



Political Theory of Societal Association: Case of the Failed State Of Syria—Part 5 Brexit

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ABSTRACT

In this fifth paper of a series on failing states, we analyze the impact that the large numbers of Syrian refugees from the Syrian civil war (2010-2019) had on political association in Britain – triggering a major change British policy and possibly threatening national unity. The theoretical model of political association is composed of three dimensions in the political dichotomies of: (1) ‘kinship or reciprocal-altruism’, (2) ‘centralization or decentralization-of-power’, and (3) ‘idealism or realism’. This is a cross-disciplinary political theory which can apply to different societies and to different times in a society.

Key Words: Civilization, Failed States, Political Theory, Middle East, Colonialism, Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, Brexit

INTRODUCTION

What kind of explanations can the social science theories use to explain events in society? A case study of the Brexit event provides challenges in theoretical explanations and offers empirical evidence to verify appropriate social science theory. We have been examining the theory of political association in historical events related to the civil war in Syria. In four previous papers which analyzed the histories of Syria and Lebanon as failed states, we have shown that their history empirically contributes to grounding (verifying) a formal theory of political association.

In this case, we add to the theory of political association, the modes of explanation in the social sciences. For example, for the public good of the citizens of Great Britain, should Brexit have occurred or not? The answer to this is a normative explanation in Brexit. What political factions in British politics pushed Brexit, and how did they benefit? Those answers are empirical explanations in Brexit. Both normative and empirical explanations occur in the social sciences (in contrast to the physical sciences in which only empirical explanations are methodologically appropriate). Understanding Brexit will further provide evidence for applying political association theory to the issue of the stability or instability of a state. Brexit occurred in the context of the failed state of Syria; and the event may have increased the possibility of Great Britain failing.

BACKGROUND – SYRIAN CIVIL WAR AND REFUGES INTO EUROPE

While Islam has been the dominant religion of the Middle East, in the twentieth century, it also became a major political factor in the newly independent states of the Middle East. Also, the ideological concept of ‘Arab nationalism’ became the second major political factor in the Middle

East. The theoretical model of political association explaining this historical situation of the last al-Assad regime in Syria is shown in Figure 1. (Betz,)




Figure 1: Societal Stasis of The Bashar al-Assad Regime in Syria

In independent Syria, the idealism of Arab nationalism had faded, while the religious division in Syria continued. The Alawite clans of the al-Assad's took power there, Shia over Sunni. 'Religious and Tribal Identity' dominated the 'Realism' of Syrian governance, under the al-Assad regimes. Syria never really became a 'nation' under the al-Assad's -- but only a one-party (Ba'athist) and one-clan (Alawite) authoritarian state.

The army of the al-Assad, under its Alawite governments, treated the Syrian Sunnis as rebels and by extensive bombing destroyed Syrian towns, outside of Damascus.

Emptying Syrian cities Sunni Syrians, they fled to Lebanon, Turkey, and Europe. This provided an opportunity for conquest of the devastated territory by a new ideological group, ISIS. (Betz,) ISIL/ISIS/IS formed militias of dissident Sunnis to attack major cities in Iraq and Syria. The 'Real' politics of Syria then became a Sunni-Shite religious ('Reciprocal-Altruism Association') divide in Syria and Iraq. Then ISIS, a radical Wahhabis caliphate, conquered large amounts of territory in eastern Syria and northern Iraq

The brutal and murderous terror of the ISIS caliphate government alienated European countries, which ISIS terrorized. Next under the ISIS assaults, the al-Assad Syrian government was about to collapse -- but was rescued by the Russian air force and the Iranian-supported Hezbollah. In Iraq, U.S. aid helped Iraq to rebuild its army and retake Mosul, with the ground force assistance of Iranian militia and Kurdish Peshmerga. Also with U.S. air force help, the Kurds and Sunni Muslim rebel militias and Iranian Hezbollah militias retook the eastern Syrian cities, defeating ISIS.

In Figure 2, we show a 'meta-model' of the the theoretical model of political association of the ISIS caliphate, as the 'context' of the application of the theory of 'political association'. [Betz,]




Figure 2: International Context of the Political Association in Syria

This was the international context of the political association of the ISIS caliphate -- in which the forces of Iran, Russia, and the U.S. provided the military support to enable the Kurds, rebel Syrians, and Hezbollah militias to recapture ISIS cities and crush the Caliphate. Depicted as a meta-model of the political association in Syria, this context is needed to understand the impact of the Syrian civil war upon neighboring countries -- particularly in Europe.

Bashar al-Assad's government had to be rescued from complete collapse by Russian warplanes and Iranian Hezbollah militias. Bashar's father and Bashar had constructed a state wherein Alawite Shiites dominated the government, economy, and military officers, resulting in an unstable state and not a stable nation.

One notes that no international organization (e.g., UN, NATO, EU) intervened to stop Bashar al-Assad's bombing of his own Syrian cities and non-Alawite citizens. And no international organization intervened to destroy ISIS. All military action was taken or supported by the respective national interests of Russia, US, and Iran. And since Russia and Iran opposed the interests of the U.S., Syria was not put back together again -- nor did the refugee outflow end nor did al-Assad genocide on Syrian Sunni and Kurd citizens end. The Syrian civil wars went on into 2021, and the refugee crisis in Europe and Turkey continued.

Refugee flow out of Syria was large -- into the neighboring states of Lebanon and Turkey and into Europe. Aram Nerguizian wrote: "The other key sources of instability in Syria include demographic shifts, ethnic cleansing, and the creation of both massive refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) populations. By mid-2015, some 7.6 million Syrians had become IDPs and an additional 3.9 million were refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt – more than 51 percent of Syria's total population in 2013." (Nerguizian, 2015)

By 2015, the United Nations (UNHCR) estimated that 12 million people in Syria needed humanitarian assistance. About 1.9 million Syrians had fled into Turkey, and 1.1 million into Lebanon. In 2016, over 13 million people required assistance. Turkey had received over 3.5

million refugees. There were 1 million applicants for refuge in Europe. Figure 3 shows the dispersion of Syrian refugees in Europe.




Figure 3: Syrian Refugees in Europe in 2015 (Source: Wikipedia: Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa))

The large numbers of Syrian refugees created political crises in many countries. In 2015, the European Union decided to accept 120,000 applicants directly and redistribute them across the EU countries. Hungary refused to allow in such applicants; and the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia also opposed the plan. By the middle of 2015, there were 313,000 asylum applications in Europe. By the end of 2015, over 500,000 Syrian refugees entered Europe. In February 2016, Austria imposed a restriction on the number of entries. Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia restricted entries to only 580 refugees a day. Large numbers of Syrian refugees were then stranded in Greece and in Turkey and in Lebanon.

In 2015, United Kingdom granted asylum to 5012 refugees; and the government announced plans to settle 20,000 refugees over five years. However, a poll of British opinion taken in May 2015, reported that 42% of British respondents said that the UK should not take in refugees fleeing persecution.

These large numbers of Syrian refugees into Europe impacted the politics of the European countries, triggering a wave of political parties which styled themselves as 'nationalists' – opposed to refugee immigration.

In Britain, without the influx of the Syrian refugees into Britain, Cameron might not have called the referendum -- and Brexit might not have happened. The Syrian refugee crisis (2010-2019) facilitated the passing of the referendum for Britain to exit from the European Union, 'Brexit'. A

political faction in British politics ('Leavers') used the refugee crisis to fuel popular support for a major change in British politics.

METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

We pause to briefly review how methodologically in the social sciences two kinds of explanation are used: 'normative explanations' and 'empirical explanations'. Methodologically this will facilitate the creation of both grounded empirical theory and grounded normative theory in the social sciences (political science, economics, sociology, etc.)

