

Examining the Capacity of Indonesia's Defense Entities on Countering Radicalism

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ABSTRACT

Radicalism for the last few decades has hampered the people and national security building of Indonesia. Contemporary global and regional constellations develop an unprecedented scale of impact radicalism as well as its tractability. The formal categorization of radicalism as an ideology based-non-military threat reflects an imperative mandate for Indonesian defense entities to review and formulate relevant and comprehensive alleviation strategies to address the radicalism. However, this urgency does not appear to have been embodied in at least two points in our opinion: the perception among associated institutions barely aware of the significance of synergy and coordination and second, a minor portion of the countering of radicalism in the frame of the roadmap for Indonesia's national defense development. This research examines the perceptions of relevant defense stakeholders in Indonesia regarding radicalism and its current approach as well as the formulation of strategies that have been implemented or designed to maintain the existence of Indonesian nationalism. We collected information and data through both documentation studies and interviews with representative officials from the relevant ministries, military, and state agencies and then compiled it descriptively. By examining the perceptions of each research object as well as the construction of the strategy that has been rolled out, we conclude the Indonesian defense entities have yet significant, comprehensive, and sustainable strategies addressing the threat of radicalism.

Keywords: Indonesia, National Defense, Radicalism, Strategy

INTRODUCTION

Radicalism is a global issue with development and character that varies among countries (1). Countries develop effective strategic steps to counter the causes of radicalism. They map the socio-economic factors that have frustrated the collective life of the nation and state. This issue is increasingly crucial to examine given the greater prevalence of radicalism in countries with certain demographic characteristics.

Countries with a strong Islamic base such as the Arab World show a more significant prevalence of radicalism (2). In most cases, radicalism in these countries is expressed in the form of jihad. The term Jihad is understood as a response to political oppression, economic inequality and inequality of justice.

Strategies and approaches in dealing with radicalism in several countries have also been unable to reduce the activities of these radical groups, and have even targeted the younger generation to become followers and at the same time activists of this radicalism from various backgrounds (3). Some of these groups and organizations are associated with political organizations and Islamic mass organizations in various parts of the world, such as Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hamas, and Hezbollah (4). However, if you look historical, these movements are very dynamic which have increased significantly as a form of resistance to the West, anti-Islam and as a result of the marginalization of political rights, a sense of justice so that radicalism has never been resolved with an appropriate strategy.

In the Asian region and especially in Southeast Asia, the influence of radicalism is clear, a considerable Muslim population is both the subject and object of radicalism. The stigmatization of Islamic radicalism has received wide attention from the media (5). Islamic radicalism represent a phenomenon that has developed in this region, one cause is the influence of groups such as Jemaah Islamiah, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS which are considered the number one Islamic terrorist group in the world. These Salafi-affiliated entities conduct the mission of emphasizing monotheistic absolutism and fighting the fertile practice of Sufism in Africa to Southeast Asia. (6). Expressions of radicalism can be in the form of a belief in rejecting pluralism, criticism of religious practices that accommodate local culture and strong Sufi mysticism, destruction of private and public property, to the extreme level of bombings like what happened in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (7). Therefore, it can be remarked that Islamic radicalism has disturbed the stability of national security in the region.

Findings from several countries with significant Muslim populations indicate there is a tendency for violence and terrorism to be increasingly associated with Salafi-Wahabi affiliated radicalism (6). In Indonesia, radicalism colors the image of Muslims, the face of Indonesian Islam is identified with several radical Muslim-based groups, such as the Islamic Defenders Front, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), Laskar Jihad (LJ), and the Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood Jama'ah Ikhwan (JAMI/Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood Community) (8). Although radical Islamic groups do not obtain a significant number compared to moderate groups, like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, they can receive people's attention. These groups stand out in the face of Islam in the country for their religious understanding and radical actions. In Indonesia, radicalism develops in three forms: belief radicalism, action radicalism, and political radicalism following the facts and developments of the Muslim community in Indonesia, although the definition and terminology of radicalism are very multi-interpretative (9).

