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Beyond Power: State, Society, and Global Change after 1750

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Abstract: The article is an essay attempting to sketch an alternative explanation of societal change to the usual one concentrating on power and wars. From a survey of concepts and ideologies and their origins in section 2, the following section is devoted to two pillars of a total change of societies, the gradual emergence of equality of women and men and the global interrelationship of wares and ideas. The liberation of former colonies, treated in section 4, was a consequence of wars but also of new conceptions of social life. The Second World War was not only a trial of strength between states, but also a test of the validity of autocracy and other ideologies (section 5). Which ideas and social formations might make states resistant to autocracy is analysed in sections 6-7, and the importance of education and knowledge production in such resistance in section 8, followed by a conclusion. Bibliographical notes (selection) for each section are placed at the end.

INTRODUCTION

The idea of this essay is to give argued answers to some urgent questions on the development of the world during its recent history with an important break around 1750-1820 and another around 1945. It is an essay, not a concise world history, nor a specialised journal article. A main objection may be that the development of the world requires an insight in the intricacies of the development during a far longer period than three centuries. To such an objection my answer is that I agree that all history when we are looking on the past has threads even further back. Perspectives on history cannot eliminate the origins in the further past. In that respect, Luke Kemp in his book on *Goliath's Curse* has been exemplary, as he takes his perspective back to the beginning of human history.[1] Yet, I think that his impressive book has deficiencies in its approach to societies, which have instigated me to write this essay, deficiencies that are far less obvious in Michael Mann's *The Sources of Social Power*[2], as he defines his object of study as power and is careful to keep the concept society as denoting something else than state.

Long-term history must focus on a leading theme. In "world histories" it is common to focus mainly on politics and wars, adding parts on material and spiritual culture. In his book Kemp looks upon the histories of the world with glasses polarised so that only the struggle for power is clearly shown. That is a misleading perspective. This essay wants to develop why I mean that the common omission of great parts of human life makes all arguments about the struggle for power scarcely enlightening. The change of the macro social transformation of human life is not primarily a question of power. Societal change is a macro term for an overall perspective on micro alterations in human life. Global change is a macro term for changes that affect several or most countries, states or not.

[1] Luke Kemp, *Goliath's Curse. The History and Future of Societal Collapse*. London: Penguin, 2023)
[2] Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1-4. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986-2013, which takes the reader from beginnings to 2011 with different subtitles for each period.

STARTING POINTS

In the background of our modern world many experiences made in the last three millennia before our era (BOE) in regions outside of Europe and North America must be included, when the Middle East (including Egypt), the Indus plains (in present Pakistan), the inland plains around the Chang River (in present China) and the mountainous areas of North Western South America (in present Peru and Colombia), were leading the social development of humankind. These regions were widely dispersed seed-beds of what has transformed the present world.

What has happened in the last 5000 years is often either presented "from above", focussing on rulers from a closed power perspective, or "from below", that is, how people could earn their living in one regime and one social setting after another. In this essay the ambition is to present different outlooks on development – social stratification, professionalism, value systems, and ideological changes – all with their roots in recent and/or old history. The mentioned theme involves bureaucratisation vs. anti-bureaucratic modes of thought from different backgrounds and the interplay between state and society.

I will distinguish between family, kinship and clan, localism, regionalism, nationalism, and globalism and the relation of several of them to state. Of the mentioned concepts nationalism and globalism are the most difficult notions, as they are defined quite differently by different actors (and also by scholars). Another difficulty is that they have become loaded with positive or negative values in a struggle between localism, nationalism, regionalism, and globalism as different forms of life – and bringing different forms of future with them.

Nationalism has been intensely discussed in the past, especially before and after the Second World War, because of its core role in fascism of different shades. The analyses have been much deeper and far-going than the examination of fascism in power and have included different social ties. Both Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson have given rise to wide-spread theorisation among political scientists, anthropologists and others. There will be reason to return to these theories and theoretical discussions.

