



Constitutional Algorithms: Navigating the Tension Between Constitutional Rights and the Common Good

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Abstract: The traditional architecture of constitutional adjudication has been predominantly occupied with restraining governmental power. This singular focus, however, has cultivated a jurisprudential blind spot: the capacity of individuals and private actors to exercise their constitutional rights in ways that systematically negate the rights of others and subvert the public good. This paper contends that the constitutional order faces an internal threat when rights are wielded as instruments of domination, exclusion, and civic paralysis. To address this threat, we introduce the concept of constitutional algorithms structured, principled judicial heuristics that compel courts to evaluate the externalities of rights-exercise. These algorithms mandate a systematic inquiry into whether a particular assertion of liberty produces a net benefit to the constitutional order or whether it inflicts disproportionate harm on the rights of co-citizens and the constitutional stability and institutional integrity. Through a systematic operational framework comprising harm identification, reciprocal justification, and systemic impact assessment, we demonstrate how courts can act as meta-guardians of the constitutional order. The paper concludes that algorithmic adjudication is essential to ensure that the exercise of one right does not negate the rights of others or subvert the public good, thereby redefining constitutional justice for Public-oriented societies.

Keywords: Constitutional Algorithms, Rights-Negation, Public Good, Reciprocal Justification, Systemic Justice, Constitutional Order

INTRODUCTION

The Unseen Crisis of the Constitutional Order

Constitutions are conventionally understood as bulwarks against tyranny. Their primary structural purpose, since the dawn of modern constitutionalism, has been to delimit the reach of the state and to protect spheres of individual autonomy. This understanding has generated a rich body of jurisprudence, strict scrutiny, proportionality, and judicial review, designed principally to police the boundaries of state power—all geared to answer one overriding question: *Has the state gone too far?* (Gardbaum, 2006; *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 1976; *Slaughter-House Cases*, 1872).

Yet, in the complex, hyper-connected, and deeply pluralistic societies of the twenty-first century, a different and more insidious question has emerged: *Have we, as rights-holders, gone too far?* The constitutional order is not merely a collection of atomistic liberties; it is an intricate ecosystem where rights interrelate, intersect, and frequently collide (Gardbaum, 2003, 2006). When freedom of expression is deployed to disseminate malicious disinformation that corrodes public integrity, when religious liberty is invoked to justify discriminatory exclusion, when property rights are utilized to frustrate

environmental sustainability, or when procedural due process is weaponized to perpetually delay justice, the constitutional order suffers a profound injury (Lucherini, 2026). The very instruments designed to secure freedom become solvents of the common good.

The Central Problematic: Rights-Negation and Subversion of the Public Good

This paper examines an important but neglected dimension of constitutional theory: the possibility that constitutional freedoms, when exercised excessively or strategically, may undermine the rights of others and the public good. Where traditional constitutional theory focuses principally on governmental overreach, our framework recognizes a dual-sided threat to the constitutional order. The first is state overreach, a well-established concern in constitutional jurisprudence. The second, and our primary concern, is the internal threat arising from rights-holders themselves.

This threat manifests in three interconnected dimensions: Direct Rights-Negation, where the exercise of one person's constitutional rights directly undermines another's entitlement to dignity, equality, or physical security, giving rise to horizontal forms of coercion that mirror those exercised by the state; Systemic Subversion, where the repeated exercise of individual rights depletes collective resources such as civic trust, public reason, and judicial efficiency upon which the constitutional order depends; and Institutional Paralysis, where procedural rights are exploited in ways that obstruct the functioning of judicial and democratic institutions, thereby delaying or denying justice to others and ultimately undermining the public good of timely, effective, and legitimate governance.

The Proposed Solution: Constitutional Algorithms

To confront this problematic, we propose a novel judicial framework: constitutional algorithms. By “algorithm,” we do not refer to computational code or artificial intelligence. Rather, we invoke the term in its classical sense as a step-by-step, transparent, and replicable procedure for solving a complex problem (Allard, 1991). A constitutional algorithm is a systematic model of constitutional adjudication that requires courts to systematically evaluate the multifaceted impacts of a rights claim, ensuring that the exercise of one right does not negate the rights of others or subvert the public good.

This algorithmic framework operates through a three-step protocol.