For this, we need to understand the different kinds of explanation logically available to social science models. We review the forms of scientific explanation, both in the physical and in the social sciences. Scientific 'Laws' are the expression of the regularities of patterns in natural processes discovered in observing between natural objects and their relationships. In the physical sciences, the paradigm of mechanism provides a modality of relationship between two objects interacting by physical forces as a cause-effect relation. This means that a cause (A) must precede in time an effect (B), so that:

- (1) *if B has occurred, then A must have previously occurred: the existence of A is necessary to the following existence of B;*
- (2) *whenever A occurs, then B follows: the existence of A is sufficient to following existence of B.*

A causal law is characterized by both necessity and sufficiency (N&S) in the relation of the cause to the effect. Logically, one can distinguish four kinds of explanatory modes (modalities) in science -- by taking the two logical relational requirements of necessity (N) and sufficiency (S) in all possible logical combinations, as shown in Figure 4.

<u>EXPLANATIONS IN SCIENCE</u>				
RELATIONSHIP	NECESSITY		SUFFICIENCY	
CAUSAL	NECESSARY (N)	&	SUFFICIENT(S)	N&S
PRESCRIPTIVE	NECESSARY (N)	&	NOT-SUFFICIENT (<u>S</u>)	N&<u>S</u>
ACCIDENTAL	NOT-NECESSARY (<u>N</u>)	&	SUFFICIENT (S)	<u>N</u>&S
THEMATIC	NOT-NECESSARY (<u>N</u>)	&	NOT-SUFFICIENT(<u>S</u>)	<u>N</u>&<u>S</u>

Figure 4. Modes (Types) of Explanations in Science.

The physical sciences (physics, chemistry, environment) use the scientific paradigm of Mechanism -- with causal explanatory relationships (N&S) between physical objects. *Physical forces are necessary and sufficient for physical objects to change their motions in a space-time framework.* (Space & Time, Matter & Energy, Force & Motion are fundamental concepts in describing the physical universe as mechanisms -- mechanical description and explanation -- scientific paradigm of Mechanism.) [] (Betz. 2011)

The scientific paradigm of Function uses the prescriptive relationship of (N&S) between functional objects. *In biology, connecting a function to a mechanism in biology requires that the mechanism object be necessary for the functional value to a biological thing but not sufficient. In the social sciences, prescriptive laws (N&S) express normative explanation for socio-technical systems.*

In historical explanation, some events are accidental, such as a particular individual being in some place at some time and something happening to the individual to change the course of history. For example, the English King, Richard the Lionheart, was accidentally killed by an arrow fired down by an opponent soldier on a fortress wall. The arrow hit was deliberate by the soldier (prescriptive, N&S) but an accident of war to Richard (accidental, N&S)

Thematic relationships (N&S) are also important in history and in the social sciences, as they connect the ideas to action. They are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain observed phenomena. Ideology is a kind of thematic explanation. Why people follow some political parties. We will next see in the history of Brexit, that thematic explanation determined the course of political history in Britain by means of a referendum to take Britain out of the European Union, 'Brexit'.

Physical science laws and theory use causal explanation (N&S) and are thus contextually independent (since sufficiency of explanation is contained within a causal law).

Social science laws and theory use prescriptive (N&S), accidental (N&S), or thematic(N&S) explanations -- all being contextually dependent (S) and require additional explanation for sufficiency.

While explaining either thematically or prescriptively, all social science theories should be methodologically 'grounded' (justified by real events in history) -- both in empirical and normative judgments.

HISTORICAL CASE: BREXIT REFERENDUM IN 2016

A faction in the Conservative Party in Britain had long argued for a renewed 'nationalism'. James McBride wrote: "For decades, the United Kingdom has had an ambivalent and sometimes contentious relationship with the European Union. ... Advocates of a British exit, or Brexit, from the union argued that by reclaiming its national sovereignty, the UK would be better able to manage immigration, free itself from onerous regulations, and spark more dynamic growth." (McBride, 2019)

The argument for a British sovereignty was a 'thematic explanation' used to justify a vote for Britain to leave the EU.

After the wave of Syrian refugees into Europe in 2012-2015, Prime Minister David Cameron had offered his national referendum in Britain in June 2016 -- on whether Britain should leave the EU. The referendum for 'leave EU' obtained a slight majority of 51.9%. Cameron resigned as Prime Minister, having not expected the 'leave' to pass. Next, since Cameron's term in office as Prime Minister had not expired, the Conservative Tory Party chose Theresa May as Britain's Prime Minister to finish Cameron's term and to carry out Brexit.

Prime Minister May chose the ideological position (thematic explanation) that a slight majority of the vote represented the voice of all the people, proclaiming: “Brexit means Brexit.” This meant that she chose to ignore the wishes of nearly half the British citizens (48% of the voters) who voted for Britain to remain in the EU. A faction in the Conservative Party (led now by May who herself had voted to remain) took the political position that a ‘policy’ affecting a whole country should be decided not by an elected Parliament but by a slight margin of a split vote in the national referendum.

This is an example of how a political faction can represent a political position of a part of a nation to stand for the position for all the nation – political ideology in the political association of a ‘factional politics’ – thematic explanation of a governing ideology.

For the next two years, Prime Minister May negotiated with the European Union for an agreement under which to leave the EU. This agreement would have been a ‘prescriptive explanation’ for Brexit. But Prime Minister May could not get this agreement passed into law by her conservative majority in British Parliament – even after repeated efforts over the two years.

A faction of the conservative party held a ‘thematic explanation’ of absolute sovereignty to prevent a ‘prescriptive explanation’ of EU negotiation to pass the British Parliament, facilitating Brexit.

Tom McTague and Charlie Cooper wrote: “Theresa May had inherited the biggest political challenge for any U.K. prime minister since 1945 — and proved unequal to the task. . . Instead of delivering Brexit and making the country work for provincial Britain, as she promised, she departed, leaving an even bigger crisis than the one she inherited, with little — if anything — by way of domestic achievements to show for her premiership. May had taken the job with a warning that failing to deliver Brexit would only empower the political extremes. Brexit meant Brexit, she said — it was a revolution that had to be enacted to stave off more dramatic disruption. . . By May 21, 2019 — less than three years later — she had nothing to show and nothing left to give. “I have tried everything I possibly can to find a way through.” Three days later it was over, but the message was the same as it had been almost three years before — a warning that the revolution would not go away.” (McTague and Cooper, 2019)

Prime Minister May had taken the job to implement Brexit but had proceeded without the political savvy to succeed. Instead she was held hostage by a faction within her Conservative Party – the hard-core ‘leavers’. Tom McTague and Charlie Cooper wrote: “With an eye on her political obituary, May used her resignation speech Friday to insist she has left nothing on the pitch. The truth, her critics counter, is that this is not the case. May went as far as she possibly could without breaking the Conservative Party. She never considered a national government, a confirmatory second referendum or a soft Brexit deal inside the single market and customs union that Labour and the Scottish National Party might be able to support, because to do so would almost certainly have cost her the leadership of her party, or caused a permanent split. Even at the end, she would only compromise so far: Her “bold” final offer to Labour was a guarantee that MPs would be given the chance to vote for or against a second referendum. This was not an offer to support a second referendum in order to pass her deal — it was an offer her aides knew was hollow, because parliament would not support it.” (McTague and Cooper, 2019)

Prime Minister May called an election in 2017 and the Conservative Party lost its majority in Parliament. Tom McTague and Charlie Cooper wrote: “The prime minister had . . . an almost unprecedented evaporation of authority, power and influence after a series of catastrophic miscalculations. None was more damaging than her decision to call a snap general election in 2017, robbing her of the majority she needed to take Britain out of the EU with a deal acceptable to her Conservative Party. “The imperceptible and unquantifiable phenomenon of political power” had drained away, said one Tory minister who backed her until the end. ‘It had gone.’” (McTague and Cooper, 2019)

Even to the end, Prime Minister May thought that a bare majority in a referendum (51% to leave) was an overwhelming ‘voice of democracy’ as a ‘thematic explanation’. And she never used a second referendum after the Brexit deal had been negotiated – a possible second ‘thematic explanation’ about how large a majority vote would constitute the ‘voice of the people’.