Another difficulty is that "global" signifies either that "something" is fund all around the world as a factual statement, or that this "something" is desirable/ non-desirable to have. Nowadays, there are efforts to stretch out the use of kinship and nationalism to all human societies, not implying that all people should have part in the same kinship or the same national ideology. The intention is rather to imply that that all peoples tend to rally around kinship and/or nation. This idea is by no means self-evident but rather a fruit of the last 150 years, when the conceptions of states and nations have often collided. The state ideology, which I will call statism, often wants to eliminate different nations among the citizens. Nationalism proper, on the other hand, often wants to split multi-national states. Statism often shows its power by discriminating national minorities and preventing immigration. The loyalty to the state where individuals live has often got the upper hand and has turned statism into a most common ideology in the twenty-first century world. National minorities, with their loyalties to their group and to their national relatives outside, are still important and often growing because of need of labour.

The concepts mentioned – from family cohesion to globalism – plus guilds, trade unions and professional organisations that were formed from the 17th century and onwards, are often treated as ideological foundations of social life by historians and social

anthropologists. Their origin and social function depended and depend on the individuals concerned. In this respect these types of loyalties differ from statism, which is forced upon citizens independent of their priorities. The individualist background through family habits, inherited patterns of behaviour, or voluntary participation in associations are peculiar and one of the reasons that they are taken up here. I want to substantiate that they are intimately connected, even when they lead to opposite conclusions. Family, kin, clan and regionalism sometimes compete with each other ideologically, as they have their roots in different social occupational activities of men and women. Trade unionism on the one hand and professionalism on the other are two poles that that unite wage earners and salaried people from the skills and knowledge required for their sort of work. Between these two ideologically different groups are those who earn their living as self-employed. Traditionally the latter group consisted mostly of craftsmen, farmers and house-wives, but in the present society quite often desk-working professionals of both genders and owners of small industries may belong to the self-employed group. They have to strive to make their invested efforts and capital yield enough profit for their own needs and those of their family, and they are often equipped with a pronounced ideology of a traditional capitalist type.

Another difficulty arises with the necessity to keep apart the dispersion of notions through interaction and media, and the propagation through education of certain abilities that are fundamental for one or the other profession. For instance, to be a physician requires much more than an ability to practise popular medicine, or from an engineer is expected not just the knowledge that may be found with any self-taught mechanic. Precisely the difference between professional knowledge and self-taught procedures is a central point in the argument I wish to drive.

THE ISSUES OF GENDER EQUALITY, GLOBALISM, AND EDUCATION

What is global and what is not? Different authors in different media use the term quite differently. An airline company that flies in and from airports in many countries and several continents may be called global in its traffic. A tea trader may have a main office and workshop in London and trade connections in China, India, Sri Lanka, and sub-Saharan Africa and be rightly called a global actor. Both the airline company and the tea trader fill the main criteria of being global that will be used here, namely that a global relation is at hand when actors (collectives of people) from different countries and parts of the world interact with each other in a peaceful way. Global interrelations may also exist when institutions are copied from one country to another, a transfer which may also consist in the way of doing things in non-formal groups. Cultural patterns that have been deeply rooted in one country sometimes have been transferred to another, often to the benefit of both – for example in medicine. Global (or regional, world-wide) cultural interrelations as well as business transactions between common people (not big companies) are very important but have often been overlooked by historians and many social scientists, as these mostly rely on specific nation sources and pose national questions to their material.

The national and internal change of individual states has also been hinged on two other social changes: women's liberation and the growth of knowledge. Both these changes are not global in their nature, but they have taken place very suitably to make a global change possible and stable. Women's liberation from subordination and their gradual conquest of equality with men in education and occupation is one, though there are several

(mainly poor) states that persist in discriminating women in their laws. However, there is a tendency to overrate women's earlier subordination when it was in fact a side-ordination.[3] Women were not only housekeepers to their husbands. Widows (there were many of them because of wars) often managed their own businesses or were even wage earners. An internal gender struggle that actually has taken place is, however, an intense fight in Europe's bourgeois strata, and later also wage-earning layers from the late nineteenth century. The world wars accentuated the equality problem by the industrial demand for women's labour. Since 1945, the global dimension of the gender question has also become more and more evident. Efforts to roll back society to pre-war conditions met a consistent opposition, and since 1945 the equality between genders has gradually won ground even if, as feminists often stress, much remains undone.