First, Harm Identification requires determining whether the exercise of a constitutional right produces a cognizable harm to the constitutional rights of others or undermines the structural integrity of the public good.

Second, Reciprocal Justification entails a two-sided justificatory inquiry: the rights-holder must account for the social costs of exercising the right to its fullest extent, while the state or affected parties must provide justification for any proposed limitation on that right.

Third, Constitutional Impact Assessment evaluates the broader consequences of competing outcomes to determine which best preserves the integrity of the constitutional order, thereby preventing the negation of rights while safeguarding the public good (Choudhry et al., 2024).

Contribution and Structure

This paper makes three main contributions. First, it develops a theoretical basis for reorienting constitutional adjudication toward preventing the denial of one person's rights through the exercise of another's rights. Second, it translates this approach into a practical judicial framework. Third, it applies the framework to real constitutional conflicts to assess its usefulness.

The paper proceeds as follows. Part II examines problems within the contemporary constitutional order, focusing on how the exercise of rights can undermine the rights of others and the public good. Part III develops the normative foundations of constitutional algorithms, based on reciprocal justice, systemic integrity, and the preservation of constitutional capital. Part IV sets out the proposed algorithm and its steps. Part V concludes by reimagining the constitutional order as a self-sustaining ecosystem, with courts serving as meta-guardians tasked with ensuring that freedom does not become the instrument of injustice.

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

Beyond the Vertical Model of Rights

The classical liberal conception of constitutional rights is fundamentally vertical: the individual stands against the state. This verticality is enshrined in the text of most bills of rights, which typically begin with formulations such as “Congress shall make no law” or “The State shall not.” This textual orientation has ingrained in constitutional consciousness the assumption that rights are, by definition, limitations on governmental power (Gardbaum, 2006).

This assumption, however, is profoundly incomplete. In reality, constitutional rights operate in a dense social matrix. Every exercise of a right occurs in a context populated by other rights-holders, each with their own claims to dignity, liberty, and fairness. The vertical paradigm conceals a critical horizontal dimension of constitutional rights: the capacity of private actors to wield their constitutional entitlements as weapons against one another. When this happens, the constitutional order is turned against itself. The state is not the oppressor; the rights-holder is. And the victim is not the state, but fellow citizens and the integrity of the constitutional system itself (Gardbaum, 2003, 2006).

Mechanisms of Rights-Negation

We identify four primary mechanisms through which the exercise of constitutional rights negates the rights of others and subverts the public good (Gardbaum, 2006).

Exclusionary Domination

This mechanism occurs when a rights-holder employs their constitutional freedom to exclude others from participation in the social, economic, or political life of the community. The paradigmatic example is the invocation of religious liberty to deny the rights of Muslims in the context of halal regulation. In January 2025, Shake and Bake Cafe Sdn Bhd and its director were charged with supplying sandwiches bearing an unauthorized Malaysian halal

logo, allegedly creating the impression that the products were suitable for Muslims (*The Star*, 2025). In May 2026, a separate food company was fined RM21,000 after pleading guilty to falsely using a halal logo on peanut products (Sufian Suri, 2026).

Here, the exercise of religious freedom does not merely express a private conviction; it actively constructs a regime of second-class citizenship. The right to religious exercise morphs into a right to discriminate, negating the affected individuals' constitutional rights to dignity, impartiality, and non-discrimination. The public good of an inclusive society of equal civic standing is directly subverted.

Epistemic Subversion

This mechanism exploits freedom of expression to erode the epistemic integrity of public discourse. The constitutional order depends upon a public sphere in which citizens can engage in reasoned deliberation, scrutinize those who govern them, and make informed choices. When freedom of expression is exercised to disseminate verifiably false information, algorithmic disinformation, or hate speech, it does not enrich the marketplace of ideas; it poisons it. Rational society and integrity are compromised, public trust in institutions decays, and the very possibility of collective self-governance is threatened. The exercise of one right-speech, negates the rights of all citizens to a legitimate democratic process and subverts the public good of rational public discourse (Government of Canada, n.d.; Lucchi, 2026).