Tom McTague and Charlie Cooper wrote: “Prime Minister May said: “I feel as certain today as I did three years ago that in a democracy, if you give people a choice you have a duty to implement what they decide,” she said. “The referendum was not just a call to leave the EU but for profound change in our country.” That call for profound change ultimately cost May her job. After March 29, her third and final attempt to force through her Brexit divorce deal, the Conservative Party’s poll ratings nose-dived amid a surge in support for Nigel Farage’s populist Brexit Party demanding a no-deal withdrawal. May herself admitted she had tried to deliver a Tory Brexit first. With May forced to take her finger out of the dyke, the surge now risks overwhelming the British political establishment. The candidates to succeed her as Tory leader and prime minister — Boris Johnson, Dominic Raab, Steve Baker, Esther McVey, Andrea Leadsom, Sajid Javid and Jeremy Hunt — have all spoken of no-deal being preferable to no-Brexit. Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour — a radical proposition in and of itself — is moving toward backing a second referendum. The crisis is not going away. “She ignored certain strategic options because she wanted to keep the party together,” one leading Tory MP said. “But the party still imploded. It’s just total, total failure.” (McTague and Cooper, 2019)

The Brexit political problem was the boundary between Ireland (remaining in the EU) and North Ireland (forced to leave the EU along with Britain). May negotiated a ‘customs union’ between Britain and EU to avoid a guarded boundary between Ireland and North Ireland. This customs union infuriated the political faction of ‘hard Brexiters’, who would not vote to approve May’s agreement. Finally, as all the Conservatives failed to support Prime Minister May, she resigned as head of the British Government in June 2019. But then a Brexit leave had been scheduled for October 2019, even without a negotiated deal, a ‘hard Brexit’.

THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE POLITICAL ASSOCIATION IN BREXIT

Figure 5 depicts the 3-D model of political association in Britain at the time of referendum for Brexit.




Figure 5. 3-Dimensional Typology of Political Association in the Historical Case of Brexit

In the Idealism dimension, the Myth prevalent in the politics of the Conservative Party was that of the former 'British Empire', and the ideological issue was 'Sovereignty'. Within the Conservative Party, a political faction pushed for the exit of Britain from the EU: the 'Brexiters'. These Brexit proponents argued that by taking back 'sovereign decisions' from under any rules imposed by the European Union, then Britain would again establish its 'Empire' (which once ruled India, the Caribbean, North America, and Australia). This ideal of *Nationalism against foreign threat* was advocated by the 'leave faction' of the British Conservative Party.

This 'leave faction' in the British conservative party used the refugee crisis to persuade the British public to approve a referendum for Britain leaving the EU. William Davies wrote: "British democracy is currently disillusioned. The parties that dominated the past century of national politics are in crisis; an astonishing YouGov poll (conducted at the end of May 2019) put both Labor and the Conservatives at 19 per cent, behind the Liberal Democrats and Nigel Farage's Brexit Party. An Opinium poll subsequently put the Brexit Party out in front on 26 per cent... Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn now hold the record for the most unpopular leadership duo ever, breaking the record set by Thatcher and Michael Foot in December 1981." [6] (Davies, 2019).

The last British national election had placed the Conservative government in power for five years. After Prime Minister Cameron resigned, then Teresa May became Prime Minister without having won a popular election. The Conservative Party alone had chosen the new Prime Minister to succeed Cameron. Later when May resigned, the Conservative Party alone would choose the next succeeding Prime Minister. The Conservative Party was filling out its five-year government term with Prime Ministers, who did not represent popularity with the British people -- but only popularity within the Conservative Party.

HISTORICAL CASE CONTINUED: BRITISH ELECTION IN 2019

After Prime Minister May resigned, the Conservative Party selected Boris Johnson to be the new Prime Minister. William Davies wrote: “The Tories have made numerous bad leadership appointments in the last twenty years . . . (But now) . . . how much do Tory members even care about general elections, compared to their passion for a no deal Brexit? There are plenty of reasons not to elect Boris Johnson as prime minister, but much of the Conservative electorate is focused only on his one perceived virtue: his celebration of ‘no deal’ (leaving the EU without any deals, arrangements).” [6] (Davies, 2019)

The issue upon May’s resignation was whether Britain would leave the EU without any negotiated deal – just leave with no agreement about trade tariffs, or British access to European markets or people in Europe or Britain living abroad. Economically, a no-agreement (called a ‘no-deal’) would create temporary chaos in trade between Britain and the EU.

But ‘no-deal’ would become the Conservative Party government’s policy position after Prime Minister May had failed again and again to get the Conservative Party’ majority vote for a Brexit deal.

Next Boris Johnson, the new Conservative Party leader, committed to a no-deal exit by the end of October in 2019. William Davies wrote: “No-deal will always be a niche minority policy position, within the electorate and even more so in Parliament. And yet this is now where all the momentum in British politics lies. This is a freakish and frightening situation. It isn’t just that ‘no-deal’ is unrepresentative of mainstream public opinion . . . but that the forces behind it make no real claim to be representative either.” [6] (Davies, 2019)

We recall the Brexit referendum of British voters (held on 23 June 2016 and resulting in a 51.9% vote for withdrawal) had not (after two years of negotiation about conditions for an exit) been passed by the British Parliament. Finally in December 2019, Boris Johnson held a new parliamentary election; and surprise! The Conservative Party led by Boris Johnson now won a large majority in Parliament -- for Britain to finally exit the EU.

This landslide vote for Johnson’s conservative party was obtained by a massive defection of working-class voters from their traditional Labor Party affiliation. Benjamin Mueller wrote: “They trudged through a stinging rain to polling stations, streams of people who once powered the left in Britain: ex-miners, supermarket clerks, retired schoolteachers, health aides. But when they re-emerged, they had voted not for the Labor Party (the side that had shepherded them through decades of political upheaval) but instead for their old nemesis, the Conservative Party, long despised here for shutting down the mines and shrinking the British state.” (Mueller, 2019).

Benjamin Mueller quoted a sample of working-class voters, traditionally for Labor but who voted then conservative. “As Dawn Ridsdale stood outside the converted barn in Barlborough where she cast her ballot (56, an unemployed sales agent), she said: ‘I’m from a Labor background -- the coal pits and fighting Maggie Thatcher and everything else. The country’s on its backside.’ She had opposed Brexit, but now wanted someone with the ruthless streak of the prime minister who had closed the mines, Margaret Thatcher, to sort it out, once and for all.

She added: 'I've unfortunately had to vote for Boris. He's the best of a bad bunch.' (Mueller, 2019).

Benjamin Mueller further explained: "Ms. Ridsdale meant Prime Minister Boris Johnson -- the upper-class eccentric who defied half a century of political geography on Thursday to tear through Labor's old coalition of small-town, working-class voters in the Midlands and north of England (a block of seats once thought so impregnable that it was called the Red Wall). Down went at least nine seats that Labor had held without interruption since the Second World War. Down went a type of tribal politics in northern England, in which people inherited voting customs from their parents and grandparents, passing fights over mine closures and benefit cuts down the generations." (Mueller, 2019).

Working-class voters had given the Conservative Party a majority. Mark Landler wrote: "Mr. Johnson's Conservative Party rode a wave of frustrated working-class voters to a decisive majority in Parliament, radically realigning British politics and reshaping Britain's oldest party. ...The voters who gave Mr. Johnson the largest Conservative majority (since Margaret Thatcher) share few of the free-trade or deregulatory instincts of the Brexiteers who masterminded Mr. Johnson's campaign or filled his last cabinet. These voters want safe jobs, protection from imports and the restoration of a Britain that vanished in the contrails of the global economy. That is worlds-away from the agile, economically open, lightly regulated Britain that Mr. Johnson's Downing Street brain trust envisions ('Singapore-on-Thames' -- to use their preferred marketing slogan)." (Landler, 2019).

In the final episode of Brexit, a normative prescription for leaving, argued by British 'Leavers', became an empirical prescription by a majority of voters, voting in a Conservative Parliament to finally implement Brexit, as a 'hard exit' from the EU.

SOCIETAL DYNAMICS ANALYSIS OF BREXIT AS A CHANGE EVENT

The Brexit event was an important and complicated political event which would change British history. Next in Figure 6, we analyze the Brexit event to make clear the kinds of explanation occurring in the event..an analysis of the event in the framework of societal dynamics. (Betz,).