The third pillar of global change is the growth of knowledge and the spread of education. The growth of knowledge is difficult to measure and impossible to present in numbers. Yet, the growth of the numbers of school pupils or of research personnel at universities and in (big) industrial companies is well known and has increased enormously. The new knowledge that has been produced is likewise well known in categories, but the growth itself eludes gauging. There will be reasons to come back to the growth of knowledge in specific fields.

Universities are just one kind of educational institutions that have existed long before 1900 but they have grown enormously during the period after 1945. Elementary and secondary schools will not be the main topic of this essay, as their growth in numbers and ambitions continued a much earlier trend in many parts of the world. Here the focus is on professional education, which in Europe started within universities. It is important to point out that there was higher education since long also in other parts of the world, such as China and India. There the aim was at least partly the same as in Europe, namely to provide the state with competent personnel for medical and administrative purposes and everywhere religion played a great role in higher education. The professionals took a specific form in 19th century Europe, when they organised themselves in order to promote their specific field of knowledge.

European universities, rapidly followed by North American, soon became diversified through technology, economy and business administration plus more recently through what has become called "applied science", and they have also become an important vehicle for gender equality. In this manner, universities have become transformed to meet the new professional demands form society. Thus, their close connection to religions, not least national Christian churches, has thinned out and in some cases disappeared. I will come back to theology (of different religions) and its role for society and priesthood in Section 7.

Vocational education has a prehistory from the nineteenth century and had grown considerably in ambitions over different fields during the first half of the twentieth century. Gradually it became diversified both in the number of fields covered by specific types of education, which was a foundation for claims to professionalism with a range of levels that students might absolve. Engineering made a global success especially after 1945. In Europe and N. America its progression was foremost a 19th and 20th century affair, but their lead

[3] For instance, see Maria Ågren (ed.), *Making a Living, Making a Difference. Gender and Work in Early Modern European Society*. New York: Oxford U.P., 2017.

was rapidly reduced by China, India and other East Asian peoples around the beginning of the third millennium.

The world-wide rise of schooling started already in the 18th century, and the educational impact on the population was different in intensity and in kind from one country to another. The most remarkable transition was made in China under Mao Zedong after the establishment of the People's Republic of China through the Big Leap and the Cultural Revolution. Especially the latter was not only an educational reform but a piece of Mao's class war, and has continued in somewhat different forms. The educational reforms are certainly part of several important causes to China's rapid recovery from a poor country in the outskirts of the world to a superpower, competing with the USA. India too, made a massive effort to increase the educational level of its rural population after the independence from Britain in 1947. Like China, its main investment was in professional education of teachers, doctors and engineers, though the news were transmitted in less dramatic forms than in China.

THE FETTERS GONE – LIBERATION OF FORMER COLONIES

The outcome of the Second World War had an outcome on global politics that has determined much of the development since then: decolonisation, as it is known from a European perspective. The losing powers Germany, Japan and Italy were stripped of their colonies, the dissolution of the British, Belgian, Portuguese, Spanish, and French domination over parts of the non-European world was known in "the Third World" as a wave of liberation from (most of) the European yoke. Among European states only the Soviet Union, which from 1923 had managed to incorporate most of the Asian conquests of the old Russian Empire in the new state after a turbulent period from 1917, could continue to rule and partly expand its area. It had a counterpart in the USA, which continued to handle the formally free minor countries of Middle America and South Asia as parts of its "sphere of interest". The Philippines had been a Spanish colony but, after a revolutionary period from 1896, it became a US colony two years later. After a Japanese occupation during the Second World War, the Philippines formally acquired its independence, but the USA continued to have a great influence on the policy, especially its foreign affairs. This way of creating dependent countries with an ethnically quite different population than a dominating neighbour, has become a frequently used method to establish a sphere of interest not only by the USA but also by the Soviet Union and its continuation in the form of the Russian Federation. Economic and military bonds have been created to make surrounding states more or less obedient followers to the central power. This political strategy was taken over by PR of China as soon as its revolutionary period was over. Formally it is something different from colonialism, but it is in fact a sort of continuation of colonial relations.