The exercise of one right, such as freedom of speech, can sometimes undermine the rights of others and the democratic process itself. Disinformation and deliberate manipulation can prevent citizens from accessing reliable information, making informed choices, and participating meaningfully in elections. The harm therefore goes beyond the speaker and affects society as a whole by weakening public trust and rational public debate. In such circumstances, the unrestricted exercise of speech may undermine the very democratic freedoms that constitutional rights are meant to protect. The role of the court is therefore to distinguish legitimate speech from forms of expression that cause serious harm to the rights of others and to the public good (*Asenov v. Bulgaria*, 2026; Government of Canada, n.d.).

For example, the deliberate spread of false information during an election may be protected as political expression in some circumstances, but when such information is designed to mislead voters, manipulate electoral choices, or undermine trust in the electoral process, the exercise of freedom of speech can interfere with the rights of other citizens to participate in a fair and informed democratic process. The issue, therefore, is not simply whether the speaker has a right to speak, but whether the exercise of that right causes harm to the constitutional rights of others and to the integrity of effective governance.

Procedural Sabotage

This mechanism exploits the procedural rights guaranteed by the constitutional order—due process, the right to a fair trial, and the right to appeal—to obstruct the administration of justice. Well-resourced litigants, particularly in civil disputes, frequently deploy a barrage

of interlocutory motions, evidentiary challenges, and procedural objections not to vindicate their own rights, but to exhaust the resources of opposing parties and to delay the resolution of disputes indefinitely (Dixon & Yap, 2025; *Metalloy Supplies Ltd. v. M.A. (U.K.) Ltd.*, 1996).

This constitutes a profound subversion of the public good of access to justice. The right to a fair trial for one party, when stretched to infinity, becomes a denial of the right to a timely remedy for the other. The constitutional order's guarantee that justice delayed may amount to justice denied is hollowed out.

For example, a party who repeatedly appeals decisions, seeks reconsideration, or challenges settled procedural matters may rely on the right to appeal to ensure procedural fairness. However, when such mechanisms are used primarily to prolong proceedings rather than correct genuine legal errors, they can prevent the opposing party from obtaining a final and effective remedy (*Young v. Wyllie (No. 2)*, 2010). The right to challenge a decision thus risks becoming a means of defeating the very access to justice that the legal system seeks to protect.

Common-Pool Depletion

This mechanism operates at a systemic and aggregate level. When rights-holders maximize their individual liberties without considering their effects on others and on society as a whole, they may gradually deplete the common resources on which the constitutional order depends. These resources include civic trust, which enables citizens and institutions to coexist peacefully; judicial credibility, which depends on public confidence that courts are fair, efficient, and accessible; and public reason, which reflects a shared commitment to resolving disputes through rational argument rather than force.

This creates a “constitutional commons problem,” where the legitimate exercise of individual rights can, when pursued without regard to their broader consequences, produce harm to the constitutional order as a whole. As civic trust, institutional capacity, and public confidence decline, the ability of the constitutional system to protect rights is gradually weakened. Rights may remain formally guaranteed, but their practical effectiveness diminishes when the conditions necessary for their meaningful exercise are eroded.

A practical illustration can be found in *CIMB Bank Berhad v. Tan Hoo Eng* (2026), where the High Court dealt with a litigant who had initiated numerous proceedings, alongside multiple appeals and interlocutory applications, in an apparent attempt to re-litigate matters that had already been decided. The court treated the persistent use of legal proceedings as vexatious and an abuse of the court process. The case demonstrates the constitutional commons problem: while access to justice and the right to challenge judicial decisions are essential safeguards, their excessive and repetitive use can consume scarce judicial resources, burden opposing parties, and delay the resolution of other cases (*CIMB Bank Berhad v. Tan Hoo Eng*, 2026).

Protecting the right of one litigant without regard to these systemic consequences may therefore diminish the ability of other citizens to obtain timely and effective justice. The constitutional order is thereby weakened as a collective system. Rights persist in name, but their substantive value is eroded because the social conditions necessary for their meaningful exercise have been destroyed.

The Inadequacy of Existing Doctrinal Responses

The result is a constitutional order that is poorly equipped to prevent the negation of rights by private actors and the subversion of the public good. A more systematic, integrated, and principled framework is urgently required, one capable of evaluating not only state interference with rights, but also the consequences of their exercise by private actors. Constitutional algorithms offer one possible means of developing such a framework.