Figure 6 3-Dimensional Observational Space of Change Event in a Societal History

In any societal event, one can analyze the event by the functional dimensions of Individual-Society, Action-Reason, Group-Process. This means that, in any societal event, one can observe specific *Individuals* as critical to the event happening in a *Society* at that time. One, can observe specific *Actions* as characterizing the event; and *Reasons* why participants in the society chose to act. Also in that event, *Groups* will be involved in the actions, along with their Processes that influenced the course of the event. Thus an analytical space for observing any change event in any society, one can analyze the event in terms of six societal factors: *Individuals-Society, Action-Reason, Groups-Process*.

Constructing a graph of this space, one can identify fifteen explanatory relationships which can connect any two of the six functional factors in the event: 1. *Ethics/Integrity*, 2. *Principles/Rules*, 3. *Institutionalization*, 4. *Ideas*, 5. *Policy*, 6. *Strategy/Leadership*, 7. *Governance*, 8. *Knowledge*, 9. *Regulation*, 10. *Performance*, 11. *Infrastructure*, 12. *Technology*, 13. *Tactics/Operations*, 14. *Ideology/Factions*, 15. *System*.

Next, we can apply these explanations to assist in the analysis of the Brexit event. Specifically, we search for explanations to understand the conflicts between the Brexiter faction and the British Government and Parliament.

Societal Factors in the Brexit Event

Individuals – The principle individuals involved in the event were the Prime Ministers David Cameron, Theresa May, and Boris Johnson. Cameron initiated the Brexit event through a referendum (although Cameron didn't support leaving). Theresa May negotiated with the European Union for two years for an exit deal, without Parliament passing a leave bill (although May had voted in the referendum to not leave). Boris Johnson initiated a general election which resulted in a majority representation for his Conservative Party, enabling passage of a leave bill.

Society – The Society involved exiting from the European Union was Great Britain, which included England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

Action – The societal change event was the passage of a national referendum for Britain to leave the European Union, followed by two years of negotiation for a leave-deal, followed by another election which gave the Conservative Party a majority in Parliament to pass a leave bill, followed by a scheduled exit of Britain from the EU in 2020.

Reason – The reasoning for passage of Brexit was to return sovereignty to Brittan from some control by the EU; while the reasoning for Brittan remaining in the EU was the advantage to Britan of access to the large EU market and ease of British citizens to live and work in any EU member country.

Groups –The groups involved in the Brexit event were British Parliament, British political parties, and fractions within the political parties. The election defeat was a disaster for the traditional British Labor Party, revealing a divisive split in the party between two kinds of interest groups: college-educated-middle-class-professionals and high-school-educated-working-class-laborers. Benjamin Mueller explained: "For Labor, which suffered its worst election defeat since 1935, the results signaled the end of an era of being able to reach into both thriving cities and left-behind former mining villages for votes. The party's two wings — pro-

and anti-immigrant, young and old, university graduates and tradespeople — were cleaved.” (Mueller, 2019).

Moreover, this split in labor-oriented politics (a working-class political faction) had been occurring not only in Britain but also in Europe and in America. Benjamin Mueller wrote: “The big, longstanding parties of the left started vanishing from Europe years ago as class alliances faded in a postindustrial economy. But the consequences of the political realignment in Britain (as in the United State), are much graver because their two-party systems prevent left-wing parties from simply resolving their differences by splitting. The left is now squabbling on both sides of the Atlantic, with both the Labor and Democratic parties grappling with a rancorous battle between young activists and more moderate voters. The results yesterday in Britain were a sobering lesson in the consequences of destroying age-old party alliances before new ones had time to germinate, analysts said. ‘You’ll have the pro-migration, culturally liberal left saying, ‘We don’t want to ally with racists,’ and you’ll have the socially conservative, economically left-wing part of the coalition saying, ‘We don’t ally with people who think we’re racists,’ and that’s a very, very hard argument to resolve,” said Rob Ford, a professor of politics at the University of Manchester. By Friday morning, Britons awoke to a Labor Party largely consigned to the cities of England. The Conservatives, on the other hand, harnessed the power of Brexit to storm districts where the party’s brand had been toxic for generations.” (Mueller, 2019).

The working-class-labor political faction had not liked the old-styled socialist hype of the leader of the Labor Party, Jeremy Corbyn. Benjamin Mueller wrote: “Outside the pubs, churches, schoolhouses and trailers where people in Bolsover cast their ballots on Thursday, it was clear that many ex-Labor voters felt more at home for the moment in Mr. Johnson’s Conservative Party than anywhere else. They bemoaned a decade of broken promises, many of them made by the Conservative Party, but bought into Mr. Johnson’s idea that the political elite, and not his party, were to blame. They were seething with anger: at immigrants, at Britain’s postindustrial economy and at the constant gaze of the country’s news media and political elite in the south, toward London. And above all, the people who made up Labor’s old base in Bolsover unburdened themselves of their withering feelings about Mr. Corbyn, spitting epithets — “Marxist,” “terrorist sympathizer,” “idiot” — about a man who made them far more unhappy than even an old Etonian like Mr. Johnson could.” (Mueller, 2019).

After all the post-war history in Britain in which the socialist policies of Labor had not earlier delivered prosperity to the working class, they did not want to ‘roll-back’ history. Benjamin Mueller wrote: “In Bolsover, the market town at the center of this sprawling district, one voter, Thomas, pointed from the polling station to where he had spent three decades working in a coal mine. For all its dangers, mining had held the promise of steady work and fair pay (and came had all the advantages of union protection) but now all these advantages absent in the industries that took its place. Still for Thomas and his wife, Christine (who declined to give their last name because they did not want friends to know how they voted) frustration at the region’s decline became wedded to anger at the immigrant workers who took the low-wage jobs that replaced mining. ‘Jobs there should have gone to ex-miners, not to foreign workers,’ Christine said of a warehouse on the site of a nearby mine. ‘Instead you see ex-miners thrown in the scrap heap.’ (Mueller, 2019)

Process – The processes involved in Brexit were a national referendum on Britain's membership in the EU, passage of a Parliamentary law to exit the EU, and successive British elections to determine membership in the British Parliament.

Societal Explanations in the Brexit Event

(2) Principles/Rules Explanation

The Principle the proponents of Brexit argued was that the sovereignty of the Great Britain was bounded, diminished by membership in the EU.

(9) Regulation Explanation

The main reason for the opposition in Britain to its membership in the EU was the requirement for British government to follow commercial 'Regulations' imposed by the EU Parliament. These regulations had recently required Britain to accept immigrants from Syria, due to its civil war. This offended some laborers in Britain who thought they had lost many jobs to immigrants. The regulations also required London's banks to follow EU financial regulations, which offended some banks and hedge funds as overly restrictive. Regulations on fishing allowed many EU fishing ships to fish in British protected waters, thereby destroying a traditional way of life in small British fishing villages. In return for submitting to EU commercial regulations, British commerce and labor had access to all of the EU markets.

(5) Policy Explanation

The history of some of the British opposition to the 'policy' of participation in the European Union went back to the 1960's conservative party. Even then some members did not want the 'policy' of Britain's joining the EU (*community*). James McBride wrote: "Many conservatives never reconciled with membership in the EU, and discontent rose in particular over immigration. The issue of migration from within the EU is fraught, as the UK is currently required to accept the free movement of EU citizens. Economic migration from eastern Europe spiked after the EU expansions of 2004 and 2007, pushing net migration to the UK to more than three hundred thousand people a year by 2015. Cameron called the situation unsustainable. ... Drawing on this anger, in 2014, the anti-EU UK Independence Party (UKIP) surged, winning the most votes in the UK's elections to the European Union parliament with an anti-immigration platform." [5] (McBride, 2019).

What is particularly interesting in this historical case was how the working-class faction reluctantly went with conservative ideology because of the immediacy of tribal resentment of immigrants.