None of these new quasi-colonial "super"-powers is entirely successful. USA established themselves as protectors of South Korea and a shield towards North Korea, but the latter seems to be on its breaking point when this is written. Further it tried to become successors to France in colonial Farther India, but after losing the Vietnam war they also lost their grip on the other states there. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant that quite a number of earlier satellite states got independence. However, since Putin came into power, he has followed a policy aiming to re-erect the empire. His efforts have so far (2026

in august) not succeeded and the new states – especially but not solely Ukraine – have shown a great will to have good terms with Russia but not to be directed from Moscow.

In the years of the "decolonisation" after the Second World War, strong ties continued to exist between former colonies and their earlier European masters. These consisted mainly of private companies, and former colonies could only gradually get more influence over such industrial companies, that used raw material in the former colony to export or to invest in their original refinery industry. This persisting bond has greatly belated the development of several formal colonies.

One of the means for the persistent influence of Europe in non-European countries was the labour market with professionalism as a distinctive European organisational form (even if there were some more or less similar groups in other parts of the world). Europeans brought their professions to North America and other parts of the world where they settled. Further is to notice that professions were not immutable, but the European organisations of for instance, engineers, tried to keep their members in former colonies. When these were in trouble or were pursued for their connections with companies in the former governing country, at least some of them fled to the country where they had had their education (even if they fled from their native country to judge from names). Their professional bonds were strong.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES AND AUTOCRACY

Autocracy is, in fact, much older in human society than any of the political ideologies that grew into domination in European political life in the late 18th century and continued to dominate the debating climate there well to the end of the Second World War. From the last decade of the nineteenth century, they were challenged by fascist autocratic ideas, formed around nationalism that had spread like e fever from the middle of the nineteenth century. Mussolini and later Hitler used them to form the fascist state, with its basis on nationalism combined with racism based on primitive amateurish genetics proclaiming the own race as the most developed and virtuous.

This autocratic idea had one trait in common with the autocracy we can observe in history from a couple of thousand years BOE in China, the Mesopotamia, Egypt, India and, with less details, the Maya culture in the North of South America. Quite probably, autocracy was established in other areas and regions at the same time or somewhat later, as is indicated by the huge graves that were erected to commemorate individuals, probably local kings or warlords, all over the planet. As in many cases their deeds are not known, we cannot be sure about their status and power, but similarities with grave customs in, for example, autocratic regimes in China or Egypt, make the inference that the wide-spread burial magnificence had to do with the dead person's position as an autocrat with an established right to decide over the means of existence in a realm of importance. The means of production have been central in social life around the planet, as Karl Marx pointed out (Marx was an interesting sociologist, though less interesting as political theorist). Indisputably, though not pointed out by Marx, the allocation of the means of production in any form of governance had to be backed up by weaponed guards of the system. The autocratic form of government thus has to be based on weaponed forces loyal to the autocrat. If their loyalty is questionable, the collapse of the actual autocrat is imminent. Normally in history this has meant only a shift of person on the chair as autocrat.

Only some of the rulers who governed their countries, regional polities, or empires during the long period from the year 3000 BOE to the year 1700 OE, were autocrats. Relatives to the rulers or rich landowners or successful warlords, who had command over more or less well organised military units, often strived to influence state leadership. To become "councillor" to the formal state head was a great step – the shoguns of Japan made the emperors powerless during two centuries. Another alternative to make the ruler's power limited was to circumscribe his power by laws established by forerunners or by representatives of the upper strata in the society. There are some, but very few, examples of popular parliaments or other decision-making bodies. Athens and other very small states could have meetings with their "citizens" excluding all females and all slaves, but none of them comprised all people who lived in the state. In fact, autocracies and oligarchies dominated the world up to the late 19th century.

Political ideas were less offensive in the eyes of the pre-eighteenth-century autocrat than well-armed units under the leadership of local bosses, landowners, barons or whatever they were called, but this does not mean that other political ideas than those of the autocracy were allowed. As long as they were only put forward in occasional volumes in dusty monasteries (or similar places) they were tolerated by the worldly lords, but not by churches or leaders of whatever religion. Their reason was that political free thinking was a challenge to the moral order, which was to an extent the foundation of both worldly and spiritual power.