The significance of constitutional algorithms is therefore not computational but constitutional. They offer a framework for moving beyond a conception of rights that asks only whether the state has interfered with an individual liberty, toward one that also considers how the exercise of that liberty affects other rights and the constitutional order (Pollicino & De Gregorio, 2022). In doing so, they could make visible forms of private power and social harm that conventional state-action doctrines struggle to capture. Their purpose is not to automate constitutional judgment, but to structure it, identify relevant interests, expose normative trade-offs, and make the reasons for constitutional intervention more transparent and accountable.

NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS: PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

The Constitutional Order as an Ecosystem

To understand why the negation of rights and the subversion of the public good may constitute constitutional harms, it is necessary to reconsider the nature of the constitutional order itself. The constitutional order is not simply an aggregation of discrete individual entitlements. It is an interconnected normative structure in which rights, institutions, procedures, and citizens mutually condition one another. The effective enjoyment of any particular right therefore depends, at least in part, upon the continued protection of the rights and institutional conditions of others.

From this perspective, constitutional adjudication cannot be concerned solely with preventing unjustified state interference. It must also account for situations in which the exercise of one right materially undermines the conditions necessary for the exercise of other rights (Lucherini, 2026). The constitutional task is therefore to preserve the conditions necessary for rights to coexist fairly and effectively. Such judicial intervention is not a rejection of liberty, but an effort to ensure that liberty can be enjoyed without undermining the rights of others.

The Principle of Reciprocal Justification provides the basis for this approach. It holds that when exercising a constitutional right seriously affects the rights of others or the constitutional order, the rights-holder may be required to justify that exercise (Gardbaum, 2003). The principle is reciprocal because, just as the state must justify restrictions on rights, individuals may also have to justify exercises of rights that cause serious constitutional harm to others.

Individuals do not need the state's permission to exercise their constitutional rights. The duty to justify arises only when the exercise of a right seriously harms the rights of others or the public good. In such circumstances, the rights-holder must provide convincing evidence to justify continued protection of the exercise.

Preserving Constitutional Capital

The concept of constitutional capital captures the broader conditions on which the effective enjoyment of constitutional rights depends. It includes institutional integrity, civic trust, social fairness, and the possibility of meaningful public discourse (Kavanagh, 2023).

These conditions are built over time but can also be weakened. They are strengthened by practices that promote participation, accountability, and fairness, and undermined when the exercise of rights excludes others, erodes public trust, or weakens constitutional processes.

The framework brings the wider effects of rights-exercise into constitutional analysis. It considers not only what a right protects, but also how its exercise affects other rights and the constitutional order. This moves beyond the traditional state-individual model toward a more relational understanding of constitutional rights. Where those effects are serious and demonstrable, they may justify constitutional limits (Forst, 2026).

The algorithmic framework we propose is, at its core, a mechanism for preserving and enhancing constitutional capital. When a court applies the algorithm, it is engaging in a form of constitutional accounting, calculating whether a particular exercise of a right produces a net gain or a net loss to the overall capital of the order. If the exercise produces a net loss, by negating others' rights or subverting the public good, the court is justified in imposing constraints. This is not an act of judicial activism; it is an act of constitutional stewardship.

The Constitutional Algorithm: A Three-Stage Framework

We now turn to the operational framework of our proposal: a structured and transparent three-step inquiry for cases in which the exercise of a constitutional right is alleged to harm the rights of others or the public good. The framework asks, first, whether a significant constitutional harm has occurred; second, whether the exercise of the right and any proposed restriction can be justified; and third, which outcome best protects the broader constitutional order. It is not intended to replace existing rights doctrine, but to complement it by bringing the effects of rights-exercise on other rights and constitutional interests more fully into judicial analysis (Alexy, 2002; Barak, 2012; Stone Sweet & Mathews, 2019).

Harm Identification

The first step is to determine whether the exercise of a right causes a serious and demonstrable constitutional harm. This harm may be direct, where the exercise interferes with the rights of others, such as dignity, physical integrity, fairness, access to justice, or political participation. It may also be systemic, where the exercise undermines broader conditions necessary for the constitutional order, such as electoral integrity, democratic deliberation, public trust in institutions, social peace, and mutual tolerance. The harm must be more than speculative or minor and must be supported by sufficient evidence.

