo-colonialist agendas in Africa; and even the numerous regional bodies in the continent, need to imbue sober reflections on Africa's human development and democratisation processes, if the avoidance of conflicts is part of any continental agenda destined to emancipate Africa's emerging societies into any real and enduring emergence.

The African Union and its sub-bodies must forge strong accelerative self-reliance cognitive capacities which create the sort of human capital necessary towards a type of democracy, which is more inclusive, inspiring, electors-friendly, consensual and participatory, inclined with willingness and capacities to providing distinct senses of belonging, so as to ensure peace, stability and development in the continent. Obviously, in this direction, consensus-based-democracy appears to be the definitive system for governance; which portends a *sine qua non* for sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies. Elections are good because they are the real substratum for democracy, especially when a large majority has to decide on national issues, such as deciding on the type of political system, power-sharing mechanisms, choosing national political leaders through elections as the president and parliamentarians, in a widely accepted constitutionally entrenched form of government; which does not depict extensive centralisation and the use of over-coercing discretionary powers allotted to one person. The African Union must elaborate a system which abhors the consequences that emanate from the articulation of citizens unfriendly and underdevelopment oriented public policies. Consequently, the Union should ensconce urgent use of consensus solving critical national issues for building viable democracies, including the rules of voting epitomised by glaring national independent electoral bodies.

Finally, I elect to insist that, consensus-based-democracy, which allows for healthy agreements based on best practices for consuming the common good; and which assures progress in providing human felt-human needs, built by equitable and genuine compromises; appears to present itself as the suitable political option for sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies. Invariably, the tested but failing Western majoritarian democracy, which encourages the winner, takes all syndromes – syndromes which orchestrate in the words of Burton (1990):

“...the eruption of human needs conflicts, which arise from the creation and entrenchment of inequitable human communities, created by skewed resource mobilisation, distribution, allocation, appropriation and consumption character in

society, [must cease to unquestionably prevail in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies]."

Thus, I advocate concerted efforts into public policies changes, first by leaders of political parties in both the ruling or opposition divides in sub-Saharan Africa's emerging societies; the African Union, the political and civil societies, must uncompromisingly imbue strong wills for dispelling and ending neo-colonialism with its attendant subjugation from the continent, particularly in this new millennium. The acquisition of self-disciplined resource-management characters, healthy enough to articulate viable political, economic and social changes, which are anchored upon consensually agreed constitutional democratic not autocratic mechanisms. Obviously, all issues of governance concern all Africa's Dicks and Harrys, especially, issues of power-sharing through the character of state organisation with its resulting state power devolution; issues that concern the refusal to systematically eradicate the use of large spectrum discretionary attributions of state power; and issues that concern the development and growth of real democracy and human emancipation.

Irrefutably, "...the coercive governing styles of most ruling political parties, cause the unacceptable imbue of discretionary postures, which front as 'politically correct syndromes,' epitomised by one-man-governance-show," that prevails in most political, economic, social and even cultural landscapes in Africa's emerging societies (Venetia 2017:5, Nnachi 2018:23). Our investigations which have been supported by other works, reveal that, "...this posture is highly detrimental to the progress, prosperity and citizens' lasting happiness, because, since such postures tremendously negate and cripple citizens' involvement into massive social, economic and political opportunities (Haggis, (2020:12, Ulrich, (2021:31). Therefore, at the behest of posterity, only Africa and Africans themselves will be judged based on how best they engaged their capacities to attract, garner and fashion their societies' abundant fortunes. According to Abbe (2020), Bukari, (2021), Africa's leaders will be questioned by future generations on how wrongly or rightly public policies were translated into viable growth opportunities; and how wrongly or rightly the enviable capacities from their political parties were employed into plunging Africa's teeming populations into harsh, debilitating and unending servitude, starvation, disease and generalised miseries.

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