BUREAUCRACIES IN STATES AND SOCIETIES

Bureaucracies are often seen as organs of the state. That is true, but it is not the entire truth. From the 19th century bureaucracies in business and industry became frequent, followed by bureaucracies in interest organisations and similar in the private sector, and the 20th century is really the breakthrough period for bureaucracies in the private sector of economy.

Among states, China was a pioneer for bureaucracy. The teachings of Confucius (Kong Fuzi) among many other things gave a multitude of rules about work and responsibility, which became the foundation of the teaching that all Chinese (higher) bureaucrats had to learn in a special school in the Chinese empire, at least from the fourth century OE. The social and state hierarchies had specific functions in Confucius's normative system, which also gave conceptual bases for both a middle course and brotherly feeling. The Chinese bureaucratic system survived and was, thus, built on 2000 years of teaching and experience when we come to the period that this essay deals with.

It is common both in history and elsewhere to regard a state bureaucracy as an extension of the ruler's power, and in many respects the development of the state bureaucracies in the 19th and 20th century state in Europe was similar to what China had experienced during more than a thousand and a half years. European (France in the 17th and 18th centuries, Austria in the 18 and 19th centuries are examples) had several self-conscious bureaucrats who pleaded for an independent status of bureaucrats. Independent then meant that they were to make their own interpretation of all relevant laws. Top bureaucrats (rarely their subordinates) considered this as their main responsibility. This has remained a rule in many democracies in Europe and was so also in the US until Donald Trump declared that he

as president had a final word in all matters. In some other countries this independence was made part of their constitutions.

State bureaucracies in this manner had often become self-governing within the bounds of constitutions and other laws that defined their field of action. This is something that is often overlooked in national histories, political analyses and also by Kemp in his overview. There were several states in the 19th and 20th centuries that were reigned by autocratic rulers of whatever title, who in principle had unlimited right or force to command bureaucracy. In some of these states, the ruler made one or some leading bureaucrats to intimate councillors, giving the regime a legal varnish, at least for a period.

During the period from 1850 to 1950, there were no female autocrats anywhere in the world (as far as I know), possibly excepting the dowager queen Cixi in China between 1861 and1908, and they have been rare later on as well.

PROFESSIONALISM AND EXPERTISE

In Sections 1, 3, and 5, I have tried to show how political ideas have become founded among citizens through the active propagation by those in state power or in leading roles of religious character. These ideas have served the purpose of creating a loyalty to worldly or spiritual leaders but also to make citizens feel that they had a mission to fill as fighters for the ideas of their lords, a collective task that made them specific and gave them a relation to each other that was important and made out a contrast to those with other masters and other ideas. It is important that all worldly masters did not implant the same ideas of good and evil in the minds of their subordinates. Likewise, all spiritual masters did not classify patterns of behaviour as good or bad according to the same criteria, neither in Europe, nor in other countries. Churches and religions had their rule systems, but the interpretation of their messages differed from prince to prince (and from bishop to bishop in Christianity). In the world at large other princes and spiritual leaders often had a similar function for religion and society.

One may have the impression from the Crusades and other “religious wars” that the worldly and the spiritual powers cooperated well up to the end of the 17th century in making the mass of the people adhere ty some ideals, but behind the consensus one can easily see the traces of different meanings and goals. In Europe and North America – and possibly elsewhere – new ideas developed gradually and with them the earlier symbiosis between worldly and spiritual power was more and more often called in question.

So far, what is said in this essay does not contradict the vast number of conclusions drawn in the discussion that followed Ernest Gellner’s and Benedict Anderson’s sociological investigations of loyalty formation through nation/nationalism and through community formation, creating a sense of participation in the local interrelation. Both authors have several good points, but none of them has drawn readers’ attention to the guild system on the one hand, and professionalism and trade unions on the other. The guild system in Europe was created on the traces of different commercial organisations in the Antiquity and the Middle Ages, but flourished as a guild system from the 17th into the 19th centuries. Professionalism had also some forerunners but got the form of stabilising demands on occupations in legal proceedings and medical treatment in the 19th century.