Some examples of the radical actions of these groups include: FPI has been involved in a number of raids and demolitions of several cafes, discos, nightclubs, gambling places and places of prostitution. (10). The LJ group is closely related to the historical struggle for jihadist action in Maluku, Ambon and Poso in Central Sulawesi. In these conflicting areas, LJ has sent its militia to fight the Christians. Meanwhile, Amir Majlis (leader of the advisory board) of MMI, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, is believed to be the leader of JL Southeast Asia and has networks throughout Southeast Asia, particularly Singapore and Malaysia, also has Al-Qaeda connections (11). Another unsettling developments of radicalism in Indonesia within the last ten years, despite lack of credible preliminary research, as follows: claims that 3% of Indonesia soldiers has exposed to radical thought (12), temporary closing of the admission of STAN (State College of

Accountancy) prospective students for the 2020 academic year due to the issue of radicalism (13), statement of Deputy V of the President's Chief of Staff (KSP) explained that radicalism has plagued Indonesia for the last 10 years (14), statement of the Minister of Research and Technology about ten universities that have been exposed to radicalism and a research study by the State Intelligence Agency said that there are 41 mosques in government office area exposed to radicalism (15).

A radical mindset that ends with the choice of using violence to combat certain social practices possesses the potential to cause resistance from local communities. This situation will exacerbate instability that has been triggered previously by radicalism itself. In this context, there is an urgency to optimize unused military capacity during the peace period to support efforts to tackle radicalism in Indonesia.

What is important is the influence and development of radicalism in Indonesia do not run parallel with the government's strategy, especially from the perspective of national defense. Researchers are challenged with the presentation of data and facts and findings in the field with parameters in three levels of radicalism, namely: radicalism at the micro, meso, and macro levels (16). Furthermore, the findings associated with the three categorizations of radicalism will be analyzed and framed in a more comprehensive map of radical movements and radicalism to get a conclusion and the relevant government strategy. The review of the results of this research will be poured into two topics: describing the government's perceptions of radicalism and its development in Indonesia and examining the efforts to deal with it from the perspective of national defense.

METHODOLOGY

The method of investigating the data and information in this study is qualitative. Researchers look at the reality that has been obtained in the preliminary study that the research problems have not been visible and are currently unclear. With a descriptive approach, we explore and understand the perceptions and behavior of organizations — in this context, government agencies — on the issues raised. The data and information in this study were complemented by interviewing the competent authorities practising a semi-structured method. The objects of this research interview consisted of the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs (Kemenkopolhukam), the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia (Kemhan), the Indonesian National Army (TNI), the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), and a prominent expert in the field of radicalism.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

National Defense

Georg Sørensen on national defense explained *"the state must be able to provide an adequate level of protection to the population from external and internal threats...under the protection of the state, people can enjoy relative security and thus pursue happiness and prosperity, happiness"* (17). The meaning of conventional defense is concentrated on efforts to ward off militaristic threats that come from outside the jurisdiction of a political entity. However, as national boundaries increasingly blur as globalization and the nature of the threat grows, defense is currently talking about a broader subject than just maneuvering the armed forces against other armed forces.

Article 30 paragraph 2 and Law number 3 of 2002 are legal references in the administration and management of Indonesia's national defense. This law serves as a guideline, direction for determining strategies in dealing with radicalism by the Government. The leading implementing authority, the Ministry of Defense, followed up with this in the form of releasing strategic documents that correspond to all types, natures, and forms of threats.

Radicalism

There are many different explanations for radicalism, how and why people become radicalized. Radicalism is a process in which a person adopts a very strong extremist view and attempts to commit acts of violence in accordance with their beliefs (18). From Hardy's explanation, it is clear that strong, rooted and deep beliefs that carry the seeds of violence will tend to carry out violent activities based on these beliefs. McCauley dan Moskalenko dalam *Exploring the theories of radicalization* menggambarkan; "*Radicalism*" vis-à-vis activism" in which the first will indicate a willingness to engage in illegal actions and the last to seek social or political change through legal activities" (19). McCauley and Moskalenko's explanation opens the view that there is great potential in an activity or activities carried out in the context of social or political change by showing it through illegal acts and then seeking these changes through official legal activities.

Radical actions, radical beliefs, and radical politics are an actual threat as well as a potential threat (19). Radicalism can affect all aspects of national and state life from all aspects and levels of society. Radicalism also gets space and a place to flourish in the majority community which is very diverse and pluralistic in Indonesia. In this position the state needs a strategy to be able to minimize and inhibit these radicalism activities and movements. An appropriate and correct strategy also requires interpretation and definition of radicalism for broader interests. Allowing the polarization of the meaning of radicalism will further increase populism and become a source of new radicalism.