The 'tribal fury' of the British working-class was focused upon the immigrants and not upon the ideological elite (as represented by the Conservative Party). Benjamin Mueller wrote: "Lifelong Labor voters broke from much of the party in supporting Brexit and then finally stopped voting for it because of Mr. Corbyn's leadership. They said that Corbyn's economic agenda was too far to the left and in a leadership rooted in London. "Thomas said, 'I still am a Labor man. I'll vote Labor again when they get rid of this lot." (Mueller, 2019).

The defeat of the Labor Party would send repercussions through the party. Rajeev Syal wrote: "Tony Blair has called on Labor members to abandon the policies and political leanings of Jeremy Corbyn to ensure the survival of the party. In a provocative intervention, the three-time

election-winning former prime minister said that if Corbyn's wing of the party remains in charge, then Labor will be finished as a political force." (Syal, 2019)

(6) Strategy/Leadership Explanation

When the Syrian civil war began, the 'leadership' of the Cameron government in Britain had not considered an alternative 'strategy' to the refugee crisis – such as a 'military strategy'. Britain could have urged NATO to impose a 'no-fly zone' over Syria. Britain, France, and Germany were partners in NATO and could have used their military power (air forces) to stop the Syrian government bombing of Syrian Sunni and Kurdish citizens. Keeping Syrians safe from bombing would have involved European military intervention (power).

But the U.S. government and the European governments did nothing to stop the Syrian government bombing its own citizens. Instead, Europe watched and watched the Syrian air-force bomb and gas Syrian cities -- and then experienced waves and waves of Syrian refugees, fleeing the bombed cities of Syria. This lack of exercise of military power by NATO allies allowed the large flows of Syrian refugee into Europe, which stimulated political crises throughout Europe.

Also, later the terror attacks of ISIS in Europe became a *propaganda issue* to bolster the 'leave faction' in Brexit politics. James McBride wrote: "terror attacks in Paris and Brussels involving EU citizens raised fears that the free movement of people leaves the UK vulnerable. With over three thousand EU nationals having traveled to Syria to fight with the self-proclaimed Islamic State ... The immigration issue powerfully combines anxieties over identity, economic security, and terrorism ..." [5] (McBride, 2019).

(1) Ethics/Integrity Explanation

The ethical consequences of the use of a divisive social media can make more difficult political compromise and political consensus in a representative democracy. The media technology in the country had been altering the communication of ideas in the political associations of Britain. William Davies wrote: "It could be that the UK faces a long future of minority governments and coalitions, in which every party is defined as a vessel for the particular discontents of its supporters." (Davies, 2019).

William Davies pointed to the use of new technology, Internet social media, as a mode facilitating political division. Davies wrote: "The question for the longer term -- is this type of politics a blip, or is this the new normal? Can we become re-illusioned with representative democracy? Or is all politics now a form of anti-politics? The sociologist Paolo Gerbaudo has called this a 'digital party' or 'platform party' (of which Farage's Brexit Party is arguably the most impressive example to date). According to Gerbaudo, such a party 'is to the current informational era of ubiquitous networks, social media and smartphone apps. What the mass party was to the industrial era (or the cynically professionalized 'television party' was during the post-Cold War era of high neoliberalism) – now the 'digital party' is aimed at rapid growth, with email sign-ups and PayPal donations (replacing formal membership). And its purpose is to disrupt." (Davies, 2019)

(7) Governance Explanation

Instead of Prime Minister David Cameron's government using power to make a military effort to stop the Syrian air-force from bombing Syrian cities, Prime Minister Cameron ordered a referendum to vote on whether Britain should leave the EU – bypassing, in governance, the representative parliament with a direct democratic vote. James McBride wrote: "Immigration was the leading complaint. The number of EU migrants in the UK nearly tripled between 2004 and 2015, from about one million to over three million, almost totally due to an influx of citizens from newer members including Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania." [5] (McBride, 2019)

The use of the referendum enabled Cameron to avoid British government responsibility for immigrant policy. James McBride wrote: "The UK was exempt from the EU's 2015 plans to resettle hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Africa, thanks to opt-outs from EU immigration policy. But for Euro-skeptics, Brussels's faltering response has highlighted the EU's dysfunction, and UK policymakers have bristled at suggestions that EU asylum policy might be altered to make it harder to deport migrants to other EU countries. Under the current system, non-EU asylum seekers are supposed to remain in the first EU country they enter." [5] (McBride, 2019).

After the passage of the referendum, then there next occurred a failure in government, as a struggle between the British Parliament and the British Government (executive branch) to control the legislative exit of Britain from the EU.

(13) Tactics/Operations

Prime Minister Johnson called for new election rather than a second referendum, as a tactical maneuver to have the power to implement a 'no-deal' Brexit. Dan Balz wrote: "The British electorate delivered another surprise Thursday, and the shock waves from the victory for British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Conservative Party are being felt far beyond the United Kingdom. . . The vote showed the widening gap between urban and nonurban areas of Britain and the reshaping of the party coalitions . . . Johnson started off badly, with one of the worst opening acts of any modern British prime minister, losing big votes in Parliament and seemingly stumbling toward disaster and a possible early ouster. But the wily Johnson did what his two Conservative predecessors failed to do and emerged Friday morning with the biggest Tory victory since 1987 and the days of Margaret Thatcher." (Balz, 2019).

Dan Balz wrote: "Johnson's predecessors in 10 Downing Street, David Cameron and Theresa May, both made huge political bets and lost. Cameron called the Brexit referendum in 2016, fully expecting that voters would support remaining in the European Union and hoping that would dampen the long-standing divisions in his party over Europe. When the opposite happened, he stepped down immediately. Cameron was succeeded by May, whose political skills were no match for the challenge she had been handed by Cameron. As she wrestled with opposition at home to her negotiations with the E.U., she made a fateful decision by calling a snap election in 2017. She hoped the election would add to her narrow parliamentary majority. Instead, the election cost her that majority. She never fully recovered, eventually stepping down because of the impasse over Brexit and her inability to maneuver through. Then Johnson made an equally bold bet and won handsomely. Faced with the impasse over the terms of fulfilling the vote to leave the E.U., he, too, called for an election. When Corbyn and Labour finally agreed to that, the die was cast." (Balz, 2019)

After three years of failing to implement a Brexit exit, many British citizens, Conservative and Labor, decided to back Johnson to just get it done. They were tired of Brexit and Labor had not promised a clear path, such as a second referendum to abolish Brexit. Laura Kuenssberg wrote: "A victory bigger than the Tories, haunted by 2017, had dreamt of. As the hours ticked by, red flipped to blue, familiar faces forced out of their seats. Boris Johnson gambled that he could win an election with support from towns and communities where voting Conservative might almost have seemed a sin. And he won. The Conservatives' majority will have an almost immediate effect on the country - unless something strange happens we will leave the European Union next month - because behind him on the green benches will be new Tory MPs who will vote through his Brexit bill, his position strong enough to subdue any opposition. There may be years of arguments about the nature of the long-term relationship but we will no longer be part of the bloc we've been entwined in for four decades. But Brexit, at least part one - to use his slogan - will be done." (Kuenssberg, 2019).

(6) Strategy/Leadership Explanation

Leadership (6) in the political parties was important in explaining the failures of the Labor Party in the Brexit election. The leadership of the Labor Party under Jeremy Corbyn was disliked by many traditional Labor voters. Owen Jones wrote: "Voters didn't defect from Labor because they felt the top 5% were paying enough tax, or because they thought our privately-run railway system was a shining success, or because of their affection for sky-high tuition fees. It was not radical policies that caused this landslide...Those pointing at Brexit as a key factor in Labor's election defeat are mocked for deflecting from the real reason: Jeremy Corbyn's unpopularity." (Jones, 2019).