Guilds and professional organisations were voluntary associations and their purpose was to guard the interests of their members, and in order to do this both types of organisations sought the help of the state. Where there was no state to rely on, for example in international trade, they might try to find another type of support. The important thing to notice is, however, that the guild system and the professions relied on another type of loyalties than those that had been the backbone of autocratic powers and law-regulated parliamentary governments.

Gellner and Anderson made an important new invention in their writings on nationalism and communities. Societies are not construed only by laws and contracts, as had been a common notion in much earlier social philosophy, where the difference between state and society often was lost. Ideas and emotions play a role to form close relations between people, and these bonds tend to be strong enough to compete with legal duties, if they come into conflict in people's minds. Family and kinship gave rise to communities that were strong. In the best case, the state's legal rules were compatible with kinship habits and lent stress and regulation to moral habits that many people regarded as original or even innate, especially rules regarding marital habits and the use of violence in internal clashes of opinion.

Sociology turning towards social anthropology of the kind Benedict Andserson is working with gives insights in the structural basis of societies from prehistoric primitive societies to those of modernity today. Gellner's analysis of nationalism may strike many readers as directly relevant for the present, exemplified by US President Trump's MAGA movement and its many copies in other countries where nationalism is flourishing.

Though both Gellner and Anderson use the concept of network for the relation between individual persons that constitute communities or nations, I would say that this concept in underestimated in their analysis of social coherence. The relations created by common guilds or professions were less tinted by politics and ideologies than by relations that may be classified as family, inherited customs or genetic kinship through DNA. Trade unions that grew to much more importance in many countries over the world are interest organisations (as professions but in contrast to guilds), and have mobilised many of those who would earlier have been within the guild system, but have (to my knowledge) not based membership on family or kinship. All these organisations established networks that were of central importance for their members.

Contrary to both professionals and guild members (actual or prospective) trade unions have not sought state support, but in many democratic states trade unions have intimate relations with parties of social democratic political colour. However, there are exceptions: in the Soviet Union, 1923-91, trade unions were organised as state organs, and in fascist Italy, 1922-45, trade unions were swallowed in a state-governed corporative system. In Russia after 1995 the trade union system is again, under Putin, laid under state control, but in Italy from 1945 professionalism again exists without state restrain.

The professions were still virtually non-existent by the end of the 18th century in Europe, but they grew more and more in rapidly in number of practitioners and in the variety of occupations that were "professional" during the 19th and 20th centuries. They did not compete with craftsmen, for their occupations demanded other skills and most often also specialised knowledge that could only be provided by specialised schools, but they took over the organisational forms from guilds. Their fundamental ideology of their work was that

they alone were the experts who could decide about the quality of their work. The last sentence summarises the main point in Eliot Freidson's last book on professionalism. That book bears the sub-title "the third logic", the point of which is that professionalism, through its internal judgement of the quality of work within the scope of the profession, differed from the market and from bureaucracy. In capitalist societies the latter two, with market competition and hierarchy as their logics, were the only different modes of "logic" that Freidson recognised.[4]

EDUCATION AND KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

The 19th century brought education as a fever to different categories of inhabitants in European societies. This does not mean that pupils and students feverishly sought for opportunities to get education more than in other periods, but social leaders in most if not all European countries founded schools and professional educational institutes in a way not heard or thought of before. One of the professional categories that got a professional standing during this century was teachers, starting with secondary school teachers but soon including also teachers in elementary schools. Each category was eager to accentuate its own specific character and the specific knowledge that was required for teachers to practise precisely their type of occupation.

Since long before the 19th century, knowledge was spread and taught in hierarchically ordered schools, but in the 19th century an earlier neglected combination of knowledge and practical use of learning slowly won ground and became the basis for teachers' professions. This revolutionised also European universities, which became regarded as guardians of pure knowledge, in contrast to the universities of the United States. Already in the 19th century several American universities established engineering faculties within the universities. In Europe there were several highly regarded institutes of technology from the 1860s, many of them with a much earlier start with a fundamental curriculum, which only gradually became more demanding and required good preparatory studies. Contrary to what happened in the USA, in Europe technological institutes were kept apart from the much older universities, with a couple of then world leading institutes in Germany and Switzerland as paradigms, and it was regarded as a great success for technology when doctoral degrees from TIs in 1907 were accepted as of the same value as those from universities. France, and Italy in its train, had another system of strict division between TIs and universities, but this was rather soon given up in Italy, which then became one of the first countries with technical faculties in the universities.