Observing some of the meanings of the above theories, we integrate the notion of radicalism as something that wants rapid, fundamental change through violent actions based on a strong belief in a political system or policy of social life because of injustice. Changes driven by these fundamental forces will have fatal consequences as well as threaten the national social order, if they are aimed at vital state objects, state symbols, state officials and state apparatus on the pretext of not getting injustice, not getting prosperity and lack. due to economic factors.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Government's Perception of Radicalism

The authorities within the BNPT in their statement to us acknowledged the latent dangers of radicalism in both individual and group groups. Law number 5 of 2018 concerning Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism is the main foothold for BNPT. Hitherto, it is acknowledged that they are based on the Deradicalization strategy and program inside and outside prisons, but still not fully targeting individuals who have not committed or carried out radical actions. Furthermore, the informant explained to the researcher that for BNPT it would be better for the Ministry of Defense and its staff to be entrusted with being in preventive tasks. The TNI at present has a substantial base in the community with Koramil units and TNI posts. TNI units or TNI posts that become eyes and ears in terms of defense will very completely be cooperated and packaged in the form of cooperation with BNPT to carry out preventive tasks against radicalism or monitor the entry and exit of radical individuals and groups.

We tried investigating the government's perceptions in dealing with radicalism by interviewing parties from the TNI Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS TNI) but there are many limitations to the information that can be shared. Researchers argue that this lack of information has an impact on the lack of description of the specific concept of the TNI, as one of the core components of defense, in dealing with terrorism. General matters conveyed to researchers are insignificant to discuss. However, we explicitly argue that the factor of confidentiality of data and programs in establishing a positive image of radicalism and building a positive stigma against the state has been unsuccessful. We barely view a deep comprehension of radicalism, deradicalization, and terrorism as well as the current ideas expressed by related officials. BAIS TNI has indeed made efforts to mobilize radical individuals, groups, and organizations. However, there are no measurement parameters for individual radicals, radical groups, and organizations. In general, the operation of mobilizing radical individuals, groups, and organizations is carried out solely by the TNI BAIS without collaborating with regional units like the Regional Military Command in Indonesia.

BNPT emphasized that the expected elementary condition is the common perception across government agencies and with the community that radicalism is a common enemy. They emphasized that handling radicalism cannot be concentrated in one institution. He added that the current formulation of radicalism still makes certain individuals or groups accused. Some of these radicalisms are positive and some are negative, some are constructive and some are destructive. BNPT hopes that it can project a vision and antipasi steps whether in the future, radical beliefs, radical actions, and political radicals will remain equally dangerous if they are at the middle and macro levels.

Etymologically, the BNPT conception is centralized on terrorism, but both radicalism and terrorism have several similarities. First, in terms of achieving goals by violence means against civilians, the security apparatus, symbols, and symbols of the state and always contain elements of radicalism. Second, there is no guarantee in a person's transformation process from radicalism to terrorism. not all radicals end up as terrorists. The example of someone we know well, even serious studies, shows that few radicals end up as terrorists. This is because, to be successful, from potential to actual, terrorist acts also depend on factors outside of the terrorist himself or his network, for example the degree to which the security apparatus or the public is alert or not. Third, radicalism and terrorism are related to society. This is the social dimension of both. The difference is in the radical society, but there is no terrorist society. However, terrorist acts very easily grow in a radical society, where acts of terrorism not only get sympathy, but also get support from the public due to feelings of marginalization and feelings of injustice and economic demands and stagnant political struggles.

The strategy

The synthesis of this strategy will contain several things if it is related to research questions, in particular related to the strategy of dealing with radicalism from the perspective of national defense. First, a structural-functional perspective that links structural officials with their authority in the institutional structure, both at the Kemenkopolkam and Kemenhan, in a strategy to deal with radicalism from the perspective of national defense. Second, a substantial perspective of a government strategy in dealing with a radicalism that includes an understanding of radicalism itself in Indonesia from the perspective of national defense. Third, the aspects of goals and strategies that link understanding of national defense in a holistic

manner as well as being a goal in developing a government strategy to deal with radicalism from the perspective of national defense. Manifestations or reflections of concrete conceptualities or appropriate and optimal strategies for defense interests in maintaining the sovereignty and integrity of the state in dealing with radicalism from the perspective of national defense will be stronger and stronger by the Ministry of Defense if there is an understanding of the universal concept of national defense. Indonesia embraces a total defense system which characterized by democracy, universality, and territory. The populist characteristic implies a defense orientation is served by and for the benefit of all the people. The universal characteristic means that all national resources are utilized for defense efforts. Concurrently, the territorial characteristic implies that the title of defense force is spread throughout the territory of the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with the geographical conditions as an archipelagic country.