Labor lost votes in the election because the Party leader vacillated on the issue of Brexit, which was on the minds of most British voters. Owen Jones wrote: "YouGov asked why voters with previously favorable opinions of Corbyn had changed their mind. About three-quarters of the responses were linked to Brexit, which dominated all political discourse after 2017 and smothered discussion of Labour's popular domestic policies. After the mass defection of remain supporters to the revived Liberal Democrats and Greens in spring's European elections, the leadership seemingly had little choice but to shift to backing a second referendum. This pivot now seems to have been fatal, and 39% of Labour leavers defected to the Tories or Brexit party." (Jones, 2019)

(14) Ideology/Factions Explanation

The explanation of 'Ideology' (connecting the societal factors of 'Groups' to 'Reason') depicts how the 'political factions' operate in the reality of a political situation. Political factions use ideology to capture political power in a democracy. The pro-Brexit faction used the ideology of 'resorting sovereignty' to argue for Britain to leave the European Union.

POST BREXIT

Problems of trade and regulation between Britain and the EU after a 'hard break' Brexit began showing up in 2020-21, even during the Covid 19 pandemic. Philip Stafford wrote: "Prospects for supervisory 'equivalence' fade as each side pursues differing rules. The UK and EU have already begun to diverge in the way they oversee financial markets as hopes the two will reach a broad agreement on supervisory "equivalence" in the wake of Brexit fade. . . The EU's priority is to develop a more harmonized internal capital market. By contrast UK politicians view Brexit

as the chance to restore powers and discretion to regulators and exchanges lost by layers of detailed and prescriptive EU rulemaking. . . European rulemaking was often a balancing act between Britain, France and Germany. Now that the UK has departed, the EU is going back to its bank-based system and the UK will strengthen its market-driven system . . . ” (Stafford, 2021) Some financial businesses began realignment after Brexit. For example, Amsterdam began picking up financial transaction business from London. Philip Stafford, Mehreen Khan and David Keohane wrote: “Amsterdam’s financial district Zuidas has seen a strong influx of business since the UK left the EU. The Dutch city has taken some business from London since the start of the year, helped by sophisticated regulators and strong IT. . . . In the race to scoop up business leaving London it is Amsterdam, and not larger banking centres such as Frankfurt and Paris, that has shone. With EU regulators striving to regain oversight of all euro-denominated business, Amsterdam has already displaced London as Europe’s main centre for share trading as more than €8bn a day of EU share dealing was forced back into the bloc. The Dutch financial capital has also taken more than 20 per cent of the euro swaps market and more than \$160bn on the sovereign debt trading markets.” (Stafford, Khan and Keohane, 2021)

The Covid-19 border shutdowns have prevented service firms from finding out how strictly the travel restrictions in the trade agreement will be enforced. The agreement allows UK passport holders to visit the Schengen area visa-free for 90 days in any 180 to attend business meetings, conferences and trade fairs, and to conduct negotiations. To deliver paid services in the EU, they require visas and work permits, with different rules for each country. But permits for British services to do business in the EU still needed adjustment.

Michael Skapiner wrote: “Work restrictions imposed by the EU trade deal have left UK companies confused...The Trade and Cooperation Agreement replaced free movement between the UK and the EU with an array of visa and work permit restrictions. While negotiators on both sides bickered until the end about fishing rights, they failed to address the post-Brexit status of service professionals. . . . For the UK, this lapse is worrying because of the size and importance of its professional services sector. Before Brexit and the coronavirus pandemic, UK firms were among the world’s most prominent service exporters. In 2018, the UK had a trading surplus in services of £28bn, of which financial services made up 22 per cent and business services, such as management consultancy, design, advertising, architecture and law, 29 per cent. Service exports overall accounted for 46 per cent of total UK exports, compared with 34 per cent for France, 33 per cent for the US and 17 per cent for Germany. . . Britain, and London in particular, which accounted for 42 per cent of the UK’s service exports, was seen as a leading business services centre, with European professionals flocking to join its firms. About 30 per cent of architects in the UK are from EU countries, rising to 70-80 per cent in some of the biggest practices, according to Andrew Forth, interim head of policy and public affairs at the Royal Institute of British Architects. “We are global leaders in airport design, public transport, sports stadiums and cultural centres,” he says.” (Skapiner, 2021)

DISCUSSION

In the analysis of the Brexit event, the Groups involved were political factions. It is useful to examine which factions financed the ‘leave’ option. Just what political faction was principally behind Brexit? The concept of ‘political factions’ is a traditional concept in political science (particularly important in the policies creating the U.S. government). The founders of the U.S. government saw a republic (a representative form of government) as necessary to curb the

narrow interests of factions (private interest groups). For example, Alexander Hamilton wrote: "By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." (Hamilton et al, 2014)

Hamilton saw a top-down form of a central government necessary to control factions. But the British Conservative party under the prime ministers of May, and Johnson were less concerned with uniting factions behind the central government of Great Britain than in pulling Britain out of a foreign alliance. About the uniting function of a central government, Alexander Hamilton wrote: "A Firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the (American) States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. . . From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily, for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms." (Hamilton, et al, 2014)

The normative explanation which Hamilton offers about factions is this: *Factions are difficult to control for the public good of a state; but freedom and democracy are the right cures for factionalism, not authoritarianism.*

Political factions are a part of process of representative government, and the basis of factions lies in common interests of a group involved in politics. Alexander Hamilton wrote: "The latent causes of faction are sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property." (Hamilton, et al, 2014)

This case of Brexit illustrates how a political faction can alter the political perceptions of a majority. William Davies wrote: "How do policies that serve a narrow set of economic interests come to be regarded as common sense, as if they benefited the economy as a whole? It's not just that capitalist states defend the interests of capital, but that they tend to favor one type of capital at the expense of others. Until recently, the consensus on 'good' economic policy

concealed a mentality that always in effect privileged finance. One economic part was treated as a proxy for the economic whole.” [6] (Davies, 2019)

Ideology existed in the Ideal dimension of Britain’s political association as a call for sovereignty but, in the Realistic dimension, who was behind the political faction of EU ‘leavers’. This faction had used the resentment against immigrants to power their ideology of sovereignty. But what was the kind of ‘property’ interests behind the faction for Brexit? Was there money (property) behind Brexit?

Some of the funders of Brexit politicians did focus on ‘property’. The political faction of the Conservative Party Brexiters’ was funded by interest groups in ‘finance’. Owen Walker wrote: “MPs’ register reveals the investment executives giving money to Tory party rivals Affluent fund managers have poured hundreds of thousands of pounds into the campaigns of Boris Johnson and Jeremy Hunt as the investment industry keeps a close eye on the contest to become Britain’s next prime minister — and pick up clues on the future of Brexit and business. The donations have come mostly from hedge fund managers, though a handful of executives from traditional investment groups have also given financial support.” (Walker, 2019)

Some of the individuals as Brexit donors were listed by Owen Walker: “Several of his (Johnson’s) donors support the UK leaving the EU. David Lilley, a partner at metals hedge fund RK Capital, gave £15,000 to Mr. Johnson, as detailed in the MP’s register of financial interests. He previously put £100,000 into the Leave campaign. Other hedge fund supporters of Mr. Johnson include Jon Wood, founder of SRM Global and a long-term Tory backer, who donated £75,000 worth of funding, office and staffing costs; and Johan Christofferson, founder of Christofferson, Robb and Co, who donated £36,000. Mr. Johnson also attracted funding from Jamie Reuben, the son of billionaire property mogul David Reuben and a managing partner at Melbury Capital, who donated £50,000; and Alex Wilmot-Sitwell, a partner at the boutique investment bank Perella Weinberg, who donated £5,000... “Charles Montanaro, who runs Montanaro Investment Managers, donated £8,000. He said: ‘I was happy to make the contribution in my personal capacity to Boris Johnson’s campaign because, after careful consideration, I am convinced that he is the best person to negotiate and deliver Brexit.’” (Walker, 2019)

In addition to support for the Brexit Prime Minister Johnson, Owen Walker found other hedge funds as donors supporting Conservative Party members: “Mr. Hunt has been less successful attracting donations from investment executives but has still benefited from his reputation of being an entrepreneur before entering politics. Among his backers are Moultsford Capital, run by private equity investor Peter Wilson, which provided office space worth £8,945, and Andrew Law, hedge fund manager at Caxton Associates and longtime Tory donor, who pledged £10,000.” (Walker, 2019)

Other reporters noted the support of the British financial community behind Brexit. Michael Savage wrote: “Boris Johnson’s donors include hedge funds and other supporters who stand to gain from a disruptive exit from the EU. . . . Earlier on Saturday, Philip Hammond, the former chancellor, suggested Johnson was pursuing the interests of financial backers set to gain from a no-deal Brexit: ‘Johnson is backed by speculators who have bet billions on a hard Brexit – and there is only one option that works for them: a crash-out no-deal that sends the currency tumbling and inflation soaring.’ . . . Hedge fund managers have backed Johnson. One of those is

Crispin Odey, a fund manager who has also previously backed Vote Leave and Ukip. Over the summer, it was reported that his fund had made a £300m bet against British businesses and stood to profit from an economic slump in the UK. . . . Odey did not respond to a request for comment.” (Savage, 2019).