The court should also consider whether the harm can be reversed or remedied. Some harms can be corrected after they occur, while others may be permanent or difficult to repair. For example, disinformation that affects an election may cause harm that cannot

easily be undone. Where the potential harm is serious and irreversible, greater scrutiny is justified. The absence of an existing harm does not necessarily end the inquiry. Where credible evidence indicates a substantial likelihood of serious or irreversible constitutional harm, the court may consider the risk even before the harm fully materializes. A rigid requirement of a credible and substantial prospect of serious harm may unduly restrict constitutional protection, since intervention may be warranted at an earlier stage where there are reasonable grounds to anticipate serious or irreversible consequences.

Reciprocal Justification

Where a serious constitutional harm has been established, the court proceeds to the second step: reciprocal justification. The question at this stage is whether the exercise of the right can be justified in light of its effects on others. The rights-holder must show that the exercise serves a legitimate interest protected by the right, is necessary to pursue that interest, and does not impose harms disproportionate to the benefits it provides. The focus is therefore not on whether the individual possesses the right, but on whether the right has been exercised in a constitutionally defensible manner given its effects on other rights and constitutional interests.

Where the state seeks to restrict the right, it must likewise provide a constitutional justification for doing so. The restriction must pursue a legitimate objective, be suitably connected to that objective, be necessary, and strike a proportionate balance between the public interest and the burden imposed on the right (Alexy, 2002; Barak, 2012; Möller, 2012).

This creates a double-sided proportionality inquiry. Conventional proportionality asks whether state interference with a right is justified. Reciprocal justification adds a complementary question: whether the particular exercise of the right can itself be justified when it causes serious harm to others or to the constitutional order. The two inquiries are not identical, since the state and the rights-holder occupy different constitutional positions. Their purpose is instead to ensure that both the exercise of private liberty and the exercise of public power remain subject to constitutional principles.

Systemic Impact Assessment

The final step is to consider the broader effects of the possible outcomes on the constitutional order. After identifying the harm and assessing the competing justifications, the court must determine which outcome best protects the conditions that allow everyone to enjoy their constitutional rights. Greater weight should generally be given to serious and irreversible harms, such as threats to life, physical integrity, dignity, fairness, or access to justice, than to less serious interests such as convenience or economic preference (Dixon & Yap, 2025).

The court should also consider the effect of its decision on institutional integrity and legal certainty. A decision may resolve an individual dispute but create wider harm if it weakens public trust in courts or other constitutional institutions (French, 2023). The court should therefore explain clearly how it identified the harm, assessed the competing claims, and reached its conclusion. Clear and consistent reasoning can also provide guidance for future cases and reduce the risk of arbitrary decision-making.

The central question is therefore: which outcome better protects the conditions that allow constitutional rights to coexist? In terms of constitutional capital, the preferred outcome is the one that best protects fundamental rights and the rights of others, maintains institutional integrity, and supports public trust and fair participation. This does not require courts to assign numerical values to constitutional rights. Instead, constitutional capital provides a way to assess whether a particular outcome strengthens or weakens the constitutional order (Kavanagh, 2023; Möller, 2012).

Taken together, the three steps create a framework for algorithmic constitutionalism. The court first identifies the harm, then assesses the competing justifications, and finally considers the broader effects of the possible outcomes. The aim is not to replace judicial judgment with mechanical calculation, but to make that judgment more structured, transparent, and consistent. By requiring courts to identify the harm, explain their reasons, and consider the wider consequences of their decisions, the framework seeks to make constitutional adjudication more systematic and accountable.

Scope of Judicial Scrutiny

Granting courts the authority to scrutinize and, where necessary, limit the exercise of constitutional rights when such exercise seriously negates the rights of others or undermines the public good is a necessary extension of constitutional rights protection. This concern can be addressed by distinguishing ordinary exercises of rights from those that cause serious constitutional harm. The framework does not permit intervention solely because conduct is unpopular, controversial, or offensive. Rather, heightened scrutiny is appropriate only where there is credible evidence of serious harm to the rights of others or to the constitutional order.