Developing a strategy requires an integral and holistic concept design so as to result in sustainable handling efforts (20). The researcher's findings that should be followed up in the form of a follow-up strategy are the absence of a number of crucial concepts for dealing with radicalism in the terrorism law. Based on Alex Schmid's categorization (16) we sort out the strategic objectives at the micro to macro level. At the micro level, radical or radical individuals, who have identity, failed social integration, are alienated, marginalized, discriminated against, deprivation of their relative rights, humiliation (directly or through proxies), stigmatization and rejection followed by moral anger and feelings of revenge; not broken down in the concept of Law Number 5 of 2018. Second, the Meso level, which is an environment of strong social beliefs that supports radical actors or radicalism who already have groups who are no longer involved in moving individuals who are already involved with constituencies or line groups hard who have been harmed, experience injustice which in turn becomes radical and leads to the formation of a terrorist organization; not broken down in the concept of Law Number 5 of 2018. Third, the macro level, namely the role of the government and society at home and abroad, which influences and causes public opinion and political opinion of a party to become radical, resulting in a conflict between the relationship between the majority and the minorities who are influential in the socio-economic field, especially towards migrants (foreigners), thus reducing the involvement of local residents which then leads to the mobilization of violent ideology (which is dissatisfied, leads to becoming terrorists), also does not break down in the concept of Law Number 5 of 2018.

If it is followed from this predetermined achievement target, of course since 2015 the Kemenkopolkukam should have had a specific elaborative policy so that it is possible to provide a way out to the relevant ministries or institutions to formulate a strategy in dealing with radicalism, especially from a defense perspective. Although it is not yet perfect and specific only to non-military threats related to terrorism from within the country and also related to international terrorism, this defense sector policy still requires efforts that continue to increase gradually from time to time. Ministry of Defense (Renstra) 2015-2019 has reached 55%. The ambivalent reality is reflected in some informants who illustrate that policies related to radicalism require new ways and are not stuck using strategies that have been running so far. In achieving the performance index in the defense sector in the 2015-2019 Strategic Plan, policies and strategies in building defense forces focus on the government only from military threats, while non-military threats are more coordinative and directed at the threat of terrorism without touching the issues of radicalism at all. In addition, it was also found that the

Kememkopolhukam only gave direction to BNPT in formulating and making strategies related to radicalism, and the Kemenkopolhukam itself did not have a specific strategy related to how the government handled radicalism. In addition, he said that basically there have been many programs related to radicalism, but they are still individual, partial and unstructured. This implicitly reinforces what has been previously stated that there is not yet a policy stipulated by the Kemenkopolhukam through the competent authorities in the defense sector which becomes the guideline for the ranks of the Kemenkopolhukam and related authorities on an ongoing basis.

If we look at the functional structure of the Ministry of Defense, what is Georg Sørensen's focus on national defense (17), we try to provide a solution to the importance of an institution like the Ministry of Defense to explain the threat level of radicalism with this ideological dimension. Radicalism is a potential threat that greatly affects the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and its citizens so that it will interfere with the sovereignty of the country. Georg Sørensen is very clear in his view that it would be better to develop a special section capable of processing data, monitoring the development of radicalism and showing which institutions are in charge and how to place state elements in a defense perspective to overcome them as in the table below:

Table 4.5 Assignment of State Apparatus Against the Threat of Radicalism

ASPECT OF RADICALISM	DESIGNATED INSTITUTION	
	Military	Police
Aim	national symbol, government official, national institution	Citizen
Instrument of operation	Non-traditional	Traditional
Area of operation	National territory, exclusive economic zone, outside Indonesia	Indonesia
Locus of incident caused by Indonesian citizen	Both outside and inside of national border	Inside of national border

Source: Researcher, 2020

Another interesting point is the BNPT and BAIS TNI institutions, where these two government agencies are more specifically dealing with radicalism structurally and functionally. BNPT and BAIS TNI agree on radicalism on several points. First, that the spread of radical ideology in the world has become one of the concerns of the international community. Second, radical ideology encourages a person or group of people to act to achieve goals that are believed and believed. Third, the development of radical ideology is very much influenced by the vulnerability of society, this vulnerability is driven by the social conditions of a society, such as limited knowledge, limited information, miscommunication, development of information technology to the occurrence of social conflicts. The higher the vulnerability of the community, the greater the chance for the growth of radical understanding of terrorism in the community. The practice of spreading ideology and achieving the goals of an ideology, often uses acts of violence without considering the prevailing legal aspects and the values that are believed by society in general.