The ‘property’ interest in the financial-interest faction which backed Brexit was to have the banking interests in London escape from the increasing European Union banking regulation (after the financial collapse of 2007-08 in the mortgage-derivative financial market). Some banking firms wished to have Britain as a lightly-regulated part of the global financial system.

Tom Burgis wrote: “There has been enthusiasm among some senior British business figures and parts of the ruling Conservative party for using the UK’s departure from the EU as an opportunity to relax the oversight of finance. Martin Sorrell, once the highest-paid FTSE 100 boss, declared in 2019 that he hoped to see a “Singapore on steroids . . . a regulation-light, tax-light UK economy, open for business in a way we haven’t seen before”. Yet even the current regulatory regime has not prevented the use of the UK as a cog in schemes to legitimize the proceeds of crime and corruption. . . . Corruption experts worried that “Singapore-on-Thames” is now under construction point to chancellor Rishi Sunak’s enthusiasm for freeports, which allow imports with scant taxation or customs checks. Transparency International, the anti-corruption campaigning group, has warned the government that pressing ahead risks establishing “onshore havens in which criminals and the corrupt could anonymously hide their ill-gotten gains”. (Burgis, 2021)

Another reason for some British financial groups to withdraw from EU financial regulation may have been to enable laundering of global money. Tom Burgis wrote: “Regulatory easing after Brexit risks attracting more dirty money to London. Anti-corruption experts warn that London is seen as a ‘laundromat’ for illicit wealth. . . . Last year’s report on Russia by parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee — eventually published after a contentious delay — found that the warm British welcome for Russian money “offered ideal mechanisms by which illicit finance could be recycled through what has been referred to as the London ‘laundromat’”. It went on: “Russian influence in the UK is ‘the new normal’, and there are a lot of Russians with very close links to Putin who are well integrated into the UK business and social scene, and accepted because of their wealth. This level of integration — in ‘Londongrad’ in particular — means that any measures now being taken by the government are not preventative but rather constitute damage limitation.” This London laundromat serves all comers: corrupt wealth from countries ranging from Brazil to Nigeria to Malaysia has been found in the UK, prosecutors say. That has raised concerns about the influence that money can buy once it arrives. As the battle lines between democracies and authoritarian kleptocracies sharpen, anti-corruption campaigners are asking which side “Global Britain” — the reimagined country emerging from Brexit — will choose in that struggle.” (Burgis, 2021)

For several decades, London has already been at the center of a global ‘off-shore’ financial network. Tom Burgis wrote: “The UK’s power either to facilitate the flow of dirty money, or to arrest it, is unrivalled. If its Overseas Territories — for example, the Cayman Islands and Crown Dependencies such as Guernsey — are included, the UK is the biggest of the “secrecy jurisdictions” that funnel trillions through the world economy incognito, according to the Financial Secrecy Index published by campaigners at the Tax Justice Network. The course it

will choose is not yet clear. But recently, an American prosecutor who has worked on big corruption cases, summed up the scale of the challenge. When asked privately whether Brexit would lead to the UK turning into another Switzerland or Macau — meaning a money-laundering, tax-evasion paradise — he replied: “Isn’t it already?” (Burgis, 2021)

CONCLUSION

The importance of empirically grounding social science theory in the empirical evidence of events in the history of societies is that theory of empirical evidence and theory of normative evidence can be methodologically distinguish. To illustrate this we list some of the normative hypotheses which can be drawn as lessons from the British society’s experience of ‘Brexit..

Normative Lessons from Brexit: Governance

A referendum may not be the appropriate governance mechanism to decide important policies which should be made by a representative parliament.

For example, the explanation in governance, of the government using a national referendum instead of a parliamentary law to determine the stay-or-leave membership in the EU was an empirical explanation. It actually happened. But should Prime Minister Cameron have done this? Should he have deviated from normal British representative government to an unusual British direct democratic government -- by using a referendum? If Cameron should not have used a referendum. This would be a normative explanation. When and under what principles should representative governments alter governmental procedure? And why?

What can we learn from the empirical history of Brexit to answer this normative prescription? Certainly, the referendum divided the country almost in half (52% to 48%). But this was only divisive in the country. It did not reconcile the factions divided by complex political issues of the country. It did not resolve issues about immigration, about market access, about international trade, about sharing natural resources, about travel and employment. The issues in Brexit were too complex for a simple democratic vote to solve. This is why Prime Minister May failed to get the British Parliament and her own Conservative Party to pass a Brexit deal, in two years of effort. This is why a disgusted electorate finally elected a Prime Minister Johnson – to just get it done. Great Britain was finally tired, just tired of the issue, of Brexit.

Traditionally, the founders of the America had advocated a division power in government by legislative, executive, and judicial branches -- as a control over power and factionalism. Alexander Hamilton wrote: The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican government may be retained, and its imperfections lessened or avoided...Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. . . The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been

the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished.” (Hamilton et al, 2014)

The Brexit faction in Britain argued against rule of representative government by elected representatives and argued to use the referendum of a direct democratic vote to legislate ‘Brexit’. The Brexit faction tried to confuse the public about the distinction between a ‘democratic’ form of government and a ‘representative democratic’ form of government. The faction used the ‘referendum’ as form of ‘democracy’ to create the ideology that representative government should pass a Brexit policy.

This argument (that the referendum of direct democracy was really the form of British government) was used as propaganda by the Brexit faction to advance their political case. William Davies wrote: “A necessary principle of representative democracy is that small minorities – parties, politicians, parliaments – stand for the whole. The system works best when there is an element of illusion involved, such that the narrow range of characters and ideas on the public stage is viewed as a decent proxy for society at large. Too much scrutiny – when a dodgy expense claim comes to light, say, or an email indiscretion – and the illusion is liable to be dispelled. But when the stage is set correctly, the illusion can be very powerful.” [6] (Davies,2019).

Traditionally, British government had been a ‘representative democracy’ with British citizens voting democratically for representatives, members of parliament to make policy by majority votes in parliament. The British government was then formed by a majority party or majority formed by a coalition of parties. However, the prime minister Cameron used a ‘referendum’ to bypass representative democracy with a direct public vote (on a policy for Britain to remain in or to leave the European Union). This policy moved the decision on Brexit from the representative democracy of parliament to the direct democratic vote of citizens. Although entry into the European Union was a policy formed by representative democracy, the exit was to be a policy formed by direct democracy.

What was happening was that a political event (Brexit) was being used by a political faction (Brexiters) to alter the institutions of a representative democracy.

Perhaps this is why representative government is a superior form of government to a direct democracy. Brexit provides empirical historical evidence that the American Alexander Hamilton was right about the effectiveness of a representative form of government over a direct democracy.