The new schools and institutes provided European and American societies with an army of well-educated men – and women, but for a long time only in "lower" professions. The continuing development according to the same goals created a new opportunity for women in the second half of the 20th century and still more in the 21st century. Then China and India (and Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong and others) raced into the competition. with reformed universities like Beijing University, and the Tsinghua Technological University (reformed as a full University in the first half of the 1990s) in China and the 21 Indian Technological Institutes established just after 1947and gradually getting positions among the best of the kind. The persons educated there, women as well as men, were not only

[4] Eliot Freidson. *Historical Professionalism*. Chicago: U. of Chicago P., 2001, Ch 7, esp 154-155

well educated but they were tightly weld together within their professions, which gave them a strength and weight in society. In some respects, professions and their members had a social standing comparable to trade unions and their members, but from other points of view they might become social competitors to the old upper class of businessmen, industrialists and aristocrats.

This is a radical change, which is often hidden in historical narratives. The transformation of society and the creation of quite new bonds between individuals and groups may serve as one of the most important explanatory factors for the versatility of not only European societies in the 20th century but the global social change, continuing to the present.

CONCLUSION

The global change that is the topic of this essay was hailed with sympathy and welcomed as a new era some decades ago (around 1960-1990). The positive emotion has recently been succeeded by its adverse. However, the feelings towards the phenomenon do not change it. The global change is here to stay. It may contain politics of different sorts, for globalism in itself (as I have taken it here) is not a political standpoint but an effect of social and material changes that have made people around the world dependent on each other. China has been the motor during the last two decades, creating envy through its success but also a wish to follow in its train.

What this essay wants to show through an all too short argument is that the global change is not just a fruit of colonialism or of decolonisation, nor of airborne inventions like good and dependable aeroplanes, nor of powerful rulers' wish to govern the whole world and enforcing all people to accept their will. Humankind has shown its capacity to withstand influencers earlier in emotions and reactions.

Historical analysts have all too often looked with only a half eye on all the things that they describe. What this essay wants to present is not a thorough system of all impulses that have led humankind through changes during the last centuries. Rather it is an inventory of a number of jigsaw pieces that have to have their place in the puzzle. There may be others spilled on the mat, which I have not observed, but the pieces I found are: women's role, the role of knowledge, the role of disseminating knowledge through education, the role of loyalty in general, the role of loyalty to specific collective organs like trade unions, professional organisations, and groups like nations (proper), klans, and families. I do not want to say that this is all but all of these pieces belong to the puzzle of the global change. They have played their role in monitoring the total puzzle.

I am aware that the metaphor of puzzle makes one to think two-dimensionally, while several dimensions are necessary to describe a phenomenon like the global change, that has really made our world more complex. But I insist that two great turning points came around 1800 and by 1945, to be more precise than in the beginning.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Under this heading the reader will find a small selection of relevant works, systematised primarily under the section numbers. Books that might appear in several sections have been brought in under the section where its content is most relevant. No references are given for the Conclusion.

Section 1 is an introduction trying to make clear the aims and limits of the essay, and a comparison is made with Luke Kemp, *Goliath's Curse. The History and Future of Societal Collapse*, London: Penguin/ Viking, 2025 and with Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 1-4. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986-2013.

Section 2: Discussions of definitions of concepts can be found in very many books and articles. I will not say that my text is based on one specific book or article. I have tried to follow discussions of democracy, state, power, coercion and similar among both philosophers, political scientists, and social scientists in general. Many meanings and definitions exist relating to the core concepts I mention. Generally for the section, I refer readers to Kemp and Mann mentioned under section1. An anthology called *State Theory and State History*, London etc.: Sage 1992, ed. by Rolf Torstendahl, presents different understandings of some crucial concepts. On nationalism I have written more fully in Rolf Torstendahl, "The overrated Role of Nationalism", in *Journal of Politics and Law*, Vol. 19, No. 3; 2026 ISSN 1913-9047, 32-37; doi:10.5539/jpl.v19n3p32.