The underlying premise is that individual liberty is relational: the protection of one person's rights cannot extend to conduct that systematically destroys the equal freedom of others. Protecting individual liberty, therefore, cannot justify the systematic denial of the liberty of others. Constitutional protection must accordingly extend not only to the exercise of rights, but also to the conditions necessary for their equal and reciprocal enjoyment. Put differently, the protection of individual liberty cannot extend to conduct that systematically deprives others of their corresponding freedoms. Constitutional protection must therefore also safeguard the conditions that enable rights to be exercised on an equal and reciprocal basis (Frantziou, 2025).

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This paper has argued that constitutional theory must account for a form of harm that receives insufficient attention in traditional rights analysis: the possibility that individuals and private actors may exercise constitutional rights in ways that seriously undermine the rights of others or the conditions of the public good. In response, the paper has proposed the concept of constitutional algorithms, structured and transparent judicial frameworks for assessing the broader consequences of rights-exercise.

The proposed three-step framework; Harm Identification, Reciprocal Justification, and Systemic Impact Assessment, provides a method for addressing such conflicts in a

systematic manner (Frantziou, 2025). It requires courts to identify significant constitutional harm, assess the justification for both the exercise of the right and any proposed restriction, and consider the broader consequences of the available outcomes. It also suggests that this approach can provide a useful framework for addressing difficult conflicts involving disinformation, unfairness, and procedural abuse (Stone Sweet & Mathews, 2019).

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

The framework has broader implications for how constitutional rights are understood. Rather than treating rights solely as protections against state interference, it views them as relational entitlements whose exercise may affect the rights of others and the conditions of the constitutional order. This does not mean that rights lose their protective force. Rather, it recognizes that the protection of individual liberty must be considered alongside the equal liberty of others and the institutional conditions that sustain constitutional government.

This approach also places greater emphasis on the responsibilities that accompany the exercise of constitutional rights. Individuals and private actors may be required to consider the effects of their conduct where it causes serious and demonstrable harm to others or to the constitutional order. The resulting model moves constitutional culture away from an exclusive focus on rights assertion and toward mutual accountability and reciprocal justification.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Although this paper develops a theoretical and operational framework for constitutional algorithms, several limitations provide important directions for future research. First, the proposed weighting mechanisms require further normative refinement, particularly where constitutional values such as dignity, liberty, fairness, and security are not readily commensurable. Future scholarship should examine whether such values can be systematically ranked, balanced, or contextualized without reducing constitutional reasoning to a purely technocratic exercise (Marzal, 2017).

Second, the framework requires further adaptation to emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, automated decision-making, and algorithmic governance, where questions of accountability, transparency, and constitutional responsibility may arise in new forms (Busuioc, 2021; Lucchi, 2026).

Third, the framework remains primarily theoretical and therefore requires empirical validation. Comparative studies of judicial decisions could assess whether the use of constitutional algorithms enhances consistency, predictability, justification, and public legitimacy while reducing the risk of rights-negation and departures from the public good (Lucchi, 2026).

Fourth, future research should investigate the relationship between judicial and legislative applications of constitutional algorithms. Although courts may employ such frameworks in constitutional review, legislatures play an equally important role in articulating and contesting conceptions of the public good through democratic deliberation (Waldron, 2006).

Finally, interdisciplinary research involving constitutional law, political theory, computer science, and empirical legal studies could further evaluate the feasibility, limitations, and institutional consequences of translating constitutional principles into structured decision-making frameworks (Appleby & Carter, 2021; Naurin et al., 2026).

CONCLUSION AND A FINAL REFLECTION ON CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE

The constitutional order is the most sophisticated human invention for reconciling freedom and order, diversity and unity, individual aspiration and collective well-being. Yet, like all human creations, it is fragile. Its stability depends not only on restraining state power, but also on preventing the exercise of rights from undermining the rights of others.

Constitutional algorithms offer one possible response to this challenge. They do not seek to weaken constitutional rights, but to place their exercise within the broader structure of the constitutional order (Simoncini & Longo, 2021). A right is exercised not in isolation, but within a community in which its exercise may affect the rights of others and the institutions that sustain constitutional government. Constitutional justice therefore requires more than the protection of individual claims; it also requires preserving the conditions under which rights can coexist and be enjoyed equally. Constitutional algorithms seek to provide a structured method for achieving that balance.

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