And fourth, the use of violence to show existence, intimidate and spread fear are common processes to achieve radical goals.

In matters related to radicalism, BNPT has been regulated in Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism into Law. Meanwhile BAIS TNI, based on Presidential Decree No. 66 of 2019 and the regulation of Army's Chief Number 41 of 2019. BNPT in carrying out its duties and functions related to radicalism is in the Deradicalization Directorate in the sub-directorate for guidance in prisons, the media literacy section, the propaganda sub-directorate and the research and evaluation section at the sub-directorate. Community empowerment at the Directorate of Prevention of BNPT. Meanwhile, BAIS TNI is under the Directorate of Radicalism and Terrorism.

In an interview with the BNPT authorities, a number of achievements were explained in the strategic plan of the BNPT for 2015-2019 as a non-ministerial government institution related to radicalism. BNPT has successfully established 32 Terrorism Prevention Coordination Forums (FKPT) in 32 provinces in Indonesia. FKPT, which is an extension of BNPT in the regions, is considered to be quite capable of preventing radical terrorism in the regions. BNPT can strengthen public deterrence and vigilance against terrorism, through de-radicalization activities and counter-propaganda of the radical ideology of terrorism, synergize and cooperate with several related Ministries and Institutions, which are contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation Agreement.

BNPT has increased cooperation and coordination between law enforcement officials to combat the development of the radical understanding of terrorism, currently BNPT has synergized with 36 related Ministries or Institutions. The implementation of several National Deradicalization Strategy Action Plans by involving all components of society and related agencies has not been fully implemented, because currently BNPT is only at the stage of drafting the NAP. From the description above, BNPT's performance achievements following the direction of BNPT policies and strategies for 2015-2019 in general still need to be improved.

The involvement of defense entities, both by the military and government civilian agencies, in responding to radicalism is reactive and kinetic in nature when it has developed into violent extremism. Such a handling strategy must be executed in a very wise manner so as not to worsen the situation by catalyzing radicalism more quickly in the future or causing side effects of human rights violations during the handling process (21). Therefore, the defense entity must work comprehensively by accepting a more persuasive approach, including one that involves non-military resources.

The development of non-military ability to deal with non-military threats that is professional, fast, precise, systematic and measurable is directed by encouraging Ministries / Agencies outside the Ministry of Defense. In addition, the mobilization and use of state defense forces to deal with non-military threats with ideological dimensions such as radicalism still prioritizes related Ministries / Institutions and the Regional Government as the main elements to deal with it. The indicator index illustrated above has an interpretive meaning that is not in line with the description of the strategy description as illustrated.

It is clearly seen as an evaluation material based on Jakum Hanneg 2015-2019 which is contained in Presidential Decree number 97 of 2015 and is followed by a derivative documentary product in the form of Jakgara Hanneg 2015-2019 which is stated in Permenhan No. 19 of 2015 that the strategy related to radicalism is a non-military threat with ideological dimensions in the Ministry of Defense it is placed only on the coordination and encouragement of agencies outside the Ministry of Defense. Although this is undeniably part of national defense, it is still far from the big picture of the government's strategy in dealing with radicalism from the perspective of national defense.

This factual reality is in line with the results of our interviews with informants from the Ministry of Defense who have served in strategic positions related to human resource management for defense. He claimed that until now the Ministry of Defense had not issued strategic guidelines in the form of the Nirmiliter Defense Doctrine, Non-Military Defense Strategy and Non-Military Defense Posture. The Ministry of Defense has just published strategic documents such as: National Defense Strategy, Military Defense Strategy, State Defense Doctrine, Military Defense Doctrine, State Defense Posture, Military Defense Posture and MEF documents. This means that until now the Ministry of Defense has not specifically published a strategy or national defense policy related to radicalism. In addition, the two Ministry of Defense officials' statements stated that the government's radicalism strategy in dealing with radicalism in Indonesia for national defense was not the domain of the Ministry of Defense, but Ministries / Institutions outside the Ministry of Defense. In this context, it is clear how much importance the Ministry of Defense has on this issue to be manifested in a government policy strategy that can be guided by many parties. The rationality of thinking built from this line of analysis provides clarity on the reality of the interests of the Ministry of Defense in the current period, that radicalism as a non-military threat with ideological dimensions in Indonesia has not become the main interest.