Normative Lessons from Brexit: Global Human Rights

In addition, the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis upon Britain and the European Union can provide empirical evidence to a second normative explanation about the interconnection of nations in a globally connected world. *It is not in the self-interest of any nation on Earth to allow any other nation to commit brutal genocide on its citizens.*

In March 2020, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mevlut Cavusoglu, wrote: “The EU was meant to be a world power that stood as a beacon for human rights and respect for the international rules-based order. But unless something is done about Greece’s treatment of refugees, and the

frenzied support it still receives from the EU, that claim will collapse. I have long warned the EU to not be complacent about the challenges it faces, including the rise of extremism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. In Turkey, we have called for a revamped international system to manage the huge displacement of people fleeing conflicts such as Syria's. We have painstakingly tried to convince the EU to help us resolve such conflicts and address the fragilities that surround Europe. If we cannot prevent these calamities at source, everyone will suffer. Yet the latest episode in this saga, which began with the outbreak of Syria's war, shows the EU has not advanced an inch towards a mature understanding of the problem or in producing solutions." (Cavusoglu, 2020)

Displaced persons in permanent refugee camps create generations of radicalized people, experiencing an injustice that continues over time. Melvut Cavusoglu wrote: "Nine years into the Syrian conflict, the province of Idlib has become a "new Gaza", where 3.5m people are sequestered. The de-escalation zone created in 2018 has suffered a massive military offensive by the Syrian government, backed by Russia and Iran. Since last May, over 1,700 people have been killed, to use UN figures. When Turkish soldiers were attacked in February, we retaliated forcefully and showed what it means to attack a NATO country. However, before we could stop the onslaught on Idlib and muster a cessation of hostilities, 1m people had begun marching towards NATO's and Europe's south-eastern boundary, the Turkish-Syrian border. We already host more than 3.6m Syrians, and help directly or indirectly another 5.5m inside Syria. This has cost us over \$40bn. Only last year, our security forces apprehended almost 455,000 people trying to migrate illegally. We cannot continue to protect the borders of NATO and Europe alone." (Cavusoglu, 2020)

Turkey had absorbed refugees from Syrian civil, as Turkey is Sunni Muslim and the Syrian refugees were Sunni Muslim. Melvut Cavusoglu wrote: "This is why we (Turks) declared last month that Turkey could not absorb any more refugees, either from Syria or beyond, and we would no longer stop those already in our country from leaving. Turkey was never intended as their final destination; we cannot force them to stay. Our unheeded calls for the EU to take this wave of migrants seriously, and to comply with the refugee deal it struck with Turkey in 2016, reached boiling point with the latest Idlib displacement. What followed is a disgrace to the EU and a stain on human conscience. The EU and its parliamentarians did little more than watch on as Greek forces sprayed tear gas and fired on people at their border. Greece also illegally suspended refugee applications. The UN was critical; the EU not. People died, scores were wounded; and European prestige was damaged globally. All this because the EU has consistently failed to develop a policy that projects peace, prosperity and dignity to its near-abroad, and has not worked earnestly with Turkey to achieve that. . . . Several countries in our common neighborhood (Turkey and the EU) are on fire, and this is producing one of the greatest human exoduses, and economic and environmental catastrophes, since the Second World War. We cannot solve problems in the source countries with wishful thinking . . ." (Cavusoglu, 2020) The empirical evidence here is that failure of the European Union to take military action (at the time through NATO to put a no-fly zone over Syria to protect the Syrian government from bombing its own citizens, Sunni and Kurd) cost the European Union in terms of (1) terrorist attacks and (2) a break-up the European Union and (3) a continuing refugee and humanitarian crisis over a decade, even into 2020.

Normative Lessons from Brexit: Factional Self-Interest Posing as National Ideology

Also this case provides empirical evidence for the following hypothesis. *The practical interests of a minority political faction, propagated deviously as an ideology for the majority, can harm the majority.*

For example, Michael Skapinker wrote: “Work restrictions imposed by the EU trade deal have left UK companies confused. Farzana Baduel says it’s as if trade agreement negotiators ‘ran out of time’ to clarify the status of professionals such as designers, engineers and architects. Farzana Baduel, chief executive of London-based Curzon PR, voted for Brexit in the 2016 referendum. Martin Darbyshire, head of ‘Tangerine’, a design consultancy that created the world’s first airline business class flatbed seat, was a fervent Remainer and felt he had to apologize for the result during a post-referendum trip to Germany. But both agree the Brexit trade agreement, concluded late last year, has left the UK’s service businesses bewildered about what comes next. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement replaced free movement between the UK and the EU with an array of visa and work permit restrictions. While negotiators on both sides bickered until the end about fishing rights, they failed to address the post-Brexit status of service professionals.” (Skapinker, 2021)

Britain’s service business had a trading surplus in 2018 of £28bn. Of this, financial services provide 22 per cent of exported services to the EU. Business services, provided 29 percent, and overall, services provided 46 percent of UK exports. Yet the Brexit exit left all these services with a confusing set of permits and licenses unresolved for continuing to do business in EU countries. Michael Skapinker wrote: The Covid-19 border shutdowns have prevented service firms from finding out how strictly the travel restrictions in the trade agreement will be enforced. The agreement allows UK passport holders to visit the Schengen area visa-free for 90 days in any 180 to attend business meetings, conferences and trade fairs, and to conduct negotiations. To deliver paid services in the EU, they require visas and work permits, with different rules for each country. British management consultants working in Austria need to satisfy an “economic needs test”, showing that no EU firm can do the work. Architects working in Germany and people providing advertising services in Denmark have to do the same. Engineers working in Finland must demonstrate they have “special knowledge relevant to the service being supplied”. There are dozens of similar restrictions, and professional services firms have no idea how long it will take for work permits to come through.” (Skapinker, 2021)

Normative Lessons from Brexit: Factional Self-Interest and National Unity

Factional self-interest masked as a majority ideology can even threaten the unity of a nation.

Great Britain was a political union of England, Scotland, Wales, and North Ireland. Whether this union will survive Brexit was in question in 2021, Philip Stephens wrote: “Boris Johnson leads the Conservative and Unionist party, so named to mark its opposition to Irish Home Rule at the turn of the 20th century. If, as now looks quite possible, the union of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is set to fracture, it will be because the prime minister’s party has left behind its history. The Tories have grown indifferent to England’s bonds with its Celtic neighbors. By temperament, Johnson has never been much interested in Scotland, where Nicola Sturgeon’s Scottish National party is pressing for a referendum on independence. Johnson’s attachment to Northern Ireland is weaker still. After promising the Tories’ allies in the

Democratic Unionist party that he would never allow an economic border in the Irish Sea, he signed up to a Brexit deal with Brussels that does precisely that.” (Stephens, 2021)

The Scots may ask for another referendum on independence. Philip Stephens wrote: “The campaign to leave the EU led by Johnson in 2016 was in essence an expression of English nationalism. He opposes separation with Scotland only because it would deliver a grievous blow to England's international stature. The break-up of a union spanning more than three centuries would be quite likely to destabilize the UK monarchy. More important for Johnson, it would probably see him turned out of office.” (Stephens, 2021)

And for North Ireland, the dilemma of the North having a ‘hard border’ with Ireland remained a political problem. Philip Stephens wrote: “Sturgeon wants independence. Northern Ireland's DUP fears that Downing Street indifference to the delicate balance struck with Irish nationalism in the Good Friday Agreement is pushing the province out of the union. Rioting on the streets has reflected unionist fears of abandonment. By prioritizing a hard Brexit for England over border arrangements for Northern Ireland, Johnson put economics on the side of Irish nationalism. . . . Nothing is preordained. The future of the UK union, however, rests above all on the full-hearted commitment to the enterprise of its most powerful nation. It will not long survive the turn to English nationalism.” (Stephens, 2021)

SUMMARY

From this societal-dynamics analysis of Brexit as a change event in British society, one can see here, as in any significant historical event, that there is seldom a single, simple explanation. There can be at least fifteen kinds of explanation relating the societal factors in the event. And in that event, some explanations are empirical and some normative.

This Brexit event has provided additional empirical evidence for a theory of political association using a perceptual space of three dimensions: Altruism, Power, and Realism. Embedding an analysis of political association within a structural-functional model of a society allows the observation of how political ideas are connected to policy operations in the historical time of a society.

Using historical episodes in societies' histories and analyzing these events in theories of political association (as a natural social experiments), one can abstract empirical explanations about the consequences of human actions and policies -- upon which societal learning in the form of *normative prescriptions* be scientifically grounded, as progress in wisdom for a global civilization.

In this method, empirical explanations from analyzing historical events in societies can provide evidence for normative prescriptions about which policies in societies should be formulated for public benefit in the society.

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