Section 3: For the history of gender equality as a concept and reality, see for instance, Maria Ågren (ed), *Making a Living, Making a Difference*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2017; Judith Bennett & Amy Froide, *Singlewomen in the European Past, 1250-1800*. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1999; Leonore Davidoff & Catherine Hall, *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850*. Revised ed. London: Routledge 2002; Rolf Torstendahl (ed.), *State Policy and Gender System in the Two German States and Sweden, 1945-1989*. Uppsala: Opuscula Historica Upsaliensia 22, 1999. - A lesson on globalism is found in the anthology with contributions of scholars from Mainland China, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Sweden. The book is called *What is China? Observations and Perspectives*, (Stockholm, Royal Academy of Learning, History and Antiquities, 2023) and is edited by Torbjörn Lodén. – Education will be reverted to under section 7.

Section 4: For the liberation of colonies, I depend mainly upon modern world histories and some works on that phase of history in India, China and South-East Asia. I have discussed these matters repeatedly with Professor Gunnel Cederlöf and learnt a lot from her works on British empire-building, and the tensions brought into the Indian society by railway building, which is often seen as a colonial blessing. See her book *Founding an Empire on India's North-Eastern Frontiers, 1790-1840: Climate, Commerce, Polity*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. P., 2014, and the edited volume *Subjects, Citizens and Law: Colonial and Independent India*, Routledge, Abingdon UK & New York, NY, 2017.

Section 5: There is a huge discussion about what autocracy is, all since Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (2nd ed, 1958, Meridian Books) was first published. Autocracy is a more modern term with a slightly different touch, as the single ruler is the focus of the term instead of the all-embracing power. It has become usual in works on political science to find traditional ideologies (liberalism, conservatism, socialism) less popular and less attractive for citizens than autocratic ideas.

Section 6: On the development of bureaucracy in general, see my article "Bureaucratization and Bureaucracy, History of", in *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, London etc., 2001 (Elsevier), pp. 1410-1415, and bibliographical notes there. On West European bureaucratisation, see Rolf Torstendahl, *Bureaucratisation in Northwestern Europe, 1880-1985*. London & New York: Routledge, 1991.

Section 7: Eliot Freidson has written many books relevant for this section. Especially I have used his *Professional Powers. A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago P., 1986, and his *Professionalism: The Third Logic*. Cambridge UK: Polity P.,2001/2004.

An earlier source of inspiration has been Magali Sarfatti Larson's *The Rise of Professionalism: Monopolies of Competence and Sheltered Markets*. (U. of Calif. P., 1977). New ed. New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers, 2013. Myself, I have written about professionalism in two monographies, one on historians (*The Rise and Propagation of Historical Professionalism*. New York & London: Routledge, 2015) and one on engineers in 10 countries of Western Europe (*Engineers in Western Europe: Ascent and Decline. A Profession Torn Between Technology and Economy, 1850-1990*. Cham, CH: Springer, 2021) and I have edited, together with Michael Burrage, two volumes called *The Formation of Professions: Knowledge, State and Strategy* and *Professions in Theory and History: Rethinking the Study of the Professions*, both published by Sage (London etc.), 1990. I do not share, more than partially, the standpoints of Andrew Abbott in his often cited *The System of Professions: An Essay on the division of Expert Labor*. Chicago & London: Univ. of Chicago P., 1988.

Section 8: Pierre Bourdieu, *La noblesse d'état: Grandes Écoles et ésprit de corps*. Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1989, is a main background for my thinking regarding higher education, as is also *Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert, vol1, Bildungssystem und Professionalisierung in internationalen Vergleichen*, ed. by W. Conze and J. Kocka. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1985. A more global perspective is given in William C. Kirby, *Empires of Ideas. Creating the Modern University from Germany to America to China*, Cambridge MA & London UK, 2022. For China, see also Joel Andreas, *Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. P., 2009.