On the other hand, the policies of the Ministry of Defense, both in the 2015-2019 Jakgarhannege which are broken down into an annual defense policy until the 2018 Jakhannege, where radicalism as a non-military threat with ideological dimensions in Indonesia is still general in nature. The principle of universality and society basically covers all Indonesian people without recognizing the principle of exceptionalism. From this perspective, it can be understood that the Ministry of Defense does not have a good interest in this issue of radicalism from the perspective of State Defense. However, if we investigate further, we will find ambivalence of factual reality. There is a paradoxical side to the territorial principle in the concept of national defense. As explained in the 2014 State Defense Book and the 2015 National Defense Doctrine, what is meant by territorial characteristics is the title of defense force that is spread throughout the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. This concept unconsciously implements an understanding of the title of defense force, both military and non-military, inseparable from military and non-military threats in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. This means that radicalism is included in this category but is sidelined.

This paradoxical reality is reinforced by the results of interviews with BNPT and BAIS TNI officials who in essence stated that there was no specific government strategy in dealing with radicalism from the perspective of national defense. This limited understanding of radicalism is supported by the absence of accurate and concrete data on individuals, radical groups in a systematic and coordinated manner both in terms of number, professional diversity and

distribution, illustrating the fact that radicalism is outside the BNPT and BAIS TNI environmental spatial planning. This reality becomes contradictory and unconstructive. Things that are of great concern from the perspective of national defense are operational functions that will become the backbone of the implementation of a strategy. The implementation of a strategy from a national defense perspective will allow the defense perspective to become a reference and guideline by related Ministries and Agencies. The opinions of officials at the Kemenkopolkukam and Kemenhan as well as the explanations presented by officials at BNPT and BAIS TNI have enriched new horizons and ideas for the Ministry of Defense. Meanwhile, elements of national defense need to be strengthened in dealing with radicalism from a defense perspective. The strength of the enforcement function regulation to deal with non-military threats with ideological dimensions will receive full support from the operational elements of the Ministries/Institutions related to radicalism such as the Ministry of Religion, the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Youth and Sports and by empowering as many people as possible. One of the main reasons for the failure of the deradicalization program in Indonesia is that it places too much emphasis on awareness and ideological restoration but the minimal allocation of human and material resources which function as a technical aspect. (21). Therefore, economic, social, and other dimensions at the individual and community level will reduce the space for movement and the spread of radical ideas from all aspects.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded so far Indonesian defence entities lacks comprehensive, patterned, and sustainable strategy to address the threat of radicalism, especially attributed to Indonesia's national defence perspective. The factual reality until now explains that Kemenkopolkukam and Kemenhan have been unable to realize a strategy in dealing with radicalism from the perspective of national defense. The argument behind this issue is the officials have not optimally asserted their authority to elaborate the 2015-2019 Ministry of Defense Strategic Plan and the 2015-2019 National Defence Management Strategy (Jakgarhanneg) which have become more specific derivative policies related to the threat of radicalism with ideological dimensions. On the other hand, radicalism and its development, as well as its negative influence on the social life of the Indonesian has been well unconceptualized, considering that the threat depicted in the defense perspective is not the obligation of Ministries/Agencies outside the Ministry of Defense to complete these tasks. Kemenkopolkukam, Kemhan, BNPT, BAIS TNI, and academics are expected to keep the same view that radicalism remain a dangerous threat seen from all aspects of life and social culture of the Indonesian nation that threatens the sovereignty of the country and the unity of the Republic of Indonesia from division. There needs to be a reconceptualization of the concept of national defense that is understood by all groups with cognitive awareness, both in the implementation and management of national defense. As follows, it can later be elaborated in the government's strategy in dealing with radicalism from the perspective of national defense. This reconceptualization can be realized in the form of the concept of a national security system, support for regulations related to radicalism so that it is easier for civilians to interpret and comprehend it psychologically to be widely involved in a more concrete implementation. Plus, there is a need for associated offices within the Ministry of Defense to be able to carry out concept descriptions or grand designs in dealing with non-military threats in every threat dimension in a single command unit under the control of the highest decision maker of the national strategy.

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